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ARTICLES
THE EMERGENT LOGIC OF HEALTH
LAW
M. GREGG BLOCHE∗

ABSTRACT
The American health care system is on a glide path toward ruin.
Health spending has become the fiscal equivalent of global warming, and
the number of uninsured Americans is approaching fifty million. Can law
help to divert our country from this path? There are reasons for deep
skepticism. Law governs the provision and financing of medical care in
fragmented and incoherent fashion. Commentators from diverse
perspectives bemoan this chaos, casting it as an obstacle to change. I
contend in this Article that pessimism about health law’s prospects is
unjustified, but that a new understanding of health law’s disarray is
urgently needed to guide reform. My core proposition is that the law of
health care provision is best understood as an emergent system. Its
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contradictions and dysfunctions cannot be repaired by some master design.
No one actor has a grand overview—or the power to impose a unifying
vision. Countless market players, public planners, and legal and regulatory
decisionmakers interact in oft-chaotic ways, clashing with, reinforcing, and
adjusting to each other. Out of these interactions, a larger scheme
emerges—one that incorporates the health sphere’s competing interests
and values. Change in this system, for worse and for better, arises from the
interplay between its myriad actors.
By quitting the quest for a single, master design, we can better focus
our efforts on possibilities for legal and policy change. We can and should
continuously survey the landscape of stakeholders and expectations with an
eye toward potential launching points for evolutionary processes—
processes that leverage current institutions and incentives. What we cannot
do is plan or predict these evolutionary pathways in precise detail; the
complexity of interactions among market and government actors precludes
fine-grained foresight of this sort. But we can determine the general
direction of needed change, identify seemingly intractable obstacles, and
envision ways to diminish or finesse them over time. Dysfunctional legal
doctrines, interest group expectations, consumers’ anxieties, and embedded
institutional and cultural barriers can all be dealt with in this way, in
iterative fashion. This Article sets out a strategy for doing so. To illustrate
this strategy, I suggest emergent approaches to the most urgent challenges
in health care policy and law—the crises of access, value, and cost.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The American health care system is on a glide path toward ruin.
Medical spending is rising at an unsustainable rate: it is on track to reach
30 percent of gross domestic product (“GDP”) a quarter century from now
and half of GDP within seventy-five years.1 The number of Americans
without health insurance is approaching fifty million,2 and surging
unemployment could push this figure much higher.3 Most of the care that
1. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR HEALTH CARE
SPENDING 12 (2007). These CBO projections presume excess cost growth rates (rates by which medical
cost increases exceed GDP growth) for Medicare, Medicaid, and other health spending that are well
below historical averages. Were medical costs to continue to rise at historical rates, health spending
would soar to an unimaginable 100 percent of GDP within seventy-five years. Id. app. D.
2. The U.S. Census Bureau estimated the ranks of the uninsured to be forty-seven million in
2006 (just before the onset of the current recession). CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D.
PROCTOR & JESSICA SMITH, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE IN
THE UNITED STATES: 2006, at 18 (2007), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/p60233.pdf.
3. A rough rule of thumb is that each 1 percent rise in the unemployment rate boosts the number
of uninsured adults by 1.1 million (job loss is thought not to substantially increase the number of
children without insurance since children who lose coverage are typically eligible for Medicaid or
SCHIP). KARYN SCHWARTZ, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HEALTH
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patients receive is of unproven value, and up to one hundred thousand
Americans die prematurely each year from medical mistakes.4 So it is for
good reason that health reform has returned to the top of the nation’s
political agenda. A decade and a half after the collapse of President
Clinton’s health reform plan, Americans are again pressing for relief from
soaring costs and telling pollsters and politicians that they want medical
care for all. The main difference, this time, is that the problems have grown
much worse.
Are law and lawyers part of the cure? The prevailing view among
health care reformers today is that lawyers have little to offer. Sure, statutes
need to be drafted, laws must be enforced, and clients need to be told how
to comply, but many reformers see these as technical tasks, requiring little
insight or imagination. Lawyers should follow the dots that policymakers
draw.5 Within legal academia as well, there is much skepticism about
health law: many do not view it as worthy of separate study. Such
skepticism might seem anomalous, since America is awash in health law.
Terabytes of legal text address the provision and financing of medical care,
mandating and constraining all manner of activities. But does this vast
COVERAGE IN A PERIOD OF RISING UNEMPLOYMENT 8 (2008), available at http://www.kff.org/
uninsured/upload/7842.pdf. Thus, for example, were the unemployment rate to reach double digits (10
percent)—five percentage points higher than the December 2007 unemployment rate—the number of
uninsured adults would rise by 5.5 million. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Labor
Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/
SurveyOutputServlet?data_tool=latest_numbers&series_id=LNS14000000 (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
4. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING
A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 26 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000) (estimating, based on extrapolations
from New York, Colorado, and Utah data, that between forty-four thousand and ninety-eight thousand
Americans die prematurely from medical errors each year).
5. Christopher Jennings, President Clinton’s senior health policy advisor from 1994 through
2000 (and chief health policy advisor to Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton’s 2008 presidential campaign)
states that health care policy is the province of people with expertise in politics, economics, and
medicine and public health, not law. Lawyers, he argues, should limit themselves to advising and
advocating for their clients—and to implementing and enforcing policies formulated by others with
relevant expertise. Interview with Christopher Jennings, President, Jennings Policy Strategies (Mar.
2007). Lawyers played peripheral roles in developing President Clinton’s health reform plan, numerous
participants in that process have told me, and President George W. Bush’s health reform proposals
(emphasizing high-deductible health plans and medical savings accounts) were developed by economist
Katherine Baicker (a member of the Council of Economic Advisors) and her staff. Interview with
Katherine Baicker, Member, Council of Economic Advisors (July 2006). To be sure, lawyers drafted
the legislation that Presidents Clinton and Bush submitted to Congress, but they had minimal roles in
formulating the concepts behind it. Lawyers have been similarly peripheral, so far, in the development
of President Obama’s nascent health care reform plans, though these plans present intricate questions of
regulatory governance. Economists (with some input from political scientists and physicians) have thus
far led the way: no legal scholar or practitioner participated in the presidential transition’s health policy
team, and only a few served on or advised the transition’s Health & Human Services Department
review team.
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body of law have a distinctive purpose or mission, or is it merely the sum
total of diverse doctrines that happen to apply in the health sphere? To
borrow from Judge Frank Easterbrook, who chided “cyberlaw” on these
grounds, does it make as little sense to study health care law as it does “the
law of the horse?”6 Laws govern the sale, theft, and racing of horses, but
they do not thereby constitute a field of inquiry,7 let alone reform-minded
action. Scholars who devote much of their energy to health law8 are made
uncomfortable by this question9—and by the status anxiety it invites.10 The
6.

Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,

207.
7. This is not to say that laws pertaining to horses do not matter, but it is to suggest that the law
of the horse is not usefully analyzed as a discrete field. “Far better for most students—better, even, for
those who plan to go into the horse trade—to take courses in property, torts, commercial transactions,
and the like . . . . Only by putting the law of the horse in the context of broader rules about commercial
endeavors could one really understand the law about horses.” Id. at 208.
8. The number of these is difficult to estimate, but a fair measure may be the one hundred or so
attendees that are typical at the annual Health Law Professors Conference, sponsored by the American
Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics. See 2008 Health Law Professors Conference—Description,
https://www.aslme.org/aslmesecure/info/description.php?conf_id=70 (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). Most
of these attendees hold faculty positions at law schools; others teach in schools of medicine and public
health.
9. The law-of-the-horse put-down has provoked a series of responses from leading health law
scholars. See Einer R. Elhauge, Can Health Law Become a Coherent Field of Law?, 41 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 365 (2006); Henry T. Greely, Some Thoughts on Academic Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 391 (2006); Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist View, 41
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347 (2006). Earlier, George Annas wondered whether health law could be
distinguished from “law and a banana,” George J. Annas, Health Law at the Turn of the Century: From
White Dwarf to Red Giant, 21 CONN. L. REV. 551, 553 (1989), and Hall—along with Mary Anne
Bobinski and David Orentlicher—fretted that health law’s topics were connected by “happenstance,”
like “the law of green things or the law of Tuesdays,” MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID
ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW & ETHICS, at xxxi (6th ed. 2003).
10. This anxiety is justified by the peculiarities of legal academia’s pecking order. As Henry
Greely has pointed out, publications in elite medical and health policy venues like the New England
Journal of Medicine and Health Affairs do not count for much when a candidate is being considered for
a law faculty position or for tenure. And elite law reviews—those at schools near the top of the U.S.
News & World Report rankings—rarely publish articles on health law topics. Since publication in these
venues is the principal metric of scholarly accomplishment when hiring and tenure are at issue, wouldbe health law scholars face a competitive disadvantage. Greely, supra note 9, at 400–02. A glimpse at
legal academia’s skepticism about health law as a field was recently afforded by litigation (and
discovery) that followed the University of Michigan Law School’s denial of tenure to Peter Hammer in
2002. Hammer sued the school, alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, obtained his tenure
file, and posted its contents on a website. A law school committee voted to grant him tenure, but at least
one panel member, James J. White, dissented. White won a sufficient percentage of “no” votes from the
full faculty to turn down the committee’s recommendation (the faculty voted 18-12 to tenure Hammer;
he thus fell two votes short of the two thirds majority that Michigan requires). Hammer v. University of
Michigan, Peter Hammer’s Lawsuit Against the University of Michigan Law School,
http://wayneoutlaws.org/hammer_v_umich/background (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). In a memo
explaining his dissent, White acknowledged that Hammer “has been recognized by many in the health
law field as one of the most prominent students of antitrust law’s application to the health care
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question is, of course, rhetorical; the point meant by those who pose it is
that the “best” legal thinking stays within bounds—bounds drawn by
established doctrinal category (tort, contract, etc.) or disciplinary method
(philosophy, history, or law and economics).
The unspoken corollary is that the best scholars and practitioners, even
on health law topics, are those who combine elite credentials of the classic
sort with professional commitment to a legal category or analytic method.
Thus, for example, medical malpractice law’s conundrums are best
explored by scholars with a rich understanding of tort law theory, or by
economists using sophisticated mathematical models and statistical
methods. And the legal governance of competition between health care
providers is best understood by antitrust lawyers with command of relevant
market analysis, rule-of-reason doctrine, and the economics of collusion. In
this view, a sophisticated grasp of health care systems and medical
decisionmaking is of secondary import. Lawyers can do more for the
regulatory governance of medicine, and for law’s coherence, by not
treating health care as different from other endeavors that law governs.
Health law scholars and practitioners have responded to the law-ofthe-horse challenge in two ways. Some have argued that medical care
provision and financing is indeed different—so unique and complicated
that it calls for an integrated regulatory governance strategy, cutting across
doctrinal boundaries.11 Others, especially practitioners, have more or less
accepted the law-of-the-horse problem as an endemic feature of the field.
They have eschewed grand theory in favor of practical questions within one
industry.” Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Disposition at exhibit 7,
Hammer v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Mich., No. 04-241 (Mich. Ct. Cl. June 20, 2006) [hereinafter
Plaintiff’s Brief], available at http://wayneoutlaws.org/hammer_v_umich/plaintiffs-opposition-todefendants-motion-for-reconsideration. But White said this merited “less weight” than the views of
antitrust law scholars. Id. Criticizing Hammer—who is both a lawyer and an economist—for having
“little contact with law and economic scholars outside of the health care field,” White concluded, “I do
not believe that we can rely on the judgment of those in health care about the tenure standards that an
elite law school should use.” Id.
11. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES 22–28 (1995) (calling for
reinterpretation of health care law’s diverse doctrines to support market competition among health
plans); James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of Medical Care: Antitrust and
State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459 (1994) (same). See also M. Gregg
Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 299–300 (2003) (urging that the task of
health law be reconceived as mediation among medical care’s competing therapeutic, caring, and other
purposes); Elhauge, supra note 9, at 388–90 (urging harmonization of health law doctrines to support a
reform strategy that incorporates market competition, universal coverage, the setting of spending limits
via political means, and some deference to physician judgment); William M. Sage, Managed Care’s
Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health
Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 630 n.131 (2003) (proposing that health care law be formulated based on
“therapeutic jurisprudence” principles).
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or another policy sphere.12 Health care law matters greatly (and merits
respect as a field), they say, because the subjects it addresses are socially
important, and close attention to health care’s complexities yields more
pertinent insights than does preoccupation with doctrinal categories or
disciplinary methods.
There are thus, broadly speaking, three “takes” among lawyers on the
field’s prospects and problems. One is rejectionist: the law of the horse
does not merit separate study. Get the doctrine right, within each legal
category, and the results will be good, or at least legitimate, for health care
and all other endeavors. The second calls on lawyers to agree on a unifying
account of what diverse legal and regulatory schemes should accomplish in
the health care sphere. The third tells health lawyers not to fret about
theory: get the policy right, case by case, by paying heed to law’s practical
impact, and do not worry about coherence in the abstract, either within or
across doctrinal realms.
I shall argue herein that health law has enormous potential to
ameliorate our nation’s worsening crises of medical care access, cost, and
quality, but that none of these approaches can fulfill this promise. Health
law rejectionists, I will contend, ignore the urgency of legal coordination.
Pursuit of rigor within doctrinal categories and regulatory regimes can
create incoherence in the governance of health care provision. Legal tools
that are well designed for some purposes yield dysfunctional results when
they work poorly in concert. Proponents of grand theory promise to solve
this coordination problem, but basing all of health care law on a single
paradigm is not possible. The law of health care provision, like medicine
12. See Greely, supra note 9, at 406–07 (advising health law scholars not to fret about the
absence of an agreed-on organizing paradigm and to instead get on with the work of analyzing health
care law’s diverse problems). It is my impression (for which I do not claim proof) that health law
scholars with left-of-center politics have been less inclined than have those toward the right to press for
recognition of one or another overarching theory—and more inclined to press for particular legal
changes without giving great weight to theory. Sara Rosenbaum, for example, has focused on
expanding health care access and bringing civil rights law to bear on racial disparities in care. See Sara
Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Addressing Racial Inequality in Health Care, in POLICY CHALLENGES
IN MODERN HEALTH CARE 135 (David Mechanic et al. eds., 2005). George Annas has emphasized the
importance of safeguarding patient autonomy and, more recently, the protection of professional
discretion from encroachment by powerful, market-driven institutions. E.g., George J. Annas & Frances
H. Miller, The Empire of Death: How Culture and Economics Affect Informed Consent in the U.S., the
U.K., and Japan, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 357, 369 (1994). Alex Capron has focused on insulating the
physician-patient relationship from market pressures. See, e.g., Alexander Morgan Capron, At Law:
Between Doctor and Patient, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Sept.–Oct. 1996, at 23, 24. And Rand Rosenblatt
has focused on resisting the stratification of health care quality based on ability to pay. E.g., Rand E.
Rosenblatt, Rationing “Normal” Health Care: The Hidden Legal Issues, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1407–
16 (1981).
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itself, pursues diverse and conflicting aims. Organizing the legal
governance of medicine around any one theory is bound to neglect some of
these aims. Such neglect, I will contend, is incompatible with stable
governance. Theory, nevertheless, is indispensable. Too often, health
lawyers ignore the big picture, urging solutions to practical problems
without heeding the connections between moving parts. Coherence matters,
even if it can never be complete, owing to health law’s competing goals.
This will lead me to a sharply different conception of health care law.
My central contention is that the law of health care provision and the health
care system itself are best understood and acted on as emergent systems.
This understanding comes to terms with health law’s seeming chaos—its
emanation from disconnected regulatory and judicial decision makers, and
from myriad, separate doctrinal spheres. As with all emergent systems,
these many inputs interact in unpredictable ways, clashing with,
reinforcing, and reacting to each other. No one actor is in position to sort
out these influences. No one actor takes a grand overview. There is no
center of command and control. The health care policy this system
produces is the sum total of these inputs and of mutual adjustments by
stakeholders and decisionmakers.
What legal scholars and practitioners who specialize in health care
have to offer thus falls short of an ability to influence the law in top-down
fashion. Yet their contributions can make a critical difference. By virtue of
their disinterestedness,13 understanding of clinical practice and health
systems, and grasp of relevant fields of law, they are best situated to see
how the moving parts fit together. They can glimpse, albeit imperfectly,14
beyond contiguous interactions between colliding doctrines, rival
stakeholders, and decision makers with overlapping authority. They are
thereby able to counsel changes of course that take account of effects
throughout the health care system, while giving weight to legal values such
as due process and doctrinal coherence. They can amplify, dampen, or
redirect the flow of policy influence through networks of legal and
13. They are, of course, not literally disinterested—they have preferences and passions (and
perhaps even clients and consulting arrangements in the health care industry)—but they are not wholly
committed to serving stakeholders’ interests, as are legal practitioners, legislative advocates, and
hospital and health plan officials.
14. Scholars of health care law cannot be expected to have fine grain knowledge of medical
practice, the organization and financing of care, or the myriad legal doctrines and regulatory
frameworks that govern medical care provision and financing. Competent specialists in each of these
areas will have richer “local” knowledge. Health law scholars are akin to general contractors: they
should be sufficiently informed to see the connections and to tap specialized expertise when it can add
substantial value.
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regulatory decision makers, as well as health care industry actors. Health
lawyers, in short, can shape the dynamics of emergence, guiding the law
toward accommodations among its many aims.
I shall proceed as follows. Part II will weigh the three, abovedescribed stances toward health care law: rejectionism, the quest for a
unifying analytic framework, and the pursuit of solutions to practical
problems with little regard for either legal coherence or connections
between the health system’s moving parts. I will consider each stance in
stylized form. In practice, the lines between them are blurry, and health law
commentators often cross over. Using examples from diverse doctrinal
realms, I will argue that each of these stances ignores critical aspects of
health law’s role, and that none offer an adequate account of what health
law’s decision makers should try to achieve. In Part III, I will make the
case for considering the legal governance of health care as an emergent
system, unguided by any one actor and thus not susceptible to any centrally
imposed paradigm. Health care law’s contradictions, I will contend, make
sense in bottom-up terms, as the product of competing perspectives and
concerns that the law must accommodate. These contradictions give rise to
feedback among legal decision makers, feedback that sculpts health law in
self-organizing fashion as these decision makers react to each other.
In Part IV, I will urge a reform strategy that rests on an understanding
of health care’s governance as an emergent system. I will argue for a
reimagining of the role of law as an instrument of health reform—a shift
from linear pursuit of specific policy objectives to a quest for evolutionary
pathways toward reformers’ ultimate efficiency, equity, and other goals.
Competing values and stakeholders, not grand designs, drive health law’s
evolution. Reform-minded actors therefore should become opportunists.
They should look for potential evolutionary pathways that launch from
present-day institutional arrangements and incentives. And they should
pursue legal and policy interventions that push our health system along
these pathways, powered by stakeholders’ and legal decisionmakers’
interacting responses. The key here is to craft interventions that are
“nonlinear” (in emergent systems argot)—interventions that achieve large,
long-term impact through minimally disruptive short-term change. To
illustrate this strategy, I will offer approaches to some of the most urgent
challenges facing health care reformers.
II. THREE “TAKES” ON HEALTH CARE LAW
There is wide agreement that the law of health care provision, like our
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medical care delivery system, is in disarray. Commentators who attempt
overviews of the field reach this conclusion unfailingly,15 each discovering
anew that chaos reigns and that the law sends incompatible, often
incomprehensible messages to health care payers, providers, and
consumers. Astonishingly complicated regulations cover such matters as
Medicare fraud and abuse16 and the tax treatment of nonprofit hospitals and
health plans.17 Frustratingly convoluted case law governs Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) preemption18 of state efforts to
regulate health plans19 and expand medical coverage.20 Further confusion
besets health care antitrust law,21 medical liability, and other regulatory
realms.
Legal scholars bemoan this, since they are lovers of coherence. They
15. E.g., HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at xxxi; Bloche, supra note 11; Elhauge, supra note 9.
16. Physician Financial Relationships with, and referrals to, Health Care Entities, 60 Fed. Reg.
41,914 (Aug. 14, 1995) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 411); Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities
with Which They Have Financial Relationship (Phase I), 66 Fed. Reg. 856 (Jan. 4, 2001) (codified at 42
C.F.R. pts. 411, 424); Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities with Which They Have Financial
Relationship (Phase II), 69 Fed. Reg. 16,054 (Mar. 26, 2004) (same), Physicians’ Referrals to Health
Care Entities with Which They Have Financial Relationship (Phase III), 72 Fed. Reg. 51,012 (Sept. 5,
2007) (same).
17. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(e) (2006); 26 C.F.R. § 1.509(a)-3 (2008).
18. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006). Even the
U.S. Supreme Court has commented unfavorably on the vagueness and confusion of ERISA preemption
law. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365 (2002) (stating that “congressional
language seems simultaneously to preempt everything and hardly anything”).
19. See Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix It:
Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 534 (2003) [hereinafter Korobkin,
Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption]; Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or
“One Good Loophole Deserves Another,” 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 89, 89–90 (2005)
[hereinafter Korobkin, Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans]. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S.
200 (2004), put the question of employer-sponsored health plans’ liability for coverage denials to rest
by holding that ERISA preempts state tort liability.
20. Several states, including Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, and Maryland, are
considering (or, in Massachusetts’ case, implementing) plans that would expand coverage in part by
requiring employers to choose between providing coverage themselves, or paying taxes or fees to
support state-sponsored coverage. ERISA preemption jeopardizes these efforts. See, e.g., Retail Indus.
Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 198 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that ERISA preempts Maryland’s
so-called Wal-Mart law, requiring firms with ten thousand or more employees to spend 8 percent or
more of their payrolls on medical coverage for their workers); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Suffolk
County, 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 416–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). But see Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City &
County of San Francisco, 512 F.3d 1112, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that a San Francisco
mandate requiring employers either to provide medical coverage or pay into a city-administered health
fund is likely to survive preemption); Golden Gate Rest. Ass’n v. City & County of S.F., 546 F.3d 639
(9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that ERISA does not preempt a San Francisco mandate requiring employers
either to provide medical coverage or pay into a city-administered health fund).
21. See Peter J. Hammer & William H. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 545, 637 (2002).
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ascribe the chaos variously to ignorant legislators, inept agency
bureaucrats, clueless judges, and the power of interest groups to shape the
law to their liking. Academics who write about health law also get some of
the blame. It has become conventional wisdom within hiring and tenure
committees at elite law schools that scholarship in this field is poor and that
the supply of exciting prospects is thin by comparison with corporate law,
antitrust, and other established subjects.22 Both health law rejectionism and
advocacy of a cross-cutting paradigm are responses to the field’s disarray.
Proponents of case-by-case pragmatism treat this disarray as beside the
point—irrelevant to the work of making health care more available,
effective, efficient, and fair.
A. REJECTIONISM: THE CASE AGAINST HEALTH LAW
The law-of-the-horse put-down works by connotation, not crystalline
logic. The problem with horses is that they are passé.23 Other areas of law
are no less of a doctrinal and statutory jumble, yet they are widely taught,
and some have considerable scholarly cachet. Environmental law is an
example.24 It would not have worked as witticism for Easterbrook. It has
become a fixture of curricula at almost all law schools, including the U.S.
News & World Report elite. Articles on environmental matters appear often
in the toniest student-edited law reviews—health law articles do not25—
and the U.S. Supreme Court regularly hears high profile environmental
cases. As Einer Elhauge points out, even some of the classics of the law
school curriculum began as hodgepodges. Tort law dates back many
centuries, but contract law (as an integrated field) does not: it is a mélange
of once-separate subjects, such as suretyship, admiralty, and the law of
22. The Peter Hammer affair—due to the discovery process that followed his lawsuit against the
University of Michigan for denial of tenure—became the occasion for rare public expression of this
sentiment. See supra note 10. But I have heard it expressed frequently, in private, in conversations
about faculty hiring with legal scholars at elite schools.
23. The “law of the horse” itself is not quite passé, as my colleague, Michael Seidman, could not
resist pointing out. Books on the subject include: DONALD CASSELL & R.J.F. GORDON, THE HORSE AND
THE LAW (1987); JULIE I. FERSHTMAN, EQUINE LAW & HORSE SENSE (1996); BRENDA GILLIGAN,
PRACTICAL HORSE LAW (2002); EDWARD H. GREENE, THE LAW AND YOUR HORSE (1971); MURRAY
LORING, YOUR HORSE AND THE LAW (1975); JULIE MACKENZIE, HORSE LAW (2001); C.L. PANNAM,
THE HORSE AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1986); THEODORE JOHN SOPHIAN, HORSES AND THE LAW (1972);
JOHN WEATHERILL, HORSES AND THE LAW (1979).
24. One could say equally of environmental law and the law of the horse that they are constituted
by “property, torts, commercial transactions, and the like.” Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 208. Indeed,
environmental law is much more of a hodgepodge than is the law of the horse, since myriad state and
federal regulatory regimes contribute to it.
25. See supra note 10.
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sales.26 So a field’s being a doctrinal admixture is no bar to its becoming an
important focus for scholars and an established part of the curriculum.
Another factor, not the hodgepodge problem, drives health law
rejectionism. Legal categories are malleable over time, as the case of
contract law illustrates, but the categories that govern at any given moment
carry great weight. In all human endeavors, categories frame perceptions
and thereby shape decisions. But law’s categories are special. Young
lawyers are taught to venerate them and to make arguments that treat them
as givens. The practice of law is, in large measure, the translation of realworld occurrences into narratives that fit into particular legal categories—
say, elements of a cause of action, prerequisites for a binding agreement, or
triggers for regulatory intervention. Students, especially in their first year,
are assessed and ranked based on their ability to perform these acts of
translation with aplomb, on behalf of hypothetical clients or causes. Law’s
categories anchor this enterprise, and disregard for them will not do.
This conservatism about categories is at the heart of law’s morality. It
constrains legal decisionmakers’ discretion27 and thus limits what lawyers
can plausibly argue on their clients’ behalf. It is central to what we mean by
due process. Its powerful corollary is the importance of interpretive
consistency and coherence both within and between legal categories.28
These are not merely ideals of craft, or further safeguards against
arbitrariness; they are answers to a bounded-rationality problem. Legal
categories invite endless bids for special exceptions, based on claims of
unique circumstance. But lawyerly cognition is not up to the task of fully
appreciating the fractal geometry of special circumstances. Legal
decisionmakers who craft exceptions to rules and categories, especially
those that govern complex fields of endeavor, are at high risk for getting
things wrong.29 They also risk producing inconsistent results and thereby
undermining confidence in rule-of-law values.
26. Elhauge, supra note 9, at 366–67.
27. The extent to which law’s categories and procedures constrain discretion is, of course, much
disputed—this large question has long been one of the central foci of legal scholarship for the past
century. E.g., Frederick Shauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909, 1915–17 (2004).
28. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 219–24 (1986).
29. The Supreme Court cited this concern in Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000), as a
reason for rejecting a health plan subscriber’s bid to construe ERISA to bar some, but not all, financial
rewards to physicians for withholding costly treatments. Holding that ERISA’s fiduciary duty
provisions did not apply to a health plan’s attending physicians, the Court said it lacked the health
policy expertise necessary to distinguish between acceptable and troublesome incentives to clinical
caregivers to practice frugally, and thus would not apply ERISA fiduciary duty principles to the practice
of medicine. Id. at 222, 231–33.
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Skepticism toward health law reflects this conservatism about
categories—and associated concerns about consistency and coherence.
Claims that one or another aspect of medical care merits distinctive
treatment under tort, contract, or antitrust law invite allegations of special
pleading and anxiety about departure from the rule of law. The proposition
that a unifying paradigm for the legal governance of health care ought to
trump interpretive consistency within doctrinal spheres raises an even
greater spectre of lawlessness. Health law’s low standing among academics
is a byproduct of these misgivings.
As environmental law illustrates, such misgivings need not be
decisive: a subject’s public import and social cachet can inspire legal
decisionmakers (and scholars) to shift their professional focus toward
policy coherence across doctrinal categories.30 But health law has not yet
won such recognition. Courts and regulators have been reluctant to sculpt
legal doctrines to accommodate health care’s peculiarities. To be sure,
there are exceptions. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, judges bent the law
of ERISA preemption to permit patients to sue health plans for medical
negligence.31 Likewise, courts have from time to time applied antitrust law
with a wink to let doctors and hospitals collaborate, purportedly on
patients’ behalf.32 But judges have eschewed explicit reliance on any
overarching governance model for health care. Instead, they have typically
pursued doctrinal coherence in disparate realms of law, with little regard
for the health policy consequences. They have, for example, sustained
30. This is not to say that environmental law (or any other “hodgepodge” field) achieves such
coherence—sharp differences over such matters as the role of cost-benefit analysis stand in the way. It
is merely to say that pursuit of such coherence across diverse doctrinal spheres and regulatory schemes
is a widely recognized environmental law goal.
31. Section 514 of ERISA preempts state laws that “relate to” fringe benefit plans. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144 (2006). To allow patients to sue HMOs in state courts for negligent care by staff physicians,
some courts characterized HMOs as medical care providers rather than as components of employers’
fringe benefit plans. See Bloche, supra note 11, at 301; Korobkin, Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption,
supra note 19, at 535. And to circumvent ERISA preemption of actions against employer-provided
health plans for negligent refusal to authorize services, some courts characterized health plans’
utilization management decisions as medical rather than administrative. Korobkin, Reinterpreting
ERISA Preemption, supra note 19, at 522. The former characterization has thus far survived; the latter
was rejected by the Supreme Court in 2004. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004)
(holding that ERISA preempts state actions against health plans for negligent denial of medical
coverage).
32. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 771–73 (1999) (upholding a professional
society’s restraints on advertising as procompetitive on the ground that they protected patients against
misleading claims). Some market-oriented health law scholars have been sharply critical of courts’
willingness to soften their application of antitrust principles when confronted with claims from
professionals that unmitigated competition might harm patients. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Health
Care as a (Big) Business: The Antitrust Response, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 939, 949–53 (2001).
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medical malpractice law’s deference to extant clinical practice patterns,
impeding efforts to make medical care more evidence based33 and cost
sensitive.34 And they have, for the most part, enforced antitrust principles
with vigor, in pursuit of a free-market vision for medicine that strains
against tort law’s more egalitarian approach to specifying the range of
allowable clinical alternatives.35
Congress and the federal agencies with authority over medical care
financing and provision have shown, if anything, less regard than the courts
for the health policy impact of their decisions. The convolutions of
Medicare fraud and abuse law, Medicare payment to hospitals and health
plans, tax treatment of nonprofit hospitals, and rules governing health
information privacy reflect the triumph of interest-group power and
compromises among competing stakeholders. Additional regulatory
convolutions play out at the state level. Constraints on potentially
duplicative capital investment by hospitals dampen competition that
antitrust law aims to encourage.36 Statutes requiring health insurers to
cover particular services or provider types are products of interest group
33. A much publicized RAND Corporation study of clinical decisionmaking found that
American patients receive only 54.9 percent of “recommended care” when measured against a set of
more than four hundred evidence-based best-practice standards. Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., The
Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2642
tbl.3 (2003). This is hardly a vote of confidence in extant practice patterns, or in the longstanding
medical tort law policy of deference to these patterns, whether or not scientific evidence supports them.
34. Extant practice patterns have been forged largely by fee-for-service incentives, which
discourage economizing, and by accompanying patient expectations of all possible beneficial care.
35. The free-market vision allows for multiple levels and standards of care tied to patients’
ability and willingness to pay. HAVIGHURST, supra note 11, at 23–25. Tort law, by contrast, presumes a
unitary standard of care, with only slight downward flexibility when health care providers can show
they were operating under resource constraints. Since clinical practice patterns vary widely, CTR. FOR
THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL SCIS., DARTMOUTH MED. SCH., THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A REPORT ON THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 91–104 (1999); John E. Wennberg & Philip
G. Peters, Jr., Unwarranted Variations in the Quality of Health Care: Can the Law Help Medicine
Provide a Remedy/Remedies?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 925, 937–41 & figs. 1–2 (2002), the idea of a
unitary standard of care is mythic, but it is nevertheless an obstacle to formal legal recognition of
multiple tiers of care.
36. As of mid-2008, thirty-six states require that a hospital obtain a Certificate of Need (“CON”)
in order to commence some capital projects, such as construction of a new wing or acquisition of new
equipment with costs above some statutory threshold level. National Conference of State Legislatures,
Certificate of Need: State Health Laws and Programs, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/certneed.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2009); 41 C.J.S. Hospitals § 8 (2008). The premise behind CON
regulation—that rivalries among hospitals tend to generate wasteful overcapacity—is at war with the
antitrust law premise that competition hones efficiency. Though health law commentators have been
making this point for a generation, see, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and
Services by “Certificate of Need,” 59 VA. L. REV. 1143 (1973), robust CON regulation and antitrust
enforcement persist, side by side.
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competition,37 rather than an overarching understanding of what medical
coverage should include. A comprehensive survey of health care law’s
crosscurrents and eddies (and contradictory policy messages) is beyond my
scope here. But one is not needed to underscore the point that pursuit of
policy coherence across disconnected doctrinal categories and regulatory
regimes has not yet become a driving force for health law decisionmakers.
Legal academia’s rejectionist stance toward health law both reflects
and reinforces courts’ and regulators’ desultory approach to health care
policy coherence. An entry-level scholar would be ill advised, from a
careerist point of view, to plunge deeply into health care’s institutional and
clinical peculiarities.38 It is better, or at least safer, to offer a new take on an
oft-pondered doctrinal question or to develop an elegant economic model,
whether or not its assumptions come close to capturing health care’s
realities. Even if the model’s premises are profoundly mistaken, the
professional risks to the modeler are low. This is because only a few
scattered scholars of health law and policy are sufficiently knowledgeable
and well positioned to assess the fit between the model’s premises and
health care’s peculiarities, and to gain an audience for their criticisms.39 An
early-career scholar can get things fundamentally wrong, from a health
policy perspective, while making a stunningly positive impression on
colleagues who are unfamiliar with health care.
These perverse professional incentives lock in health law rejectionism
and reduce legal academia’s ability to contribute to the rationalization of
health care’s regulatory governance. In view of the enormity of our health
system’s problems, this desultory approach to its governance is a costly
indulgence. Mark Hall and Elhauge have argued that health law deserves
recognition as a “field” because medical care and its financing are
distinctive, even unique, in ways that matter for the application of law.40 I
37. Interest groups at play in statehouses across the country include providers’ trade associations
and patient advocacy groups, which tend to push for expansion of coverage for particular services, and
insurers and employers, which resist new coverage mandates in order to control costs and maintain
market flexibility.
38. Such an intellectual immersion is at high risk of yielding work that strikes legal scholars as of
limited reach and therefore uninteresting.
39. See Plaintiff’s Brief, supra note 10 (asserting that an elite law school should give little weight
to the opinions of health law scholars when assessing tenure candidates’ work).
40. Both state that health care’s distinctive features are so important to the analysis of legal
issues that an industry-wide focus is preferable to treatment of health care as just another application of
generic legal doctrines. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 361; Elhauge, supra note 9, at 380. Elhauge
distinguishes his argument from Hall’s by chiding Hall for failing to say why medicine’s unique
features merit treatment of health law as a separate field. Elhauge, supra note 9, at 380–81. But Hall
does point to particular features that he says might merit separate legal treatment: these include the
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would press this further. Fixing America’s health care mess is a matter of
national urgency, and an integrated approach to the development of health
law will be essential to any solution.
The high stakes are familiar but worth underscoring. Continuation of
the growth in medical spending that has persisted over the past several
decades41 will ensure federal fiscal catastrophe. To support Medicare and
Medicaid at this rate of growth, the percentage of GDP that goes to taxes
would need to rise by nearly one-third by 2030 and more than one-half by
2040. By 2050, it would need to nearly double. Failure to keep pace with
this schedule of shockingly large tax increases would lock in unsustainable
budget deficits.42 Absent this Medicare and Medicaid growth, we would
face no such nightmare scenario: tax revenues could remain stable, at 18.3
percent of GDP (the average rate in recent decades), without a long-term
federal deficit.43 The sustained gap between rates of medical spending
increase and growth throughout the rest of the economy also threatens the
ability of businesses to compete in world markets while employing
Americans. Germany and Canada, our closest health spending rivals, spend
vulnerability of patients, the professional ideals of health care providers, the role of trust and
dependency in relations between the two, and medicine’s existential stakes. HALL ET AL., supra note 9,
at 358. These features, he says, deserve separate treatment, including a departure from generic legal
doctrine, to the extent that they matter when law is applied. Id. at 361. This is circular reasoning, one
might say, but, for Hall, it frames the question of what health law is about: “[I]t [is not] necessary to
agree on what are all the special features of medicine, much less how and why they should matter in
particular areas of law. Debating, disagreeing, and figuring this out is what health law scholarship
does.” Id. Elhauge’s approach fits within Hall’s framework. Elhauge suggests that medical care
deserves distinctive legal treatment because it encompasses a unique set of relationships among
patients, doctors, hospitals, insurers, employers, and the state. Elhauge, supra note 9, at 369–70. He
notes that other fields, including property and family law, are defined in terms of their governance over
distinct sets of relations, id., and he proposes to apply a mix of market theory, political authority,
professional judgment, and moral thinking about autonomy and equity to the problems that these
relations pose. Id. at 381–89.
41. Since 1960, American health care spending has outpaced income growth by an average of 2.7
percentage points per year. Henry J. Aaron, Budget Prospects and Health Policy, in BEYOND LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS: SOLVING AMERICA’S MEDICAL COST CONUNDRUM (G. Bloche & L. Meltzer eds.,
forthcoming 2010). See also CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 1 (projecting unsustainable
increases in both public and private sector medical spending absent dramatic policy changes).
42. Assuming no increase in the percentage of GDP going to taxes, the federal deficit would rise
from just over 1 percent of GDP in 2005 to almost 8 percent of GDP in 2030, nearly 12 percent in 2040,
and 16 percent in 2050. Aaron, supra note 41 (citing Congressional Budget Office projections).
43. Id. As Aaron notes, neither long-term Social Security obligations nor growth in other
entitlement programs are projected to make substantial contributions to the long-term federal deficit.
Assuming no cuts in Social Security benefits or increases in Social Security taxes, the projected Social
Security shortfall over the next thirty to forty years is about 2.5 percent of GDP—hardly trivial, but
small compared to the federal government’s health care burden. Projected decreases (measured in terms
of percentage points of GDP) in other parts of the budget will fully compensate for this Social Security
shortfall. Id. (relying on Congressional Budget Office projections).
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little more than half of what we do, per capita, on medical care, and no
other country so burdens its business sector with direct responsibility for
health care costs.44 Finally, our national failure to provide medical
coverage to forty-seven million Americans45 is not merely cruel and
indecent; it is a threat to social stability. In the two other industrialized
nations that have eschewed universal coverage, the resulting suffering and
indignity have fed large-scale civic unrest.46 We are hardly at the point of
riots in the streets over health care; to the contrary, most Americans report
satisfaction with their medical coverage. So far, this satisfaction has been
an obstacle to health care reform: voters are disinclined to give up what
they have in order to improve the lot of others. But the growing number of
uninsured Americans could tip the balance suddenly from complacency
44. The United States is alone in relying so heavily on employers to provide coverage to its
nonelderly. Other industrialized countries (except for China, which does not provide universal
coverage) spread this expense more broadly, through various public-financing schemes. Germany, with
its system of employer-supported, quasi-public “sickness funds,” comes the closest to our workplacebased system. See Stephanie Stock, Marcus Redaelli & Karl Wilhelm Lauterbach, The Influence of the
Labor Market on German Health Care Reforms, 25 HEALTH AFF. 1143, 1144 (2006) (discussing
German employers’ evolving role in financing that country’s Social Health Insurance system). But
German employers’ contributions to sickness funds cover only 46 percent of the cost of care for
workers and their families. Id. at 1144. Employees pay an additional 54 percent. Id. By comparison,
American employers pay, on average, 84 percent of premiums for employee-only coverage and 73
percent of premiums for family coverage. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUC.
TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2008 ANNUAL SURVEY 68 (2008), available at
http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/7790.pdf. Employees and their families pay the rest; public funding plays no role
(unless one counts the tax expenditure represented by the deductibility of employer and employee
contributions toward health insurance premiums). In the United States, employment-based insurance
covers approximately 60 percent of individuals (workers and their dependents). Press Release, Ctr. on
Budget & Policy Priorities, The Number of Uninsured Americans Is at an All-Time High (Aug. 29,
2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/8-29-06health.pdf. In 2006, 27.6 million workers were
uninsured because not all businesses offer health benefits, not all workers qualify for coverage, and not
all employees can afford their share of health insurance premiums even when workplace-based
coverage is available to them. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 2, at 23.
45. See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 2, at 18. Over the past two decades, the ranks of the
uninsured have risen by about eight hundred thousand per year. Id. at 58 tbl.C-1.
46. The shredding of China’s social safety net, including universal access to basic health care
regardless of ability to pay, has contributed to widespread disturbances and outbreaks of violence in
poor, rural areas. See Hannah Beech, Inside the Pitchfork Rebellion, TIME, Mar. 13, 2006, at 28; Elaine
Kurtenbach, Health Crisis Plagues Rural Areas of China, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at A16. China
is now urgently pursuing strategies for making medical care available to all. William C. Hsiao,
Editorial, The Political Economy of Chinese Health Reform, 2 HEALTH ECON. POL’Y & L. 241, 244–45
(2007). In apartheid-era South Africa, poor black people’s lack of access to basic care fueled anger over
the indignities and deprivation associated with all-white rule. AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
SCI. & PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HEALTH: THE LEGACY OF APARTHEID
19–27
(1998),
available
at
http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/report-1998legacyapartheid.html. One of Nelson Mandela’s highest priorities after becoming president of South
Africa in 1994 was to make basic medical services available to all.
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toward popular ire.47
Should this happen, law will be critical to the crafting of an affordable
and effective approach to Americans’ health-related hopes and fears.
Statutory drafters will need to consider how disconnected regulatory
schemes work together, and against each other, to frame choices for the
health system’s many actors. And the bounded rationality inherent in these
drafting efforts will require courts and agencies to fill in the statutory
interstices as unanticipated situations arise. To do so without a strategic eye
toward the governance of our health system as a whole would be to sow
chaos.
The same is true of efforts to gain control of medical costs. Neither
public nor private health care spending can be contained in isolation: each
influences the other by shaping research investment, product development,
standards of care, and patients’ expectations. Cost control that persists will
require trade-offs that Americans can tolerate. This will call for
management of tensions between medicine’s therapeutic, caring, and other
purposes, as well as mediation of conflicts among health care industry
stakeholders.48 Striking balances between benefits, risks, and costs in the
abstract will not do. As questions arise within the doctrinal and regulatory
realms that bear on medical spending, legal decisionmakers will need to
assess the impact of proposed answers on industry actors’ behavior. They
will also need to think strategically about synergies and conflicts between
disconnected legal frameworks. Fixation on doctrine and disregard for the
health care context will lock in health policy disarray.
This is not to say that health care lawyers and health law
decisionmakers should eschew doctrinal consistency or other rule-of-law
values. To the contrary, these values are a vital part of the health law mix;
the health sphere should not become lawless in pursuit of even the most
urgent policy objectives. But where plausible interpretations of the law can
accommodate important health care policy concerns, legal decisionmakers
should not shy away from adopting such interpretations. And coordination
among the doctrinal and regulatory schemes that shape health care policy
should be a high priority when legal decisionmakers are called on to make
47. See supra note 45. Rising copayments, deductibles, and employee contributions toward
premiums for employment-based coverage are likely to feed dissatisfaction even among the insured.
These costs have not increased substantially as a proportion of total medical spending, but they have
risen in relation to employee compensation. See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH &
EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2006 ANNUAL SURVEY 6 (2006), available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/7527/upload/7527.pdf.
48. Bloche, supra note 11, at 302.
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interpretive judgments in the health sphere.
These are hardly radical propositions. Nine years ago, the Supreme
Court did both of these things when it ruled that health plans’ financial
rewards to physicians for practicing frugally do not violate ERISA’s
fiduciary duty provision.49 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Souter
acknowledged ERISA’s ambiguities, pointed to health plans’ need to limit
services to stay within budget, and concluded accordingly that the fiduciary
requirement should not be read to bar rewards to doctors for rationing
care.50 Rationing, he wrote, was necessary to control medical spending.51
Souter also underscored the need to resolve ERISA’s ambiguities in a
manner consistent with the surrounding health law context.52 Construing
ERISA to prohibit health plans from rewarding their doctors for saving
money would have put ERISA at odds with the Health Maintenance
Organization (“HMO”) Act of 1973,53 he said, since such incentives are
essential to HMOs’ efforts to keep within their budgets. The 1973 Act
awarded federal subsidies to HMOs and required employment-based health
plans to offer an HMO option; this, Souter said, constituted congressional
endorsement of HMOs’ rewards to doctors for practicing frugally.54 Souter
also cited state law remedies for medical malpractice as reason not to create
an ERISA cause of action for improper physician incentives.55 Such a
cause of action, he wrote, would duplicate malpractice law, since proof of
substandard care would be necessary to show that improper incentives
49. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 236 (2000). But see infra text accompanying notes 95–99
(pointing out contradictions between the Court’s understanding of health care law in Pegram and in
subsequent cases).
50. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 219, 225, 235–36. My own view is that Pegram was unwisely decided.
The Justices took no account of the corrosive effect of payments to physicians for withholding care on
professional trustworthiness and the doctor-patient relationship. It is indisputable that rationing is
inevitable when a health plan undertakes to provide care within a limited budget, but it is hardly the
case that physicians must play the lead role in doing the necessary rationing. See M. Gregg Bloche &
Peter D. Jacobson, Commentary, The Supreme Court and Bedside Rationing, 284 JAMA 2776, 2777
(2000). Pegram nevertheless represents an effort to accommodate vital health policy concerns—in this
case, the importance of cost containment—and to harmonize the operation of uncoordinated legal and
regulatory schemes within the constraints of existing doctrine.
51. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 221.
52. Two articles by Russell Korobkin on ERISA’s treatment of employment-based health plans’
coverage determinations, Korobkin, Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, supra note 19, and states’
efforts to extend coverage to the uninsured, Korobkin, Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, supra note
19, represent, in my view, the finest effort by a legal scholar to resolve ERISA’s vagaries in a manner
sensitive to both health policy concerns and the surrounding legal and regulatory context.
53. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (2000)).
54. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 220–22.
55. Id. at 235–36.
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resulted in harm.56
Integration of rule-of-law values with sensitivity to law’s impact in the
health care sphere is central to the work of health lawyers. So is acceptance
that their working conditions are hazardous. Health law practitioners,
scholars, and decisionmakers stand on seismically active ground, cleaved
by regulatory and common law schemes that strain against each other.
Policymakers who are in a position to draft new statutes and regulations
would seem to have it better. They can, in theory, formulate rules that take
account of both the health system’s realities and the surrounding legal
environment. But in practice, interest group power and unintended
consequences often foil the best of intentions. Later in this Article, I will
set out a strategy for legal practitioners, scholars, and decisionmakers that
takes account of these distinctive challenges.57 That the challenges are
sufficiently distinctive and urgent to treat health law as both a separate field
and a high professional priority cannot, in my view, be seriously contested.
B. “BIG THEORY”: PURSUIT OF A UNIFYING PARADIGM
If the health law rejectionists are wrong—if the governance of our
health care system is in dire need of integrated treatment, as I contend—
where should we begin? The way forward, say some, is more and better
“big theory”—greater effort by the brightest minds to develop a unified
understanding of what the law of health care provision ought to
accomplish. Several unifying models have been urged. One—health law as
a scaffold for market competition—ranks well ahead of others in its hold
on scholars who aspire toward coherence in health care law. Another–
protection for professional authority–often plays the role of straw man in
legal scholarship; yet it enjoys considerable support. A third is defense of
patient autonomy, and a fourth is public determination (through politically
accountable mechanisms) of medical spending priorities. These models are
not mutually exclusive; indeed some commentators on health law call for a
unified understanding that taps different models for varying governance
purposes.58 For example, the law could support political (or market)
determination of a health plan’s overall budget while deferring to doctors’
clinical judgments within this budget. Such a composite approach could
also preserve some space for individual patient choice.
Proponents of each of these several models, and advocates of
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 236.
See infra Part IV.
HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 359–60; Elhauge, supra note 9, at 379–90.

2009]

EMERGENT LOGIC OF HEALTH LAW

409

composite approaches, hold that an overarching conception of health care’s
governance should guide the law’s treatment of medicine. They make their
cases for why one or another model is best, or why one or another
composite is best matched to health law’s variegated governance tasks. But
they do not say how we should choose from among them. Hall and Elhauge
each contend that argument about which is best is an endeavor that health
law scholars should undertake with zeal.59 But neither they nor others
answer the question of how the makers of health law—the myriad courts,
regulators, and legislators who shape it in piecemeal fashion—ought to
settle this argument.
To give effect to a unified conception of health care governance, these
disconnected decisionmakers would have to resolve such arguments in a
tightly coordinated way, within disparate doctrinal and regulatory contexts.
Coordination of this sort is unachievable. No single decisionmaker has the
power to pull all (or even most) of the others into line. No networks,
positive feedback loops, or mechanisms of viral spread are capable of the
horizontal dissemination necessary to give effect to a single way of doing
things. To the contrary, the clashing perspectives of multiple interest
groups and levels and branches of government pose an insurmountable
obstacle to broad agreement on a single understanding of health care
governance.60
An even larger obstacle is our irresolution, as individuals and as a
society, over the purposes of medicine and, thus, the aims of health policy.
It is often said that the purpose of medicine is the promotion and restoration
of health, yet we could promote health in much more cost-effective fashion
by doing more to create educational and economic opportunity. A large
body of evidence supports the conclusion that income and wealth,61
education, social connectedness,62 and the quality of the built
59.
60.

HALL ET AL., supra note 9; Elhauge, supra note 9.
See HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID S. BRODER, THE SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF
POLITICS AT THE BREAKING POINT 345–95 (1996) (analyzing the collapse of President Clinton’s health
reform plan as the product of paralytic conflict between interest groups). Conceivably, a crisis of
transcendent magnitude—say, an economic cataclysm equal to or worse than the Great Depression of
the 1930s—could mobilize Congress and the president to act in the face of interest-group power to
implement a unified understanding of health care governance as part of a plan for universal coverage
and comprehensive health-system reform. But the failure of President Franklin Roosevelt’s Depressionera plan for universal coverage—a plan opposed by the American Medical Association and other
interest groups—underscores the difficulty of doing so. See RICK MAYES, UNIVERSAL COVERAGE: THE
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 19–20 (Univ. of Mich. Press 2004) (2001).
61. Michael G. Marmot, Understanding Social Inequalities in Health, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY &
MED. S9, S14–18 (2003).
62. John T. Cacioppo & Louise C. Hawkley, Social Isolation and Health, with an Emphasis on
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environment63 are more important than medical care as determinants of
health.64 Some medical services make measurable contributions toward
improving health at reasonable cost,65 but many others do not.66 It is easy
to read this as proof that we are grossly overspending on medical care,67
but this begs the question of why. Self-serving, free-spending doctors may
be part of the problem, but why are we so willing to go along? The answer
is that we want something else beside utilitarian maximization of health—
otherwise we would bring the wrecking ball to our intensive care units and
reallocate this spending to pay for prenatal care or preschool.68 We want
intangibles like hope (even when it is illusory), comfort, and reassurance.
We are willing to pay for plausible explanations of our ailments: some tests
that are pure waste from a treatment perspective allay anxiety by helping
patients to better understand their circumstances. We want our doctors’
uncompromising loyalty at times of need: we appreciate the importance of
cost control, but we would rather that they economize on the other guy.
And we cling to the Saving Private Ryan69 perspective on rescue—
whatever the cost—as affirmation of every person’s moral import and
community membership: at dire moments, we believe, doctors should do
all they can to save their patients.70
We want all these things, but we would prefer not to pay. We elect
Underlying Mechanisms, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S39 (2003); Robert J. Sampson, The
Neighborhood Context of Well-Being, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S53 (2003).
63. Cacioppo & Hawkley, supra note 62; Sampson, supra note 62.
64. Various papers were presented on this topic at a conference held by the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars titled “Health Disparities in the United States.” See Woodrow Wilson
Int’l Ctr. for Scholars, Health Status Disparities in the United States, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/
index.cfm?topic_id=116811&fuseaction=topics.documents&group_id=347153. See also generally
RICHARD WILKINSON, UNHEALTHY SOCIETIES (1996) (arguing that there is a strong association
between socioeconomic factors and quality of life).
65. DAVID M. CUTLER, YOUR MONEY OR YOUR LIFE 22–60 (2004) (finding that advances in
therapy for heart attacks, depression, and low birth weight have yielded substantial health benefits at
reasonable cost).
66. HENRY J. AARON & WILLIAM B. SCHWARTZ WITH MELISSA COX, CAN WE SAY NO? THE
CHALLENGE OF RATIONING HEALTH CARE 1–2 (2005).
67. If health is our sole objective, we are most certainly overpaying. Research by John Wennberg
and his colleagues at Dartmouth Medical School’s Center for Evaluative Clinical Sciences strongly
suggests that approximately 30 percent of American medical spending yields no net health benefits. See
John E. Wennberg, Elliot S. Fisher & Jonathan S. Skinner, Geography and the Debate over Medicare
Reform, HEALTH AFF., Feb. 13, 2003, at W96, W104, http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/
hlthaff.w2.96v1?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&author1=wennberg&andore
xactfulltext=and&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT (estimating that 30 percent of
Medicare spending yields no clinical benefits).
68. See Bloche, supra note 11, at 270–82, 299–309.
69. SAVING PRIVATE RYAN (DreamWorks SKG 1998).
70. Bloche, supra note 11, at 304–05.
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politicians who promise tax cuts, and our shopping and dining choices keep
the pressure on businesses to skimp on workers’ health care. We put the
pressure on ourselves (and our doctors) as well, by choosing health plans
with an eye toward price, then demanding tests, treatments, and referrals
without regard for cost when we are ill and afraid. Some argue that there
are right and wrong resolutions to our contradictory expectations of
medicine—and of health law and policy.71 But even if this were true in the
abstract, it is of little help in gaining agreement on the purposes to be
served by health law and policy. As a practical matter, our irresolution is
sure to persist, abetted by our resistance (as individuals and as a society) to
acknowledging the contradictions within ourselves. Ongoing conflict over
the aims of health law is therefore inevitable. Agreement on a unitary
conception of health care governance, even one composed of a composite
of the previously discussed models, is unachievable. The work of health
care law, as I will argue later,72 must include management of fundamental
differences73 tied to interest group viewpoints, politics and ideology, and
our many cultural and psychological contradictions.
The impossibility of settling on a single conception of health care law
is illustrated by the most prominent scholarly effort to purvey one. More
than thirty-five years ago, Clark Havighurst began to challenge the thenprevailing assumption of deference to medical authority over health care
resource allocation.74 Havighurst urged reliance on markets and criticized
laws that allowed physicians to act collectively to fix prices and set
standards of care.75 As the health planning paradigm gained influence in
the early 1970s (culminating in legislation creating a national network of
politically accountable planning bodies76) he responded with a scathing
71. Norman Daniels, for example, holds that the moral purpose of health care is restoration and
maintenance of health. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 36–58 (1985). If so, hope, explanation,
and affirmation of community solidarity are not grounds for additional medical spending. Clark
Havighurst asserts that once a consumer signs up for a health plan, he or she should be bound by that
plan’s economizing policies—and that courts have been too willing to defer to sick patients’ after-thefact preferences for pricey care by forcing health plans to pay for services beyond the scope of plans’
contractual commitments. HAVIGHURST, supra note 11, at 110–53, 157–221.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 138–58.
73. The fundamental nature of these differences distinguishes health care law from numerous
other fields, especially those—antitrust, torts, and contracts, for example—that have become organized,
more or less, around the paradigm of economic efficiency.
74. Clark C. Havighurst, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Market for Health Services,
35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 716 (1970).
75. See Brief for Clark C. Havighurst as Amicus Curi, Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th
Cir. 1974) (No. 73-1247), rev’d, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
76. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641, 88
Stat. 2225 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k–300s (2000)).
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critique of this strategy’s coercive feature—its requirement that hospitals
seeking to offer new services or to make major capital investments obtain a
“Certificate of Need” from state regulatory authorities.77 Havighurst also
rejected bioethics approaches that emphasized patient autonomy without
regard for the need to set limits and to make cost-quality trade-offs. He
thought of himself as a “radical,”78 and in the early 1970s he was, but he
made shrewd use of prestigious and powerful institutions, including the
Institute of Medicine and the American Enterprise Institute, to push his
views into the mainstream.79 Over time, in conjunction with others,80 he
formulated a comprehensive model of competition in markets for medical
care and coverage.81 In the tradition of Milton Freedman, he emphasized
personal freedom as much as efficiency. Today, his vision of health law as
a catalyst for market allocation of clinical resources—driven by consumer
preferences and specified through contracts among patients, doctors and
hospitals, and health care payers—has come close to prevailing among
legal scholars who focus on health care organization and financing. Within
the upper echelons of the legal academy, it is the main alternative to health
law rejectionism.82
It has also had enormous real-world impact.83 In 1975, the U.S.
Supreme Court discarded the “learned professions” exemption from
application of the antitrust laws,84 opening the way for federal and private
actions against anticompetitive practices in health care. Collective price
setting and prohibitions against advertising—once praised by scholars,
including a Nobel prize-winning economist, as essential to an
anticommercial ethos that sustained patients’ trust in their doctors85—were
77. Havighurst, supra note 36.
78. Clark C. Havighurst, I’ve Seen Enough! My Life and Times in Health Care Law and Policy,
14 HEALTH MATRIX 107, 129 (2004).
79. Havighurst was also a chief health policy advisor to Ronald Reagan during the 1980
presidential campaign and the early months of Reagan’s presidency.
80. Others who played leading roles in development of the market paradigm—and who at times
collaborated with Havighurst—include Paul Ellwood (widely viewed as the father of the HMO
concept), Alain Enthoven (who coined the term “managed competition”), James Blumstein (an early
critic of deference to professional judgment and reliance on political mechanisms to allocate clinical
resources), and Richard Epstein (an early advocate of contractual variation in clinical standards of care).
81. See generally HAVIGHURST, supra note 11 (detailing his most comprehensive account of this
model).
82. See supra note 10 (discussing elite legal academia’s skepticism toward health law).
83. What follows is a brief summary of the competition model’s transformative impact on health
care law. I am not going so far as to assert that Havighurst’s work alone brought about this impact—the
decisiveness of its influence would be exceedingly difficult to assess—but it is beyond question that
Havighurst has been the preeminent voice for this model among health law scholars.
84. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787–88 (1975).
85. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
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suddenly illegal. By the end of the 1970s, the health planning paradigm had
fallen into wide disfavor, and conservatives were gaining ground in their
opposition to regulatory methods of cost containment.86 In 1980, Alain
Enthoven’s call for cost control through competition between vertically
integrated health systems87 seized policy makers’ attention. President
Reagan’s budget director, David Stockman, lauded the proposal as a
“counterrevolution in health care policy.”88 Insurers that once passively
paid claims for whatever the doctor ordered began to say no to pricey,
unproven treatments—and to create integrated systems like those that
Enthoven (and Havighurst) envisioned. Courts empowered insurers to
depart from doctors’ determinations of “medical necessity” (the almostuniversal contractual standard for coverage, then and now) and to decline
claims.89 Influenced by scholars sharply critical of laws protecting
professional prerogative,90 judges whittled away at such doctrines as the
ban on so-called corporate practice of medicine, which limited health
plans’ and hospitals’ ability to exercise managerial control over physicians’
clinical judgment.
Most importantly, federal courts construed ERISA to preempt a wide
range of state laws that would otherwise govern employer-sponsored health
plans.91 This largely deregulated employment-based coverage, since
ERISA neither mandates nor restricts employee benefits. Employersponsored plans were free to fashion packages of covered services without
regard for professional beliefs about appropriate care—or for political
action at the state level to set health care priorities.92 Plans, moreover, were
REV. 941, 965–66 (1963).
86. In 1979, a Democratic Congress rejected President Jimmy Carter’s proposed national scheme
of hospital price controls. See Alain C. Enthoven, Consumer-Centered vs. Job-Centered Health
Insurance, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan. 1979, at 141. Despite considerable evidence that hospital rate
regulation constrains private sector health spending, it never again received serious federal
consideration.
87. ALAIN C. ENTHOVEN, HEALTH PLAN (1980).
88. Id. (book jacket quotation).
89. E.g., Sarchett v. Blue Shield of Cal., 729 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1987). To be sure, in Sarchett and
other similar cases, courts imposed stringent requirements of good faith and fair dealing. Judges also
invoked the standard insurance law principle that ambiguity in coverage contracts must be construed
against the insurer and in line with “the reasonable expectations of the insured.” Id. at 273. But even
with these reservations, permitting insurers to say no represented a radical step away from blind
deference to doctors’ determinations of medical necessity.
90. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to
Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 474–75 (1988).
91. See supra notes 18–20.
92. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 757–58 (1985) (construing
ERISA’s preemption provisions to immunize self-insured employer-sponsored plans from state
mandatory benefits laws).
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immune from state medical malpractice suits for denial of coverage. This
insulated them further from professional authority, since physician-set
standards of care were (and still are) the touchstone of malpractice liability.
A measure of the market model’s real-world success is the fact that by
1992, cost containment through competition between health plans had
become the centerpiece of the Democratic presidential nominee’s proposal
for health reform.93 Since then, no serious candidate for the presidency has
proposed health reform that did not rely mainly on markets to cover the
uninsured and limit spending.
Yet, the market-oriented counterrevolution in health care law and
policy never fully supplanted competing models. Efforts to shift medical
malpractice liability from tort to contract94—and to thereby permit health
care payers and providers to offer levels of care that diverged from
professional standards—were almost uniformly rejected by the courts.
Medical tort litigation remains a contest over whether defendants’ actions
measure up to clinical practice norms set by physicians. Even in the
antitrust setting, courts have displayed ambivalence about no-holds-barred
medical markets. Most notably, a 1999 Supreme Court holding allowed
California dentists to band together to set ethical limits on price
advertising.95 The Justices said such limits were “procompetitive,” and thus
permissible under the antitrust laws, because they helped to clarify
consumers’ understanding of dentists’ price discounting practices. Marketoriented critics of the professional paradigm chided the Court for turning
antitrust principles on their head by characterizing restraints on competition
as “procompetitive.”96 The Justices, said Havighurst, had reverted to older
thinking about the virtues of professional benevolence as a corrective for
flawed markets.
In two more recent health care opinions, both authored by Justice
Souter (who also wrote the opinion allowing dentists to restrict
93. To be sure, the Clinton plan (both during the 1992 campaign and through the 1993–94
legislative debate over health reform) also incorporated regulatory measures—for example, national
budget ceilings for insured health spending—that the competition strategy’s proponents did not like.
Enthoven participated in formulating the Clinton plan, then dropped out of the process, disillusioned.
Havighurst contributed his views but sharply criticized the administration’s plan for being too
regulatory. See Havighurst, supra note 78, at 123–27.
94. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 87.
95. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771–73 (1999). The advertising restrictions at issue
required dentists to reveal their standard, prediscount prices and to otherwise be transparent about the
size of claimed discounts. Id. at 761.
96. Once again, Havighurst led the charge (among scholars, at least). Havighurst, supra note 32,
at 949–53.
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advertising), the Court showed its ambivalence about markets in a different
doctrinal context—ERISA. Both cases involved the balancing of clinical
benefits and costs when a physician provides care within a health plan’s
budgetary constraints. In Pegram v. Herdrich,97 decided unanimously in
2000, the Justices embraced the market model wholeheartedly. The Court
characterized clinical standards of care in economic terms as judgments
about “acceptable . . . risk” and “optimum treatment levels” to be made by
health plans and their physicians in response to market forces.98 But two
years later in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran,99 the Court opted for
the paradigm of deference to medical professionalism. Holding that ERISA
does not preempt state laws requiring independent physician review of
refusals by health plans to pay for tests, treatments, and referrals, a 5-4
majority characterized such review as akin to a doctor’s second opinion,
not a legal remedy for contractual breach by a health plan.100 This
maneuver enabled the majority to rescue state-mandated independent
review from the black hole of ERISA preemption (since established
jurisprudence holds that ERISA preempts state remedies for coverage
denial), but it divorced independent review from health insurance contracts,
and thus from the market. Under Rush Prudential, medical reviewers are
free to make their own clinical judgments and to thereby require health
plans to pay,101 without regard for the terms of the deal struck among
employers, health plans, and subscribers. That Souter wrote both of these
opinions, as well as the Court’s 1999 opinion on dentists’ advertising
restrictions, underscores the Court’s irresolution when it comes to the
market model.
For Havighurst and other market purists, irresolution is probably too
polite a term. Havighurst condemns departures from the market paradigm
as the product of “authoritarian/collectivist . . . leanings,”102 and he saves
97. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
98. Id. at 221–22. The Court treated ERISA as a statutory framework for such a market, but it
allowed that Congress could intervene, if it chose, to set limits on these market-driven “judgments of
social value.” Id.
99. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
100. See id. at 381–83 (rejecting characterization of independent medical review as an arbitral
remedy for contractual breach).
101. Patients who prevail in medical review proceedings can then obtain judicial enforcement of
the favorable result by pursuing their federal remedy under section 1132(a)(1)(B) of ERISA. Id. at 385.
102. Havighurst, supra note 78, at 110. Havighurst makes me into his example of “persons with
authoritarian/collectivist, rather than pluralist, leanings” who oppose allowing “people [to] make
consequential choices for themselves.” Id. He mischaracterizes my empirical account of the limitations
of welfare economics as a tool for analyzing choice between health care’s competing purposes.
“Bloche,” he says, cannot imagine “allow[ing] individuals . . . to make the consequential choices” and
“is quite comfortable with having nonaccountable judges serve as the ultimate arbiters” of health care
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special ire for those who would allow professional judgment to trump
contractual limits on health spending.103 But Souter’s irresolution reflects
our own, as a nation, about the purposes of health policy and thus the
premises of medicine’s legal governance. No legal system can render
clarity—certainly not clarity that lasts—out of pervasive conflict over core
premises. Full commitment to any one paradigm requires sustained public
disregard for passionately felt concerns that are embodied in others. We are
nowhere near a settled view of the place of market mechanisms, public
allocation, and professional judgment in the governance of medicine. We
differ sharply, both between and within ourselves, over the relative import
of equity, solidarity, rescue, relief of suffering, and the restoration and
promotion of health. We differ, also, over the comparative weight we
should accord to these purposes and to society’s other concerns; from
education and the environment to criminal justice and national security.
These differences make agreement on a unifying paradigm for health care
law unattainable.
C. CASE-BY-CASE PRAGMATISM
Proponents of case-by-case pragmatism in health care law treat the
quest for a unifying theory of legal governance as beside the point; a
distraction from the work of making medical care more efficient, effective,
equitable, and otherwise expressive of our values. As Henry Greely puts
the point, “the existence or absence of a dominant paradigm has nothing to
do with the value of academic health law”104 or with the quality of health
care lawyers’ contributions. Whether one prefers a single paradigm or a
“messy, sprawling, and loosely connected field” is a matter of personal
style; neither “is right or wrong in the abstract.”105 Rather than fretting
about the matter, health lawyers should just get on with it: “[t]here is work
to be done.”106 Most law review articles on health care topics take this tack,
as do lawyers’ contributions to the medical and health policy literature.
Without reference to overarching theory, or lack thereof, this work
addresses particular legal and policy problems, such as medical
choice. Id. at 110 n.5 (citing Bloche, supra note 11). And he misrepresents my acknowledgement that
legal interpretation in the health care context requires normative judgment: this acknowledgement, he
claims, constitutes a rejection of personal choice in medical matters. Id.
103. That the “medical necessity” standard for coverage (a staple of almost all health insurance
contracts) constitutes contractual deference to professional judgment is a possibility Havighurst does
not acknowledge.
104. Greely, supra note 9, at 408.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 409.
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malpractice, racial disparities in care, and hospitals’ obligations to provide
free care to the poor.107 It is influenced (overtly or otherwise) by
underlying values, but its aim is practical guidance for courts and
regulators, grounded in cross-disciplinary appreciation of the workings of
health care and law.108
This work has made important contributions to the solution of
problems in health law. Sara Rosenbaum’s quest to bring civil rights law to
bear on racial disparities has produced a blueprint for doing so109 and put
pressure on providers and health plans to take equity more seriously.110 Jay
Katz’s call for greater focus on sick people’s varying beliefs and fears111
has sensitized legal commentators, clinical caregivers, and some judges to
the pitfalls of allowing informed consent to become a routinized, pro forma
process. But these and many other efforts to address particular problems in
health law pay too little attention to interactions among the medical care
system’s moving parts—and to the contradictions and confusion embedded
in the messages that health law sends.
For example, Rosenbaum’s advocacy for robust use of civil rights
107. Other topics that health law scholarship frequently addresses, in disconnected fashion,
include tax treatment of nonprofit hospitals, Medicare fraud and abuse, regulation bearing on clinical
quality and hospital rates, and myriad bioethics matters.
108. There are outstanding and diverse examples of such work. See, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SILENT
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984) (pleading eloquently for more emphasis on dialogue between
doctor and patient and greater deference to sick people’s varying, idiosyncratic preferences); Michelle
M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrance of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice
Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595 (2002) (presenting recommendations for medical malpractice reform);
Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern Healthcare System:
Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE
J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215 (2003) (advocating for the use of federal civil rights law as a tool
against racial disparities in care); David M. Studdert & Troyen A. Brennan, Toward a Workable Model
of “No-Fault” Compensation for Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225 (2001)
(presenting recommendations for medical malpractice reform).
109. Rosenbaum & Teitelbaum, supra note 108. Stepped-up enforcement efforts (by the
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Civil Rights) and statutory reform (to establish a
private right of action against health care providers based on disparate racial impact, in the wake of
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), which held that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act provides
no such right of action) would be needed to pursue Rosenbaum’s blueprint. But see Richard A. Epstein,
Disparities and Discrimination in Health Care Coverage: A Critique of the Institute of Medicine Study,
48 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S26, S31 (2005) (criticizing covert, mandatory cross-subsidies inherent in
civil rights law remedies for racial disparities in medical care).
110. Hospitals and health plans have been critical of the civil rights approach, preferring to treat
racial disparity in care as a quality issue better addressed by managerial methods that promote best
practice for all. See Nicole Lurie & Tamara Dubowitz, Health Disparities and Access to Health, 297
JAMA 1118, 1120 (2007). But the possibility of civil rights litigation has pushed them to address the
disparities question.
111. KATZ, supra note 108, at 151–64.
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litigation to combat racial disparities in care disregards the potential impact
of such litigation on efforts to improve the quality of medical services.
Racial disparity is, at bottom, a quality-of-care matter. At issue are
disparities in standards of care and in the compassion and respectfulness
with which care is provided.112 Strategies that bring quality of care (in
these several senses) into line with agreed-on best practice will, in course,
ameliorate racial (and other) disparities. Litigation is of doubtful value as a
tool for achieving this, as abundant evidence from the study of the medical
malpractice system shows.113 Litigation prioritizes individual
accountability over pursuit of systemic changes that have been shown to
promote clinical excellence. These include promulgation of evidence-based
practice protocols, candid discussion of clinical errors (with an eye toward
“lessons learned”), collection of data on doctors’ and hospitals’
performance, and coordination of care in complex cases (involving
multiple specialists).114 Malpractice cases commonly turn on the opinions
of partisan “experts” rather than science-based standards of practice,
putting reduction of legal risk in conflict with pursuit of health care
quality.115 Individual blame, moreover, discourages open discussion of
mistakes and of management strategies that might prevent them,116 since
112. Not all differences in care constitute disparities. The Institute of Medicine has proposed a
useful distinction between appropriate differences in the care patients receive (arising from differences
in clinical circumstances and patient preferences) and inappropriate disparities (tied to race and
ethnicity, absent clinical justification). INST. OF MED., UNEQUAL TREATMENT 125–59 (Brian D.
Smedley et al. eds., 2003).
113. See COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., supra note 4 (reviewing
the large literature on mismatches between the messages sent by the medical tort system and the causes
of medical errors).
114. See COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., CROSSING THE QUALITY
CHASM 128–40 (2001) (urging team-oriented managerial strategies, borrowed from aviation and other
industries, for health care quality improvement).
115. The medical tort system, for the most part, continues to labor under the fiction that there is a
single standard of appropriate care in each case to be determined by the trier of fact based on testimony
from plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts. Malpractice law typically accords partisan experts trump status
over standards of care developed by academic and clinical leaders, based on scientific evidence. This
makes malpractice litigation into something of a roulette wheel, since doctors’ practice styles vary
greatly and often depart from evidence-based standards. Cf. CTR. FOR THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL
SCIS., DARTMOUTH MED. SCH., THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE: 1998, at 53–80 (1998)
(reviewing and analyzing local variations in medical and surgical responses to a broad range of
illustrative clinical problems). Thus, at best, the malpractice system offers minimal reward for best,
evidence-based practice. At worst, the system encourages doctors to depart from best practice when
doing so might protect them from plaintiffs’ experts.
116. A substantial literature documents the risk-reducing value of open discussion and rigorous
analysis of the causes of error. See, e.g., Ellison C. Pierce, The 34th Rovenstine Lecture: 40 Years
Behind the Mask: Safety Revisited, 84 ANESTHESIOLOGY 965 (1996) (discussing anesthesiologists’
success at reducing risk by identifying mistake-prone parts of the anesthesia process).
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admission of errors can increase liability risk.117 Fear of liability, moreover,
discourages collection of data on doctor and hospital performance—data
essential to ongoing quality improvement. And pursuit of culpable
individuals diverts attention from opportunities to improve quality by better
coordinating care and otherwise promoting team effort.
This is hardly to say that civil rights law has no place in efforts to
reduce health care disparities. Nor is it to deny the moral force of the
argument that racial injustice must be named and blamed,118 even when it
results from institutional insensitivities, rather than intentional design.119
But it is to caution that individual culpability operates on health care
systems in paradoxical fashion, creating incentives that put quality
improvement, and thus amelioration of racial disparity, at risk.
Management of this risk requires attention to medical care’s moving
parts—and to the mix of messages that the prospect of liability sends.
Similarly, calls by Jay Katz and others for informed-consent law to
take richer account of individuals’ beliefs, hopes, and fears120 disregard
competing health law and policy goals, including cost control and
distributive fairness. Empowering patients to assert their subjective
preferences puts pressure on doctors to accommodate them. This, of course,
is the point of such empowerment. But to the degree that doctors
accommodate by prescribing pricier, more intensive treatments to some,
medical spending will rise, and health insurance will spread this burden to
all of us.121
117. Immunizing discussion of possible errors from discovery—or from admissibility—in
litigation does not fully address this problem, since potential plaintiffs can use information from such
discussion to pursue other evidence of alleged clinical errors (for example, by deposing participants in
such discussions).
118. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY 16–22 (2001) (arguing
for the importance of identifying and addressing the racial bias embedded in our institutions, social
structures, and thought processes).
119. See generally M. Gregg Bloche, Race and Discretion in American Medicine, 1 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 95 (2001) (analyzing racial disparities in health care as the product of
interaction between clinical uncertainty, institutional and economic incentives, bias and stereotypes, and
historical discrimination).
120. Current informed-consent doctrine, as Katz points out, makes little space for individual
patients’ varying preferences. Katz, supra note 108, at 82–84. In most states, physicians need only tell
patients about risks and benefits that a reasonable physician would deem material to a patient’s
decision. (The reasonable physician standard, moreover, is typically applied by reference to prevailing
professional approaches to disclosure.) In other jurisdictions, doctors must disclose those risks and
benefits that a reasonable patient would deem material. This rule is no more friendly to individual
differences in patients’ beliefs, hopes, and fears. See id. at 81–82.
121. To be sure, “medical necessity” clauses in insurance contracts limit physicians’ ability to
accommodate patients’ subjective preferences. Insurers employ these clauses to resist covering care that
lies at or beyond the margins of accepted clinical practice. On the other hand, health insurance law
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The changes that Katz and others urge, moreover would turn
informed-consent law into an instrument of inequity—and of racial, ethnic,
and gender disparity, to the extent that patients’ preferences (and
willingness to pursue them) vary with group membership.122 Tying clinical
practice more closely to sick people’s subjective preferences would
empower the self-assertive to obtain costly, “boutique” care—care not
typically provided to the more retiring among us—at the insurance pool’s
expense.123 Not only could this widen disparities in care, it would also
make health insurance into a mechanism for cross-subsidies from the
diffident to the demanding.124
Neither Katz nor other proponents of greater legal deference to
patients’ individualized preferences acknowledge, let alone address, these
conflicts among autonomy, control of costs, and distributive fairness.
Empowering patients to express their hopes and fears is a deeply appealing
idea. But health care law serves other purposes, at odds with maximum
responsiveness to sick people’s personalized preferences. Focus on
informed consent, without regard for these other purposes or for the legal
doctrines that pursue them, contributes to health law’s confusion.
“There is work to be done,” as Greely says, and health care law is
indeed a “messy, sprawling” field.125 But this work includes the
accommodation of health law’s cacophony of aims and the management of
conflict among its myriad legal doctrines and regulatory regimes. No single
paradigm can neatly accomplish this. Yet disregarding this challenge would
(which itself embodies tension between support for cost control and for patients’ and doctors’ clinical
freedom) makes it risky for insurers to say no to such care. Constraints on nay-saying by insurers
include the availability of independent medical review in cases of coverage denial in at least forty
states, see Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 369 (2002), and rules of insurance
contract interpretation (for example, the principle that ambiguous contract language must be construed
based on “the reasonable expectations of the insured,” 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 297 (2003)) that
favor the insured. Insurance law would provide ample opportunity for patients and their doctors to
demand pricier services if informed-consent law took greater account of patients’ subjective
preferences, as Katz urges.
122. There is some evidence that male patients are more assertive than women in their careseeking behavior and that whites, as a group, are similarly more assertive than African-Americans.
INST. OF MED., supra note 112, at 131–35.
123. Magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”), which typically costs in excess of $800, is an
illustration. Should savvy and assertive patients be referred for MRIs to rule out exceedingly unlikely
illnesses simply because these patients verbalize their anxieties (and make demands of their doctors)
with less reserve than do others? Turning informed-consent law into a cudgel against doctors who resist
such entreaties would further empower the most privileged patients and thus widen socioeconomic and
racial disparities in medical care.
124. Since, within any given insurance plan, all pay the same premium, more demanding patients
would enjoy subsidies from those in the same clinical circumstances who ask for less.
125. See Greely, supra note 9, at 408; supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text.
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guarantee chaos in the governance of our medical system. Law’s
contribution to creating a more cost-effective, caring, and just health
system will turn in large measure on how courts, regulators, and other legal
decisionmakers pursue this task.
III. HEALTH CARE LAW AS AN EMERGENT SYSTEM
Can health care law rise to this challenge? No single legal actor can
answer this question. No homunculus can command health law’s
fragmented decisionmakers to adopt one or another way of doing things.
The law of medical care provision and financing can be usefully
understood as an emergent system.126 It arises from myriad “deciders”—
and from the interactions between them and the health care system’s
disconnected participants. Like other emergent systems, biological127 and
social,128 the legal governance of health care exhibits an intelligence (often
perverse129) that materializes from below.130 Efforts to influence this
intelligence for the better must take account of this. In this part and the
next, I shall propose a strategy for doing so—a strategy that breaks sharply
with the counsel that commentators on health law have, so far, offered legal
decisionmakers.
126. My proposition is not that health care law “is” (in some absolute sense) an emergent system;
my claim, rather, is that the emergent systems model has value as a tool for understanding and
navigating the obstacles to health law reform.
127. See, e.g., GERALD M. EDELMAN, BRIGHT AIR, BRILLIANT FIRE 7, 39–41 (1992) (analyzing
intelligence and consciousness as the emergent product of neural networks); BERT HÖLLDOBLER &
EDWARD O. WILSON, THE ANTS (1990) (analyzing the complex social organization of ants (and other
insects) as the emergent product of simple biochemical signals exchanged among individual ants);
STUART A. KAUFFMAN, THE ORIGINS OF ORDER (1993) (drawing on complexity theory to analyze
evolution as a nonlinear process).
128. See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD & MICHAEL D. COHEN, HARNESSING COMPLEXITY (2000)
(urging business leaders to think of their organizations as complex adaptive systems, empowered by
variation, in both product lines and decisionmaking strategies, to adjust to changing market conditions);
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 13–14 (1978) (considering the
connections between individual incentives and patterns of social behavior).
129. The logic of emergent systems is, from the perspective of the aims we seek, often perverse:
common examples include the development and spread of cancer, epidemics, war, and economic
bubbles and busts. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 15–17 (2d ed. 2005)
(tracing breakdowns in market valuation that arise from interactions between individuals’ selfdeceptions and misperceptions).
130. See generally JOHN H. HOLLAND, EMERGENCE: FROM CHAOS TO ORDER (1998) (laying out
the idea of emergence); STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE (1995) (offering accounts of
how order in complex systems emerges from innumerable interactions among simpler elements).
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A. BEYOND THE MYTH OF THE “DECIDER”
Commentary on health care law (and other legal fields) typically
presumes the existence of key decisionmakers—and their top-down
authority over the law within their domains. More often than not, in most
fields of law, this presumption is a close-enough approximation to reality.
The Supreme Court holds sway over federal constitutional law, and a
variety of federal agencies set the rules within their regulatory realms,131
subject to judicial review and congressional oversight. Health care law does
not function this way. No single authority sets the rules or is in position to
implement the proposals and paradigms urged by commentators. Health
law is the product of many, scattered deciders who act not in concert but in
interdependent fashion. It exhibits the properties of an emergent system—a
system with a design that arises from ongoing feedback among these
scattered deciders.132 Its design—its intelligence—transcends these
deciders. Indeed, it is a common feature of emergent systems that their
component elements do their part absent awareness of their places in the
larger scheme.
Ants, for example, “decide” to forage or to fight, or to follow paths
and to ferry food from distant places, based on pheromone levels they
detect. They neither take orders from superiors nor grasp their larger
mission on the colony’s behalf.133 Researchers have shown this by
exposing individual ants to different mixes of pheromones in laboratory
settings. The ants then forage or follow as they would in the wild, behavior
that seems perversely out of context beneath the laboratory’s bright
lights.134 Neurons, similarly, sum up the electric signals they receive, then
fire to activate or suppress follow-on cells that participate in networks tied
to perceiving, understanding, and acting on the world.135 Neurons have no
“sense” of their larger, networking mission. They simply follow the laws of
chemistry and physics; the logic of our thoughts and behavior emerges
from this.
131. Standard examples of agencies that function as the principal authorities within their realms of
law and policy include the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, and the
Environmental Protection Agency.
132. The emergent properties of health care law (by comparison to other areas of law) are a matter
of degree. All areas of law are influenced by multiple, interacting decisionmakers; thus all areas of law
can be seen as emergent to some degree. My limited point here is that the law of health care provision
and financing is more dependent on myriad, minimally coordinated decisionmakers—and less
influenced in top-down fashion by centralized legal authority—than almost any other field of law.
133. Eric Bonabeau & Guy Théraulaz, Swarm Smarts, SCI. AM., Mar. 2000, at 72, 73–74.
134. See id. at 74.
135. See EDELMAN, supra note 127, at 115–18.
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Likewise, the designs of cities, societies, and economies emerge from
the motives and actions of individuals who think they know what they are
doing but who are mostly unaware of their roles in fashioning and
sustaining neighborhoods, subcultures, industries, or the other social forms
that organize our collective lives.136 We are, of course, different from ants
and neurons—we are more flexible (since our neural networks evolve in
response to events), hierarchical, and, up to a point, self-aware. But what
we have in common with our remote, six-legged relatives is that the
intelligence of our social forms transcends our sense, as individuals, of our
motives, judgments, and actions.137
B. THE EMERGENT LOGIC OF HEALTH CARE LAW
The structure of health law is similarly emergent, for better and worse.
Take, for example, the tension between malpractice law’s reliance on
professional standards of care and the proposition that markets should
permit consumers to pick from among different levels of care, an idea
embedded in antitrust doctrine and, to some degree, judicial interpretation
of health insurance contracts. Commentators on health law treat this tension
as a failure of coherence. Market-oriented commentators complain that
liability for breach of professional standards prevents health plans and
providers from offering lower-cost care and coverage options.138 Liberals
who object to tying medical care to ability to pay defend professional
136. See PAUL KRUGMAN, THE SELF-ORGANIZING ECONOMY (1996).
137. Other legal scholars have invoked emergence, albeit toward ends that differ from mine.
Commentators on environmental law have drawn an analogy between ecosystems (often analyzed by
researchers as complex adaptive systems characterized by self-organization and nonlinear responses to
changing conditions) and the legal regimes designed to protect them. They have argued that complexity
(and the variation it generates) makes legal governance more robust—more responsive to changing
circumstances—just as complexity and chaos (which engender variation and thus expand evolutionary
options) make species and ecosystems better able to adapt to change. This line of reasoning has led
them to favor such approaches as greater devolution of regulatory authority to the states and the vesting
of federal regulatory authority in multiple, overlapping agencies. E.g., Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity
Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 930–31 (2005); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness
of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical
Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996). These scholars appear to presume that law
adapts by becoming more “fit” in response to selective pressures. I am skeptical about this proposition
(certainly the present state of health law is profoundly maladaptive, if by “adaptive” we mean wellsuited for the pursuit of agreed-on policy ends), given the power of interest groups, cascades of
collective fear and belief, and other nonrational factors to shape legal outcomes. Cf. Mark J. Roe, Chaos
and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996) (arguing that different approaches
to corporate governance in the United States, Europe, and Japan are products of initial conditions and
path dependence, not pure “evolution-toward-efficiency,” and that suboptimal governance schemes
persist in the absence of rival approaches with large efficiency advantages).
138. E.g., HAVIGHURST, supra note 11, at 115–17.
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standards as a floor below which levels of care should not fall.139
Looking at health law as an emergent system yields a different
understanding—one that treats this conflict as a mechanism of feedback
among scattered deciders with differing perspectives. A deeply felt
commitment to health equity, and to the ideal of life’s pricelessness,140
animates tort law’s deference to professional standards of care, as does sick
people’s yearning to trust their doctors.141 Were the law to utterly abandon
its reliance on professional standards, it would detach itself from these
concerns. This would undermine people’s confidence in law’s
responsiveness to their hopes and fears. Yet life is not priceless, resources
are scarce, and Americans revere the market as the most efficient, least
authoritarian way to manage scarcity. Antitrust and other doctrines that
promote consumer choice in health care express this. The legal regimes that
govern medical malpractice and restraints on competition thus embody
different suites of concerns142 to which Americans are inextricably
committed. From an emergent systems perspective, this is not a
contradiction; it is an opportunity for mutual feedback among component
systems that constitute health law. Antitrust lawyers who take Havighurst’s
combative stance toward professional standards can stay true to their
convictions, as can egalitarians who see health care allocation based on
ability to pay as anathema. Both sides think they know what they are
doing—campaigning to make health law more consistent (and to get it
“right”) by cleansing it of the pernicious influence of the opposing view.
Both sides, meanwhile, participate in a larger process of which they may be
unaware—a process of feedback between legal schemes that sometimes
sustains existing arrangements and that at other times pushes health care
governance hard in one direction or another,143 as scattered deciders take
139. See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine when Health Care Is Medically
Necessary?, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 229, 229 (1999) (urging reliance on professional standards to
determine levels of care and health insurance coverage).
140. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 135 (1978) (reflecting on the
tension between the ideal that life is priceless and the reality that we put lives at risk for economic
gain).
141. Mark Hall has perceptively observed that people’s trust for their doctors increases with
severity of illness—and the accompanying anxiety and fear. He cautions that trust deepens out of
proportion to trustworthiness as patients become more needy. Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust,
55 STAN. L. REV. 463, 507–09 (2002).
142. I have oversimplified my depictions of these sets of concerns—the thinking behind both (that
is, consumer-choice approaches and policies that put greater emphasis on equity and/or reliance on
professional norms) is more nuanced and variegated. But my oversimplification will serve to support
the larger point I am making here about the role of these suites of concern in health law’s emergence.
143. Since the late 1970s, health care law has shifted dramatically toward the market model, albeit
not as wholeheartedly as some market enthusiasts would have preferred. See supra text accompanying
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account of developments in neighboring suites of law.
There are many other examples of such feedback schemes in health
care law. Some involve classic tensions in American public life, between
national and local governance (the struggle over ERISA preemption of
state efforts to expand coverage is a case in point144), equity and autonomy
(the debate over the extent to which informed-consent law should
accommodate individuals’ varied preferences145 is illustrative), and public
versus personal responsibility for finding shelter against life’s vicissitudes
(the central theme of recurring battles over the scope of Medicaid, the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program (“SCHIP”), and other health
insurance initiatives for the disadvantaged). Others are more specific to
medicine (for example, different views on the role of science versus
clinical intuition in shaping medical practice).146
Some feedback mechanisms drive change in health systems through
public impression as much as law. During the late 1990s and early 2000s,
the managed-care industry successfully fought off class action suits and
Congressional proposals (so-called patients’ bills of rights) to hold it
accountable for refusing to cover physician-prescribed care.147 But press
coverage of lawsuits and legislative hearings made managed-care horror
stories into the stuff of kitchen-table conversation. Consumers left highly
restrictive health plans or pressed their employers to do so, and investors
turned bearish toward the industry, motivated by consumer backlash and
perceived legal risk. Health plans responded by abandoning the very
practices (such as frequent coverage denials and monetary rewards to
doctors for withholding care) they had fought in Congress and the courts to
notes 74–96.
144. See, e.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that
ERISA preempts Maryland’s so-called Wal-Mart law, requiring firms with ten thousand or more
employees to spend 8 percent or more of their payrolls on medical coverage for their workers). Efforts
by multiple states, most notably Massachusetts and California, to expand coverage by requiring
employers to contribute more toward medical costs, will likely lead to reprises of this struggle in the
months and years ahead.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 120–24.
146. Although the Daubert principle, requiring that expert testimony on scientific and technical
matters be grounded in “scientific knowledge,” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
589–90 (1993), has been applied by state as well as federal courts in many legal contexts, it has not
generally been applied to medical testimony concerning appropriate treatment in malpractice and
insurance coverage cases. Courts’ peculiar reluctance to extend Daubert to these contexts probably
reflects their regard for physicians’ clinical judgment—the proverbial “art of medicine”—when
supporting scientific evidence is lacking.
147. M. Gregg Bloche & David M. Studdert, A Quiet Revolution: Law as an Agent of Health
System Change, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 29.
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defend.148 The industry prevailed in the legal arena, but the struggle carried
a cost imposed on health plans by unhappy customers and investors.
Such feedback schemes enable the expression of values and concerns
that are at odds with each other but deeply felt, to the point that health law
cannot realistically discard them. Legal and regulatory actions that offend
these values inspire responses—from the losing parties and from legal
decisionmakers with different perspectives. Decisionmakers charged with
implementing different legal regimes—tort and contract, ERISA, antitrust,
and many others—send negative or positive feedback signals through their
responses. Refusal by state judges, for example, to endorse contractual
departure from professional standards of care in medical malpractice cases
sends a dampening message to antitrust and other decisionmakers eager to
advance the market model in the medical realm. On the other hand, state
courts’ growing willingness since the 1970s to permit insurers to deny
coverage for physician-prescribed services on contractual grounds149
signals that their support for professional authority has diminished.
The Supreme Court’s refusal to give full effect to the market model
even in the antitrust context—for example, the Justices’ acceptance of
professional restrictions on price advertising150—may reflect its summing
of these and other mixed signals, from many decisionmakers, about the
comparative desirability of unfettered competition and deference to
professional norms. Justice Souter’s seeming confusion about the sweep of
markets—his characterization of clinical standards of care as the product of
market-driven cost-benefit trade-offs in Pegram, followed by his portrayal
of medical standards as a matter of professional opinion, not contract, in
Rush Prudential151—may merit criticism as lawyerly craftsmanship. But it
is a sign of the Court’s role as a processor of mixed messages about the role
of markets and professionalism in health care governance. The Justices
participate in overlapping networks of feedback involving health law’s
myriad decisionmakers.152 In response to the varied signals the Justices
receive, they invoke competing models of medical governance, all of which
have some legal force. So it is hardly surprising that the Court sends
148. Id. at 37–38.
149. See supra text accompanying note 86–89.
150. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 95–101.
152. The Court is, to be sure, an outsized participant: its “signal” to these networks is decisive on
federal law matters plainly covered by its precedents, and it is “loud,” due to its audibility, even on
matters outside this scope. Yet the network metaphor still holds: by analogy to strategically placed cells
in neural networks, the Justices have much influence, but they exercise it through constrained channels
in response to other decisionmakers.
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messages that do not cohere: consistency would require the Justices to
discard large parts of health law, embodying values and concerns
Americans are unwilling to abandon.
Within the networks of decisionmaking that constitute health care law,
negative feedback tends to support the status quo, and positive feedback
tends to promote change. Novel judicial, regulatory, and legislative gambits
typically provoke suppressive responses,153 but they sometimes catch fire,
propagating to broader networks of decisionmakers. The law’s embrace of
the market paradigm is the highest profile example. Isolated initiatives in
the 1970s—the Supreme Court’s abandonment of the learned-profession
exemption from antitrust law154 and congressional passage of a law
promoting HMOs155—triggered positive responses, probably potentiated by
rising skepticism toward professional authority. Other decisionmakers
picked up, then amplified the signal. The Federal Trade Commission began
antitrust enforcement against health care providers, state regulators backed
away from limitations on hospitals’ capital investment, and courts, as
mentioned earlier, allowed insurers to decline coverage for physicianprescribed care.
Preceding and parallel developments in neighboring legal spaces
widened the possibilities for propagation. Those who urged more robust
informed-consent requirements during the 1960s and 1970s did not mean to
promote medical markets,156 but by winning broader legal recognition for
patient autonomy, they primed courts’, regulators’, and the public’s
receptivity to the competition paradigm. And for the Congress that enacted
ERISA in 1974, in response to pension fund scandals that shattered
153. An example is the effort by some state and federal judges, beginning in the late 1990s, to
chart a path around ERISA preemption of managed care liability for negligent coverage denial. See
Bloche, supra note 11, at 301. To avert preemption under ERISA’s section 514 of state laws that “relate
to” employment-based health plans, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006), judges sought to characterize health
plans’ coverage determinations as medical judgments (beyond the preemptive reach of section 514,
based on established precedent) rather than plan administration (clearly within ERISA’s preemptive
shield). See Bloche, supra note 11, at 301. Variants of this approach caught on in some jurisdictions,
including several federal circuits, but the Supreme Court squelched the strategy in 2004, in Aetna
Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208–21 (2004), holding broadly that ERISA’s preemption
provisions preclude such liability.
154. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787–88 (1975).
155. Health Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300e (2000)) (offering grants and loans to qualifying HMOs, exempting
qualified HMOs from restrictive state regulation, and requiring employers with twenty-five or more
employees to offer their workers an HMO alternative to conventional fee-for-service insurance).
156. See M. Gregg Bloche, Medical Ethics in the Courts, in ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF HEALTH
POLICY 133, 135–40 (Marion Danis et al. eds., 2002) (considering the emergence of patient autonomy
as a value in bioethics commentary and legal doctrine during the 1960s and 1970s).
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American workers’ confidence, the potential implications for health
insurance were an afterthought. But by preempting most state regulation of
fringe benefits (and substituting no minimum requirements of its own),
ERISA largely deregulated the market for medical coverage.
Out of many interwoven networks of deciders, health care law
emerges. This process hardly guarantees a governance system that serves
us well; by way of analogy, emergence in biological systems generates
tumors, seizures, and other phenomena that careen out of control when the
feedback mechanisms that maintain homeostasis fail. America’s worsening
crises of cost and access, clinical mistakes that kill tens of thousands of
patients per year, and the proliferation of treatments absent proof of their
value strongly suggest that, in health care law, much has gone awry. How
to intervene to make health law part of the solution is a question that calls
for attention to the logic of emergence.
IV. TOWARD AN AGENDA FOR HEALTH CARE LAW
Commentators on health care law and policy urge courts, legislators,
and sundry regulators to pursue elegantly designed approaches, rooted in
one or another governance paradigm. Rarely is this advice taken. Instead,
health law decisionmakers continue to churn out a hodgepodge of
disconnected doctrines and policies. Academic disdain for this incoherence
makes for edgy commentary,157 but it has done little to change health law.
If the health law commentariat is to become more than marginally relevant,
it will need to radically shift its focus, toward opportunities for influencing
the dynamics of emergence. Seen through an emergent systems lens, health
law’s contradictions express competing, deeply felt values and concerns
that feed back on each other. If health law is to maintain its democratic
legitimacy, these discordant values and concerns cannot be abandoned.
Thus the challenge for health lawyers is not to efface the field’s
contradictions. It is to glimpse or intuit the flows of influence through
networks of scattered deciders, with an eye toward chances to amplify,
dampen, or redirect the flow; and with a readiness to seize moments as they
arise.
The most effective democratic leaders—and the greatest legal
advocates—have preternatural understandings of their potential avenues of
influence.158 They intuit how networks of decisionmakers might react to
157. In my view, David Hyman is by far the most engaging—and insightful—on this theme. See,
e.g., DAVID A. HYMAN, MEDICARE MEETS MEPHISTOPHELES (2006).
158. President Franklin Roosevelt, a law school dropout, intuited open and closed pathways with
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legal and policy changes—and thus how these changes might play out over
the long haul. They grasp the potential for small changes to have large
long-run impacts—that is, they intuit possible nonlinear relationships
between legal interventions and social consequences. They do not invoke
the emergent systems model or metaphor. Yet this model captures a critical
aspect of their judgment: their ability to anticipate the possibilities and
limits of their influence by intuiting other legal and political actors’
responses.
In the field of health care reform, such understanding has been in short
supply. With disastrous results, the Clinton administration crafted an
unwieldy reform scheme that took little account of likely sources of
resistance.159 After the Clinton plan’s collapse, many observers wrote off
the possibility of substantial reform, concluding that interest group
opposition stands immovably in the way. This pessimism is misplaced.
Opportunities for transformation abound, but they require attention to the
dynamics of health law’s emergence. They also require reformers to
acknowledge a corollary of the logic of emergence—that they can
jumpstart change but cannot order up precise results, since exact outcomes
cannot be known in advance.160
I shall devote the rest of this Article to these opportunities for
transformation. Though the obstacles are formidable, possibilities are
plentiful on the health care policy fronts that are of most urgent concern:
access to care, cost, and value. There are, of course, large differences of
opinion as to what constitutes sufficient access to care, how much America
should spend on health services, and how to assay their value. I have
opined in detail on these questions elsewhere,161 and I will not do so here.
aplomb as he maneuvered through political and legal obstacles to his economic reform strategies, then
to the waging of war. See generally DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR (1999). Legendary
examples of lawyers with this gift include Clark Clifford, Thurman Arnold, and Thurgood Marshall.
See generally DOUGLAS FRANTZ & DAVID MCKEAN, FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES: THE RISE AND FALL OF
CLARK CLIFFORD (1995); SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMAN ARNOLD: A BIOGRAPHY (2005); JUAN
WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY (1998).
159. THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG 48–73 (1996).
160. Emergent systems are self-organizing; that is, their order arises from the incalculable (quite
literally) combination of simpler interactions at lower levels (for example, neurons that constitute a
nervous system; businesses and individuals who comprise an economy). Because these countless,
simpler interactions cannot be exhaustively predicted, their emergent results cannot be specified in
advance. See supra Part III.A. Emergent software is illustrative: its repeat “plays” of a given, complex
scenario (for example, a model for the spread of an epidemic, the propagation of a financial panic, or
the evolution of traits by natural selection) yield different results. The predictive power of such software
comes not from individual runs, or plays, but from large numbers of plays (made possible by enormous
computing power) that, together, suggest the range of possible outcomes.
161. See M. GREGG BLOCHE, DO NO HARM (forthcoming 2009); Bloche, supra note 11.
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But I note that my views about the goals of reform are influenced by my
belief that making decent medical care available to all is a moral
imperative, that current medical spending trends are unsustainable, and that
the law should leave room for diverse understandings of health care’s
value.
I note also that thinking about health care governance as an emergent
system hardly predisposes the resulting analysis toward reform. To the
contrary, the emergent systems model is descriptive—and open to use (or
exploitation) by anyone who aims to advance or stymie reform. Indeed, as I
will point out below, strategies that show awareness of emergent
possibilities have, in the past, been employed most effectively by actors
and interest groups intent on blocking health systems change. My aim in
Part IV is to invite reformers to harness the power of emergent strategies on
behalf of urgently needed change in health care provision and financing.
A. EXPANDING ACCESS TO CARE
Although a large majority of Americans support universal health
insurance coverage,162 political and legal obstacles have repeatedly stymied
efforts to achieve it.163 Contemporary barriers include ERISA preemption
of state initiatives to expand coverage (many of these initiatives require
employers to cover their workers or pay into public funds set up to
subsidize insurance), ideological resistance to publicly supported coverage
as incompatible with personal responsibility, and health care stakeholders’
concerns about disruptions in cash flows on which they have come to rely.
Foremost among the likely disruptions is the shift from veiled crosssubsidies to visible means of financing care for the less well-off.
Americans subsidize care for the medically indigent through a variety of
mechanisms that few understand. These include extra payments from the
162. Robin Toner & Janet Elder, Most Support U.S. Guarantee of Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
2, 2007, at A1 (citing survey data from N.Y. TIMES/CBS NEWS, POLL: FEB. 23–27, 2007, at 15,
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/03022007_poll.pdf).
163. These failures date back to the administration of President Woodrow Wilson, whose nascent
proposal for publicly sponsored coverage was undercut by wartime portrayals of public coverage as a
German concept (German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had pioneered the idea of universal publicly
provided health insurance in the 1870s) incompatible with Americanism. See RONALD L. NUMBERS,
ALMOST PERSUADED 75–78 (1978). Numbers observes: “As [World War I] progressed, Americans in
increasing numbers began referring to compulsory health insurance as ‘un-American’ and predicting
that it would lead to the ‘Prussianization of America.’” Id. at 77. In the 1930s, President Franklin
Roosevelt’s administration developed a plan for public coverage (as a companion to Social Security),
but Roosevelt backed off in the face of fierce resistance from the American Medical Association and
others. Other presidents who unsuccessfully proposed universal coverage include Harry Truman,
Richard Nixon, and, of course, Bill Clinton. See generally MAYES, supra note 60.
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Medicare trust fund to hospitals with large numbers of uninsured patients,
as well as private insurance premiums set high enough to contribute to the
costs of indigent care.164 Publicly sponsored coverage for the less well-off
would supplant these covert cross-subsidies with a high-profile tax,165 an
inviting political target. The prospect of these cross-subsidies’
disappearance, moreover, alarms hospitals and clinics, who fear that public
funding for broader coverage will not suffice to replace this “bird in
hand.”166
1. State Solutions?
States have seized the initiative on the health reform front, and
creative, bipartisan ideas about how they might expand coverage have
spread virally.167 From a conventional health reform perspective, the
prospect of fifty different insurance schemes is anathema: a single, national
system (whether market oriented or government administered) is essential
to avoid Byzantine bureaucratic and legal complexity.168 But from an
emergent systems vantage point—a perspective that focuses on
evolutionary possibilities—the state-by-state route is worth encouraging.
Ongoing ideological and interest group gridlock at the federal level has
stymied reform at the national level. State-by-state progress could build
momentum toward nationwide insistence on universal coverage, so long as
high-visibility state initiatives are seen as successes worth propagating.169
164. Robert A. Carolina & M. Gregg Bloche, Paying for Undercompensated Hospital Care: The
Regressive Profile of a “Hidden Tax,” 2 HEALTH MATRIX 141 (1992).
165. A tax with a distributive profile akin to that of the federal income tax would be more
progressive than the current system of veiled cross-subsidies (from private insurance premiums and the
Medicare trust fund) for uncompensated hospital care. Id. at 156–58. On the other hand, public
coverage sufficient to provide access to comprehensive, mainstream care would cost more than the
current, incomplete web of cross-subsidies for care in hospitals and community clinics.
166. Resistance to California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s failed health reform plan was
illustrative. Schwarzenegger proposed in 2007 to pay for expanded medical coverage in part by pooling
current cross-subsidy streams and rechanneling them from hospitals and clinics to support insurance
premiums for the less well-off. GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF CAL., GOVERNOR’S HEALTH CARE
PROPOSAL 7 (2007), http://gov.ca.gov/pdf/press/Governors_HC_Proposal.pdf. Health care providers—
the recipients of these cross-subsidies—have fretted about the prospect that they could lose these crosssubsidies and still face a substantial uncompensated care burden, absent the achievement of universal
coverage.
167. See Stuart Butler & Henry Aaron, A Bipartisan Push on Healthcare,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, May 13, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
05/11/AR2007051101784.html.
168. Multistate employers, especially, dread the prospect of myriad state regimes, each with its
own minimum coverage requirements and revenue-raising scheme.
169. There is no small risk here. The success or failure of Massachusetts’s pioneering plan for
universal coverage will have a large impact on the future of state reform. The financial difficulties that
endanger Maine’s Dirigo program, Pam Belluck, Maine Learns Expensive Lesson as Universal Health
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Similarities in design are likely to result from the propagation of successful
state models along informal networks of influence;170 this would ease
administrative burdens. But if large employers or health plans become
concerned about the balkanization of legal and regulatory requirements,
they could press Congress and the White House for federalization of the
emerging universal coverage scheme. They might well succeed,
demonstrating the power of feedback mechanisms to transform health
policy and law in circuitous fashion171—and locking in a national
commitment to medical coverage for all.
Support for state initiatives thus constitutes a wise gamble from an
emergent systems perspective. It carries no guarantee that the country will
embrace any particular model for expanding coverage;172 states will decide,
case by case, and more likely than not, one or a few prevailing models will
emerge. Nor must it lead, in the end, to state governance of health
insurance coverage. Congress and the White House could respond to state
initiatives by imposing an overarching federal scheme. Were this to
happen, state reforms would still have served a vital purpose as steps in the
evolution of universal coverage.
This rationale favors legislative revision of ERISA to clear the way for
state experimentation,173 and, in the meanwhile, this rationale supports
judicial construction of ERISA to minimize preemption of state
initiatives.174 There is ample doctrinal space for such a judicial reading.
Plan Stalls, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2007, at A1, and led to the collapse of Tennessee’s TennCare scheme,
Robert E. Hurley, TennCare–A Failure of Politics, Not Policy: A Conversation with Gordon Bonnyman,
25 HEALTH AFF. W217, W217–25 (2006), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/
abstract/ 25/3/w217, underscore the uncertain fate of state initiatives.
170. Such networks include the National Governors Association, the National Conference of State
Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, and numerous think tanks that function as forums for
the sharing of state health reform experiences and ideas.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 153–55.
172. States are now weighing a variety of models, alone and in combination; these include
expansions of Medicaid, employer obligations to provide coverage or contribute toward its cost,
consumer-directed health care, premium support, and insurance market reforms. CTR. FOR BEST
PRACTICES, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, LEADING THE WAY: STATE HEALTH REFORM INITIATIVES
(2007), available at http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0707HEALTHREFORM.PDF.
173. Bipartisan support for revising ERISA will become increasingly likely as states enact
coverage expansion initiatives and look to their congressional representatives for support. Former
Massachusetts governor Michael Dukakis argues that California and other states considering such
initiatives should ignore the ERISA preemption issue as they draft legislation, then ask Congress to
either exempt them or to trim back the preemption for everyone. Personal Communication with Michael
Dukakis, in L.A., Cal. (Feb. 2007).
174. The extent to which ERISA preempts state laws requiring employers to either provide
coverage for their employees (up to some state-defined minimum level of benefits) or to contribute
funds in some other fashion, toward coverage of the uninsured, will be the principal focus of such
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The Supreme Court has said, in a case involving state regulation of hospital
charges for the purpose of expanding coverage, that ERISA’s preemptive
provisions are to be read narrowly when they infringe on traditional state
power over health matters.175 To be sure, there is lower court precedent to
the contrary,176 but the accretion of state reform initiatives would put
pressure on judges not to stymie legislators’ wills when neither Supreme
Court precedent nor the plain language of ERISA requires it.
2. Personal Responsibility
Objections to publicly supported coverage on the ground that it is
incompatible with personal responsibility177 pose a larger challenge for
efforts to expand health care access. Commentators, advocacy
organizations, public officials, and others who favor government action to
increase access have offered many countervailing arguments.178 This battle
has been joined in American politics since Theodore Roosevelt urged
national health insurance during his Bull-Moose run for the presidency in
1912.179 There have been incremental steps forward—Medicare and
Medicaid in 1965, Medicaid expansion during the 1980s, and SCHIP in
1997. Yet portrayals of public coverage as a handout—a step toward
socialism180 and away from self-reliance—have retained their resonance.
preemption litigation as state reform gathers steam. See supra note 20. State insurance market reforms,
including new mechanisms for pooling risk among small employers, could also face preemption
challenges under ERISA.
175. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 659–62 (1995) (holding that state law requiring hospitals to collect higher payments from
commercial insurers than from nonprofit Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans survives ERISA section 514
preemption).
176. E.g., Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180 (4th Cir. 2007).
177. The leading proponent of this view among legal scholars is Richard Epstein. See generally
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE? (1997).
178. There are innumerable examples of leading scholarly efforts to make the case for government
action to achieve universal coverage. See, e.g., DANIELS, supra note 71, at 42–48 (making a Rawlsian
case for universal coverage); EZEKIEL J. EMANUEL, THE ENDS OF HUMAN LIFE 120–24, 178–97 (1991)
(criticizing Rawlsian arguments and making a communitarian case); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE 64–94 (1983) (offering communitarian arguments). See also INST. OF MED., INSURING
AMERICA’S HEALTH (2004) (reviewing clinical, economic, and philosophical arguments for universal
coverage).
179. MAYES, supra note 60, at 1.
180. The American Medical Association deployed the “socialism” canard with much effect in the
1930s to derail President Franklin Roosevelt’s national health insurance proposal. See id. at 19–20. In
muted form, it persists to the present day: 2008 Republican presidential candidate Rudolph Giuliani
characterized Democratic candidates’ universal coverage proposals as “socialized medicine.”
Republican Presidential Candidate Giuliani Discusses Health Care at Events in N.H., S.C., KAISER
DAILY HEALTH REP., Aug. 17, 2007, http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/health2008dr.cfm?
DR_ID=46953.
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Universal coverage proponents have struggled to rebut this portrayal
with more and better arguments. But the logic of emergence suggests
another approach—one that takes advantage of the tension between
people’s contradictory commitments to universal coverage and to selfreliance. Rather than ruing this contradiction, health policy progressives
should harness its political energy by weaving individual responsibility and
mutual obligation together into a new reciprocity of personal and public
commitment to health. This new reciprocity might start with an “enhanced
sense of individual obligation—to eat sensibly, exercise regularly, avoid
smoking, and otherwise care for ourselves.”181 It could include an
obligation to buy insurance. Our failure to do these things should carry
consequences, such as premium surcharges and a measure of
embarrassment over personal behavior that adds health risk without
corresponding social benefit.182 The state, in exchange, should offer some
protection when self-reliance falters. Americans who cannot afford
coverage should be able to turn to their government for help in acquiring it.
If the United States is to come close to universal coverage, personal
responsibility will probably need to play a larger role than it did in the midtwentieth century welfare state.183 But in return, we should be able to count
on each other, through our government, to shield us from the degrading,
life-endangering consequences of going without basic care because we
cannot pay.
3. Taxes, Subsidies, and Settled Expectations
Health care stakeholders’ concerns about disruption of their revenue
streams as a result of movement toward universal coverage need to be
taken seriously. From a conventional policy wonk perspective, this
disruption should not count. It is a mere transition problem. If one or
181. M. Gregg Bloche, Health Care for All?, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1173, 1174 (2007).
182. Such behaviors include substance abuse, reckless sex, and overeating. Here, conservatives
have a point (in my view) when they chide some liberals for characterizing these behaviors as wholly
the products of illness, compulsion, corporate marketing, or social injustice, rather than personal choice.
Social norms that reward self-control and punish lapses have a role. See M. Gregg Bloche, Obesity and
the Struggle Within Ourselves, 93 GEO. L.J. 1335, 1351–54 (2005). This is hardly to say that social
conditions have no causal role in behaviors that put health at risk; to the contrary, poverty (and its
tendency to keep people focused on their immediate needs), environmental disadvantages, the media’s
messages, and other social circumstances are important factors. But a sense of individual responsibility
can make a positive health difference, even when social unfairness renders the playing field uneven.
183. The health care reform ideas being taken seriously in state capitals and in the 2008
presidential campaign are notable for their emphasis on personal responsibility. Bloche, supra note 181,
at 1174–75. Some (including the Massachusetts plan) include an individual mandate to buy insurance,
and most make some reference to people’s responsibility to keep fit, stop smoking, and otherwise care
for themselves.
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another universal coverage scheme constitutes an improvement over
today’s tangled web of cross-subsidies, it ought to be enacted—unless a
competing scheme would improve things even more. But from an emergent
systems perspective, transitions are crucial. They are not details to be
worked out, bureaucratically and legally, after new policies are chosen;
they are the terrain that must be negotiated to achieve policy ends.
Obstacles thrown up by stakeholders, bureaucratic structures, and legal
regimes must be anticipated. And public perceptions are crucial, as is
illustrated by voters’ resistance to new taxes, even when these would
supplant payroll deductions that cross-subsidize care for the poor.
Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson understood this
last point when they insisted on characterizing working Americans’
contributions toward Social Security and Medicare as insurance premiums,
not taxes. Aspiring architects of expanded medical coverage today would
do well to fashion schemes that separate collection of general tax revenues
from public financing of care for people unable to meet their own needs.
This is more than just rhetoric; both promising political pathways and
insurmountable obstacles to reform emerge from the structure of people’s
perceptions about the options they confront.184
Aspiring architects of reform should also avoid large, immediate
disruption of current financial arrangements, even when the policy case for
disruption is powerful. Sudden disruption of settled expectations invites
fierce political and legal resistance from stakeholders—resistance that can
put reform at risk.185 From an emergent systems perspective, getting reform
right is more than a matter of preparing a blueprint for the best policy in the
abstract; it requires charting a path through networks of political and legal
influence. Policies that postpone the prospect of disruption—leaving open
multiple, more gradual evolutionary possibilities—will tend to arouse less
resistance.
There is, for example, a strong public policy case for ending tax
exemption of nonprofit hospitals upon the advent of comprehensive,
universal coverage.186 The prevailing rationale for property and income tax
exemption of hospitals has long been their provision of care to people
184. See DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN 89–93 (2007) (drawing on neuroscience evidence
to argue that people form policy positions by (unconsciously) organizing their perceptions of new
circumstances into preconceived patterns, then reacting emotionally to these patterns).
185. M. Gregg Bloche, A Graveyard for Grand Theory, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1534, 1535 (2007).
186. M. Gregg Bloche, Health Policy Below the Waterline: Medical Care and the Charitable
Exemption, 80 MINN. L. REV. 299, 394–98 (1995).
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unable to pay.187 Adoption of universal coverage would render this
rationale obsolete. Elimination of these tax subsidies would make
additional state and federal dollars available to support insurance for those
unable to afford it. Redirecting public funds from subsidies for hospitals to
coverage for the uninsured would both empower patients188 and better
match public spending with clinical need.189 Yet the nonprofit hospital
sector’s resistance to loss of its tax exemptions weighs heavily against
trying to do so as part of a health reform plan. Exemption, even for
hospitals that provide minimal “charity” care, has become a settled
expectation, and enactment of universal coverage—at either the state or the
federal level—without the nonprofit sector’s support is difficult to imagine.
Thus the demise of this otherwise unjustifiable190 subsidy is not worth
demanding.191
The same is the case for other cross-subsidy schemes entangled within
the disordered web of American health care financing. Extra Medicare
payments to teaching hospitals for the training of residents, so-called
disproportionate share subsidies from Medicare to hospitals that admit
large numbers of poor patients, and myriad other flows of cash have their
dug-in defenders. For some observers, such seepages of public funds
constitute arguments against government action to expand coverage.192 But
187. This “quid pro quo” rationale is well-established in state property tax law, and until 1969 it
was explicitly part of the IRS rationale for federal income tax exemption. Id. at 382–83. Other proposed
justifications for tax exemption include Henry Hansmann’s argument that it compensates for nonprofit
firms’ disadvantage in raising capital, owing to their inability to distribute profits to owners, and the
nonprofit hospital sector’s claim that nonprofit status yields community benefits, beyond free care,
deserving of public subsidy. Id. at 320–22.
188. Instead of being beneficiaries of hospital charity, the (formerly) uninsured would become
consumers with purchasing power and choice of providers. Id. at 334.
189. Tax subsidies for hospitals support hospital-based care, rather than the full range of clinical
services (including outpatient screening, chronic disease management, and preventive care) available to
patients with adequate insurance. Tax subsidies are thus a poor substitute for insurance. Id. at 369.
190. But see Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law and Ethics
of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1346–47 (2003) (arguing that nonprofit hospitals
supply community benefits that merit tax exemption).
191. Although tax exemption is, in my view, unjustifiable, see Bloche, supra note 186, from a
policy analytic perspective, its persistence presents an opportunity. Rather than insisting on its
elimination, one might (from an emergent systems perspective) seize on it opportunistically, as a
fulcrum for policy leverage. This might be accomplished by taking nonprofit hospitals’ claims of
community benefit, see Horowitz, supra note 190, very seriously, to the point of conditioning tax
exemption upon hospitals’ achievement of benchmarks for health promotion, clinical quality, and as
care for the needy. Transforming tax exemption into a type of pay-for-performance, in this fashion, is
politically and legally more plausible than eliminating it altogether. M. Gregg Bloche, Tax Preferences
for Nonprofits: From Per Se Exemption to Pay-for-Performance, 25 HEALTH AFF. W304 (2006),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/abstract/25/4/W304.
192. See, e.g., HYMAN, supra note 157, at 27–47.
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for those who hold that failure to extend coverage to the nearly fifty million
Americans without it is indecent, this leakiness is an acceptable cost. The
emergent systems perspective counsels patience. Perhaps, once universal
coverage becomes America’s baseline expectation, these embedded
subsidies will be seen as giveaways, and courts and regulators will no
longer countenance them. On the other hand, they could survive, like farm
subsidies, despite popular scorn—protected by politically leveraged
advocates.193
4. The Politics of Emergence: The Demise and Rebirth of Health Care
Reform
Thus far, opponents of publicly sponsored universal coverage have
displayed a deeper intuitive awareness of the power of emergence than
have advocates of health insurance for all. A stunning example played out
in 1993, as congressional Republicans scrambled to prepare for President
Clinton’s anticipated health care reform juggernaut. The party’s Senate and
House leaders eyed plausible compromises that might have achieved nearuniversal coverage with a reduced role for government.194 These
compromises hewed to traditional Republican principles. They would have
left open a wide playing field for competition between health plans,
193. This points to another role for health law and policy scholars—as participants in the process
of emergence. Scholars of health care governance are uniquely positioned to detect embedded interestgroup influence, to expose it, and to speak to public audiences about its pernicious policy and legal
impact. They are especially well-situated to identify cases of government responsiveness to this
influence and to call public officials to account when they service parochial interests. This has
traditionally been the role of investigative journalists, but deeply probing reporting on public affairs is
in decline. National news organizations are budgeting less for investigative reporting and in-depth
analysis, and recent changes in the ownership and business objectives of leading newspapers (most
visibly the sale of the Los Angeles Times and the Wall Street Journal by founding families deeply
committed to these publications’ journalistic missions) could lead to further declines in penetrating
reporting and analysis. The expertise necessary to track and interpret government action in such
complicated realms as health makes it unlikely that the blogosphere will fill this gap. By incorporating
this work into their professional role, and by seeking visible platforms for their findings and analyses,
scholars of health law and policy can diminish the ability of embedded interests to shape health law and
policy, unrestrained by the prospect of public revelation. A potent array of public platforms is available
to scholars and researchers: these include op-ed pages, medical and health policy journals covered by
national media (principally the New England Journal of Medicine, JAMA, and Health Affairs),
symposia and briefings sponsored by high-profile think tanks, and blogs sponsored by some of these
venues.
194. Options included R.I. Sen. John Chafee’s proposal, the Health Equity and Access Reform
Today Act of 1993, S. 1770, H.R. 3704, 103d Cong. (1993) (proposing mandatory private insurance
with a scheme of public subsidies for low-income subscribers and cosponsored by twenty-one other
Republican senators, including Minority Leader Robert Dole) and the Heritage Foundation’s Consumer
Choice Health Plan, see Stuart M. Butler, Have it Your Way: What the Heritage Foundation Health
Plan Means for You, POL’Y REV., Fall 1993, at 54.
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minimally restricted by federal regulators. But conservative strategist
William Kristol looked beyond the policy logic of the possible deals and
toward the longer-term implications of government-guaranteed coverage.
For Republicans, he intuited, the implications were disastrous. Enactment
of any publicly financed scheme to cover all would rekindle Roosevelt-era
confidence in government as guarantor of personal security, undermining
the broader Republican case for lower taxes and less government.195
Conversely, utter defeat for health care reform on President Clinton’s
watch would deliver a lasting blow both to Americans’ belief in
government’s ability to solve complex social problems and to confidence in
the Democrats’ ability to deliver on their promises.196
In a memo that quickly achieved iconic status among conservatives,
Kristol urged Republicans to go all-out to kill health care reform.197 There
should be no deals, no carefully nuanced compromises, Kristol argued. The
Clinton plan should come to nothing, except disillusionment.198 Swayed by
Kristol’s analysis, House and Senate Republican leaders abandoned
compromise alternatives in favor of a scorched-earth stance toward health
care reform.199 By the fall of 1994, the Clinton plan had succumbed.200 A
few months later, disillusioned voters delivered both houses of Congress to
the Republicans for the first time in forty years. Universal coverage
disappeared from the national agenda for a decade, despite the ongoing
increase in the numbers of the uninsured. More than that, Americans
maintained their skepticism toward government’s ability to transform their
195. SKOCPOL, supra note 159, at 145–46 (quoting Memorandum from William Kristol,
Chairman, Project for the Republican Future, to Republican Leaders (Dec. 2, 1993)). Calling the
Clinton plan “a serious political threat to the Republican Party,” Kristol warned that passage of
comprehensive reform would “revive the reputation . . . of Democrats as . . . the generous protector of
middle-class interests” and “relegitimize middle-class dependence for ‘security’ on government
spending and regulation.” Id. at 145.
196. Kristol wrote that rejection of the Clinton plan “by Congress and the public would be a
monumental setback for the president, and an uncontestable piece of evidence that Democratic welfarestate liberalism remains firmly in retreat.” Id. at 146.
197. See id. at 145–46.
198. “The goal over the next several months,” Kristol urged, at the height of the battle over the
Clinton plan, “should not be simply to wound the proposal, to nitpick the numbers or criticize some of
the most onerous provisions, but to defeat the Clinton plan root and branch. . . . We want to use the
health care debate as a model for routing contemporary liberalism and advancing an aggressive
conservative activist agenda.” Adam Meyerson, Kristol Ball: William Kristol Looks at the Future of the
GOP, POL’Y REV., Winter 1994, at 14, 15.
199. See SKOCPAL, supra note 159, at 146–47.
200. Neither Kristol nor congressional Republicans can claim full credit for defeating health
reform. Potent opposition from health insurers and other interest groups had a large impact, as did the
Clinton administration’s tactical missteps. See JOHNSON & BRODER, supra note 60, at 123–24, 137–
207.
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lives for the better through grand social policy schemes. Kristol had gotten
it right. By focusing his party on the emergent consequences of the success
or failure of health care reform,201 rather than on the policy pluses and
minuses of particular compromises, he positioned Republicans to achieve
their larger, longer-term objectives.
Proponents of robust government action to achieve universal coverage
have been slower to seize on the promise of emergence. The architects of
the Clinton plan intended for it to take effect as a finished product. To be
sure, they envisioned a phase-in period, and they deferred to competition
among health insurers to fill in the plan’s fine details. But they fashioned a
detailed, top-down regulatory scheme to define the parameters of this
competition,202 and they envisioned little change in the plan’s basic
structure once it went into effect. Advocates of Canadian-style single-payer
coverage likewise urge top-down imposition of their approach, with little
regard for the enormous disruption it would entail.203 This disruption is the
driving force behind opposition to the single-payer model. A sudden switch
to single-payer would push the American health economy toward chaos by
shattering current financial arrangements and dislocating millions of
workers.204 Political resistance by those potentially affected makes this
approach a nonstarter.205
201. Kristol did not explicitly invoke emergent systems thinking, but he thought emergently. He
strategized to create conditions more likely to give rise to feelings and beliefs conducive to longer-term
Republican political and policy success.
202. The Clinton plan’s regulatory mechanisms addressed myriad matters in top-down fashion,
including specification of minimum benefits to be provided by competing health plans, establishment of
cross-subsidies among insurers to compensate for risk selection and adverse selection, and requirements
that employers assume financial and administrative responsibility for employee coverage.
203. See, e.g., Physicians’ Working Group for Single-Payer Nat’l Health Ins., Proposal of the
Physicians’ Working Group for Single-Payer National Health Insurance, 290 JAMA 798 (2003)
(urging complete replacement of private insurance by public, single-payer coverage without discussion
of transition issues, aside from a brief mention of job retraining programs for insurance company
employees).
204. Adoption of single-payer coverage would put an end to cash flows in the hundreds of billions
of dollars per year from private health care payers to hospitals, doctors, drug and device makers, and
others. Cash flows from the public payer (or payers, if a system of regional payers were adopted) would
commence in lieu of private payments, but there would surely be substantial changes in coverage
policies and amounts paid, with profound financial implications for health care providers. Moreover,
many of the millions of Americans who administer our decentralized system of private coverage and
payment could find themselves out of work. There would be ripple effects as well, on labor markets (as
millions, or at least hundreds of thousands, found themselves out of work), businesses that look to
insurance companies for investment capital, and economic sectors that depend, in turn, on these
businesses’ buying power and on the purchasing power of insurance company employees.
205. I take no position here on the policy question of whether a single-payer model would be
better as an end state, in the abstract, than other universal coverage schemes. For a powerful argument
that the single-payer model is superior, see THEODORE R. MARMOR, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH CARE
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There is, nevertheless, cause for optimism about health care reform. A
new generation of proposals harnesses the power of emergence in ways that
enhance the likelihood of extending coverage to all, or at least to many.
During the 2008 presidential campaign, leading candidates from both
parties urged legal changes that would free states to pursue promising
initiatives—initiatives now jeopardized by ERISA preemption206 and by
limits on states’ ability to make creative use of their Medicaid and SCHIP
funds to expand coverage.207 Some supporters of universal coverage
dismiss state initiatives as mere incrementalism—a diversion from the
quest for universal coverage. This criticism ignores the emergent
possibilities of state-by-state action—its potential to propagate “me-too”
optimism (and feasible compromises), as well as the prospect that state-bystate success (and ensuing worries about regulatory balkanization) could
prompt Congress to enact nationwide reform.208
Likewise, proposals advanced by both Republicans and Democrats
during and after the 2008 campaign would leave private, employmentbased coverage intact while opening up evolutionary pathways toward
large-scale change. President Bush209 and the principal Republican
contenders to succeed him urged an end to tax preferences for employerprovided health plans.210 Americans, they argued, should be able to spend
pretax dollars on coverage and care, up to a limit, whether or not they
acquire or tap workplace-based insurance.211 By leaving employment-based
REFORM 215–33 (1994). My limited point is that top-down imposition of a single-payer model by
legislative enactment would be so disruptive as to preclude its happening.
206. See supra notes 173–74 (discussing possible ERISA preemption of state laws requiring
employers to contribute toward their workers’ health benefits or toward funds established to subsidize
coverage for the uninsured).
207. Mitt Romney, Rudolph Giuliani, and Barack Obama were among the candidates who made
greater deference to state initiatives part of their campaign messages on health care. However, they did
not specify the legal changes they would pursue in order to accomplish this. See Robin Toner, 2008
Candidates Vow to Overhaul U.S. Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2007, at A1.
208. See supra Part IV.A.1.
209. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 87 box 4-1 (2007),
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/eop/2007/2007_erp.pdf.
210. Under current law, employees’ and employers’ contributions toward workplace-based
medical coverage are not treated as taxable income. I.R.C. § 105 (2006). Likewise, employee
contributions toward health savings accounts are nontaxable (up to an annual limit). Id. § 223.
Employers can also make nontaxable contributions to workers’ health savings accounts (up to an annual
limit) when employers offer and workers choose high-deductible insurance plans. Id. By contrast,
Americans who do not subscribe to employment-based health plans must spend post-tax dollars on care
and coverage (up to very high annual limits, above which medical expenses become deductible). Id.
§ 213.
211. See Katherine Baicker, William H. Dow & Jonathan Wolfson, Lowering the Barriers to
Consumer-Directed Health Care: Responding to Concerns, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1328 (2007) (article by
former Bush administration Council of Economic Advisors member and staffers, making the case for
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coverage in place, this approach averts sudden, large-scale disruption of
settled arrangements and expectations. But by removing a powerful
disincentive to the purchase of care and coverage outside the employment
relationship, this strategy opens the way to the emergence of new ways of
pooling risk—and to new health plan designs. Over time, as innovative
pooling mechanisms appear, workers with employment-based coverage
could migrate to them. Meanwhile, Americans without workplace-based
insurance options could pay for care and coverage on their own, using
pretax dollars. This level playing field could reduce the ranks of the
uninsured, especially if combined with public subsidies for the least welloff.212 On the other hand, this new generation of Republican proposals calls
for greater out-of-pocket (albeit tax-subsidized) spending on care213 and a
reduced role for insurance, relative to traditional health plans (including
HMOs and preferred provider organizations). Over time, this approach
would probably lead to steeper tiering of levels of care, based on wealth.214
Democratic proposals hold out a different range of emergent
possibilities. The leading Democratic presidential candidates prioritized
near-universal coverage (their Republican rivals did not), but sought to
minimize disruption of established arrangements and settled
expectations.215 To this end, the Democrats’ proposals would leave
treating employment-based and independently purchased health plans in tax-neutral fashion).
212. Id.
213. President Bush has called for tax-deductibility of contributions to health savings accounts
(his principal proposed vehicle for out-of-pocket medical spending)—a regressive tax subsidy since
those most in need pay the lowest marginal tax rates. Other proponents of this approach (so-called
consumer-directed health care, accompanied by high-deductible insurance) urge that the least well-off
be given tax credits toward their contributions to health savings accounts—a more progressive
approach. Id.
214. M. Gregg Bloche, Consumer-Directed Health Care and the Disadvantaged, 26 HEALTH AFF.
1315, 1316–22 (2007). By “levels of care,” I refer to levels of personal attention, convenience, and
technological intensity—aspects of health care that are attractive to many patients but that do not
necessarily correlate with clinical outcomes.
215. The plans proposed by the three principal Democratic candidates—Hillary Clinton, John
Edwards, and Barack Obama—were remarkably similar. Aside from the question of an “individual
mandate” (Clinton and Edwards proposed that all Americans be required to sign up for insurance;
Obama urged such a mandate only for children) the differences were little more than cosmetic. See
generally BARACK OBAMA’S PLAN FOR A HEALTHY AMERICA, http://www.barackobama.com/
pdf/HealthPlanFull.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2009); Press Release, Hillary for President, Hillary
Clinton’s “American Health Choices Plan” (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://www.pnhp.org/
news/2007/september/hillary_clintons_a.php; John Edwards for President, Universal Health Care
Through Shared Responsibility, http://johnedwards.com/issues/health-care/health-care-fact-sheet (last
visited Mar. 20, 2009). See also Henry J. Aaron, Take a Chill Pill, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 14, 2007,
http://www.tnr.com/politics/ story.html?id=7f7e2f07-86f5-4eb6-86f5-047139f05ef6 (characterizing the
campaign vitriol between Senators Clinton and Obama over individual mandates as overdone and
contending that the three candidates’ health reform proposals did not differ substantially).
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employment-based coverage in place. They pursue universal coverage by
expanding Medicaid and SCHIP to reach lower-income Americans not now
eligible for these programs and by subsidizing middle-income Americans’
purchase of private insurance. They avoid extending Medicaid and SCHIP
to people at income levels that are within the marketing sights of private
insurers (doing so would arouse strong insurance industry opposition216),
and the subsidies they promise for the purchase of private coverage are a
multibillion dollar benefit for insurers.217 The only likely near-term losers
are employers who do not now provide coverage: they would have to
choose between offering insurance or paying a tax (or “fee”) to support the
public subsidies.218 Thus, these plans would pursue universal coverage by
leveraging some existing arrangements and minimizing disruption to
others.
On the other hand, they open pathways toward more fundamental,
long-term change. By establishing insurance exchanges to pool risk (and
thereby reduce premiums) for individual insurance purchasers and small
employer groups,219 they create an economically viable alternative to
workplace-based coverage. Over time, this alternative purchasing
mechanism could eclipse the workplace as America’s main source for
private insurance. The ability of insurance exchanges to attract large
numbers of purchasers220 and to offer many coverage choices will give
216. The battle over state and federal efforts to expand SCHIP to cover children from families
with higher incomes illustrates the likelihood of such opposition. New York, for example, attempted in
2007 to make SCHIP available to children in families with annual incomes as high as $80,000. After the
Bush administration announced that it would construe the SCHIP statutory scheme to disallow this, the
state indicated it would challenge the administration in court. Sarah Kershaw, Eight States to Press
Bush on Insurance Coverage of Children, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at B1.
Meanwhile, in the last months of 2007, President Bush vetoed two Congressional efforts to
expand SCHIP funding and eligibility to income levels unacceptable to the administration. Robert Pear
& Carl Hulse, Congress Set for Veto Fight on Child Health Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, at
A28. The 2008 election resolved this conflict: within a month of President Obama’s inauguration,
Congress passed yet another SCHIP expansion bill, which the president promptly signed. John K.
Iglehart, Expanding Coverage for Children—The Democrats’ Power and SCHIP Reauthorization, 360
NEW ENG. J. MED. 855 (2009).
217. Employers that provide insurance to low-wage workers will also benefit from these subsidies
(and, possibly, from expansion of Medicaid and SCHIP).
218. They would be losers to a lesser degree than they would have been under the 1993 Clinton
plan, since Democrats contemplate raising most of the revenues needed to support the public subsidies
by allowing President Bush’s term-limited income tax cuts to expire at the end of 2010 for the
wealthiest Americans. See Laura Meckler, $318 Billion Tax Hit Proposed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2009,
at A1.
219. The large risk premiums that insurers charge for individuals and small groups mean that the
prices they pay for a given level of coverage are much higher than the prices for larger groups (which
incur more predictable aggregate medical costs).
220. Larger numbers of purchasers translate into lower premiums for health plans listed on an
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them formidable advantages over employment-based plans. Vast
purchasing pools could turn these exchanges into the “Amazon.com’s” of
medical coverage, able to outperform all but the largest employers on price.
Things could play out this way, but, then again, they may not. The plans
leave the future of employment-based coverage open. Its persistence, or
demise, would be determined by millions of Americans, acting as best they
can to protect their families and themselves, with minimal attention to the
policy impact of their choices.
A more provocative possibility is the emergence of single-payer
coverage from these plans. The proposals call for creation of a public
plan,221 to be listed on health insurance exchanges as an alternative to the
private options. If the public plan fared better than its rivals in the
competition for subscribers—whether because of lower administrative
costs,222 better deals with doctors and hospitals, or other reasons—it could
eventually come to overshadow them. This growth could feed back on
itself in positive fashion by empowering the plan to obtain lower prices
from providers,223 thereby crowding out private competitors. Absent
congressional intervention to limit the public plan’s monopsony power over
providers or to otherwise restrain its growth, it could evolve into singlepayer coverage.224 This long-run outcome—ideal in the eyes of some and
nightmarish to others—is hardly foreordained. American antipathy toward
government bureaucrats and one-size-fits-all solutions could limit the
public plan’s appeal. But the leading Democratic plans leave this
possibility open, to be decided in emergent fashion by future health plan
subscribers.
exchange, thanks to larger risk pools and higher numbers of “covered lives.”
221. Hillary Clinton’s proposal called for “a public plan option . . . modeled on the traditional
Medicare program.” Press Release, Hillary For President, supra note 215. The Barack Obama and John
Edwards proposals contained similar language.
222. Single-payer advocates point to dramatically lower administrative costs for public, singlepayer plans, by comparison with private plans. E.g., Steffie Woolhandler, Terry Campbell & David U.
Himmelstein, Costs of Health Care Administration in the United States and Canada, 349 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 768, 768 (2003). But see Henry J. Aaron, The Costs of Health Care Administration in the United
States and Canada—Questionable Answers to a Questionable Question, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED 801,
801–02 (2003) (arguing that projections of administrative savings achievable by implementing the
single-payer model in the United States have been exaggerated).
223. See Gerard F. Anderson et al., It’s The Prices, Stupid: Why the United States Is So Different
From Other Countries, HEALTH AFF., May–June 2003, at 89, 101–03 (reporting that prices for health
services are lower in nations with monopsonistic public plans (or multiple plans that bargain
collectively) than they are in the United States, where health care purchasing power is fragmented, and
explaining these price differences as a function of international differences in payers’ ability to exercise
monopsony power).
224. Private plans might remain in the market, offering high-end, boutique coverage options for
wealthy subscribers.
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B. CONTROLLING COSTS AND PURSUING VALUE
We know, in general terms, what needs to be done to control health
care spending. In theory, we need simply say no to care that exceeds budget
limits we set, whether for individuals, institutions, or society. But this of
course begs many questions. Who should set these limits, and at what level
of governance—from the individual patient to hospitals, health plans, or the
nation as a whole? And how should resources be dispensed within these
limits? We could, in theory, just say no once annual budgets are exceeded
(or on a random basis) without regard for the comparative value of
different kinds of care. Virtually all agree that this would be a preposterous
approach: limit setting should be tied, somehow, to the expected value of
diagnostic and therapeutic measures. But how do we figure these expected
values, trade them off against each other (and against the expected value of
nonmedical spending options),225 and decide what health plans should pay
for226 within their economic constraints?
1. Obstacles to Progress
Despite countless, carefully thought-out efforts by scholars to resolve
these questions, we have not progressed as a society toward answers.
America has been loath to embrace total health care spending limits at the
national or regional level,227 and consumers have proven hostile to tight
constraints on health plan budgets.228 They have also been reluctant to
225. Were it possible to achieve consensus on how to figure the expected values of diagnostic and
therapeutic measures—say, in quality-adjusted life years or some other metric that achieves
commensurability—trading them off against each other (and against the expected values of alternative,
nonmedical use of the resources at issue) would be a matter of simple arithmetic. But we are far from
agreement on a commensurable measure—or on how to cope with the incommensurability of expected
results from different clinical interventions for different illnesses. Bloche, supra note 11, at 275–77;
Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1449, 1493–1524 (1994).
226. People able and willing to pay will have access to extant treatments regardless of the limitsetting treatments that health plans make, but “thumbs-down” judgments by health plans could reduce
wealthy people’s demand for some treatments by stamping them as low-value.
227. Early versions of President Clinton’s health plan included global budgets—national and
regional—to be implemented as a backup cost-control strategy if managed competition failed. In the
face of strong resistance from health care interest groups (and charges from Republicans that the
Clinton plan would ration care), the Clinton plan’s drafters transfigured their global budgets into a
comprehensive scheme of caps on health plan rates—and, therefore, health plan spending. Continued
characterizations of this aspect of the plan as health care rationing played a substantial role in the
Clinton plan’s declining popularity and eventual defeat. See JOHNSON & BRODER, supra note 60, at 85–
86, 161–63; SKOCPOL, supra note 159, at 39–47.
228. Americans’ resistance to health plan budget limits played out in different forms during the
several years after the Clinton plan’s collapse, as employers shifted vast numbers of workers into
HMOs and other restrictive health plans. Beginning in the late 1990s, restrictions on choice of provider
and access to costly treatments triggered intense popular backlash (expressed through political, legal,
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appoint themselves as limit setters by signing up for lower-cost coverage
that kicks in only after they and their families spend thousands of dollars on
care out-of-pocket.229 Moreover, we are nowhere near to agreement on an
approach to working out the expected value of clinical interventions, then
making the requisite trade-offs, within whatever budget limits are
established.
a. Assessing the Benefits and Hazards of Medical Interventions
There are myriad obstacles to the making of these trade-offs—
obstacles that pose large challenges for health law. We lack data
concerning the effectiveness of most medical interventions,230 and political
resistance from doctors, hospitals, and drug and device makers has blocked
large-scale, publicly funded research to fill this void.231 Private insurers
lack the requisite incentives to step into the breach. Research into the
comparative efficacy of tests and treatments is a classic public good,
supplied at socially suboptimal levels by private health plans because they
cannot capture all of its social benefits. Savings from published research
that results in the demise of low-value therapies redound to the benefit of
and market mechanisms, see supra text accompanying notes 145–48), forcing health plans to abandon
these restrictions and allow costs to float upward. More worrisome is our country’s resistance to limits
on Medicare spending, though Medicare’s long-term threat to American fiscal stability dwarfs that
posed by Social Security, military spending, or any other federal program. Aaron, supra note 41. On the
other hand, Americans have proven quite tolerant of budget limits on health plans for the poor and nearpoor. Under the pressure of competing priorities and frugal taxpayers, states have capped their
Medicaid benefits at levels unthinkable for Medicare and private health plans, to the consternation of
advocates for the disadvantaged. See, e.g., Hurley, supra note 169 (interviewing an advocate of
Tennessee’s Medicaid program).
229. So-called consumer-directed health plans, which combine very high deductible insurance
with cash contributions to health spending accounts (vehicles for pretax, out-of-pocket medical
spending), enrolled only 5 percent of the 158 million Americans who received medical coverage
through the workplace in 2007 (up one percentage point from 2006). Only 10 percent of employers
offered such plans in 2007. Gary Claxton et al., Health Benefits in 2007: Premium Increases Fall to an
Eight-Year Low, While Offer Rates and Enrollment Remain Stable, 26 HEALTH AFF. 1407, 1411–13
(2007). The economist Rashi Fein has argued that people choose more comprehensive medical
coverage (when they can afford it) in part because they dislike the experience of having to trade off
money against health when they or their loved ones are ill; low deductibles that do not otherwise make
economic sense (since they raise premiums substantially) are attractive to health plan subscribers as a
safeguard against this unpleasant, sometimes anguishing experience. RASHI FEIN, MEDICAL CARE,
MEDICAL COSTS 147 (1986).
230. Bloche, supra note 11, at 266–70.
231. See Shannon Brownlee, Newtered, WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 2007, at 27; Bradford H. Gray,
Michael K. Gusmano & Sara R. Collins, AHCPR and the Changing Politics of Health Services
Research, HEALTH AFF., June 25, 2003, at W3-283, W3-297 to -298, http://content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w3.283v1.pdf (identifying interest group hostility as a major factor in the demise of
the federal agency devoted to research on the effectiveness of clinical interventions).
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all health plans, not just those that pay for the research.232 Likewise,
benefits from treatments found to be of high value accrue across the
medical marketplace, not just to the plans (and subscribers) that fund the
studies. To be sure, pharmaceutical firms and medical device makers
finance a great deal of research,233 but these studies are fashioned with
regulatory hurdles in mind. They are aimed at identifying chemical
candidates for intellectual property protection and Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) approval, neither of which require showings of
comparative therapeutic value. Safety and efficacy, not cost effectiveness
(by any measure) are all that the FDA regulatory scheme requires for
approval.234
Even if the federal government (or the private sector) were to commit
to a large-scale program of comparative research into the outcomes of
diagnostic and therapeutic interventions, serious obstacles to evidencebased, cost-sensitive practice (and payment policies) would remain.
Selection of outcome measures for such studies is fraught with normative
questions that lack agreed-on answers.235 A classic example is the
comparison of coronary revascularization (angioplasty and coronary artery
bypass surgery) and drug therapy for atherosclerotic heart disease. What
roles should prolongation of life, reduction of pain, and improvement of
physical endurance have in assessment of these therapies? Such measures
sometimes correlate, but often, they diverge. Preferences will vary from
patient to patient, and for some patients, they will fluctuate over time.
Variation of this sort opens the way for competing interest groups—say,
232. In theory, a health plan could conduct clinical effectiveness research on a proprietary basis,
then use the research results to formulate coverage policies that yield competitive benefits through cost
savings that accrue uniquely to the plan. In practice, this scenario is implausible, since coverage policies
that deviate from industry practice would spark hostile reactions (including appeals to state-mandated
independent reviewers and to the courts) from doctors and patients. To defend these policies, the plan
would have to explain them, by going public with its research design and results—and thereby
transforming its proprietary information into a public good.
233. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (“PhRMA”) reports that its
members spent $44.5 billion on drug research and development in 2007, and that such spending for the
pharmaceutical industry as a whole was $58.8 billion. PhRMA, About PhRMA: Who We Are,
http://www.phrma.org/about_phrma/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). Skeptics contend that a great deal of
this purported investment in research is in fact disguised advertising and other promotional spending.
E.g., JERRY AVORN, POWERFUL MEDICINES 198–216 (2004).
234. The FDA has taken the position that its enabling statute does not permit it to consider a
candidate drug’s cost-effectiveness or comparative value. The relevant statutory language requires only
that drugs be safe and effective; it thereby supports this position. JOHN R. THOMAS, PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENT LAW (2005). The pharmaceutical industry opposes Congressional revision of the FDA’s
enabling statute to empower the agency to consider comparative efficacy, value, or cost.
235. Elhauge, supra note 225, at 1496.
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heart surgeons, invasive cardiologists,236 medication-prescribing internists,
and cost-conscious insurers—to reject research results (by criticizing the
outcome measures chosen) when studies do not go their way.
The design of comparative clinical trials is bedeviled by another
problem that constrains their real-world applicability. Participants in
clinical trials typically represent a homogeneous subset of the population
with the disease or symptoms being studied. This reduces the risk that
confounding influences—such as age, genetic and lifestyle factors, and the
coexistence of other illnesses—will interfere with comparison of the tests
or treatments being studied. But this prerequisite for good science means
that a study’s findings often apply to a small fraction of the patient
population for which the tests or treatments are potentially relevant.237 That
is, most real-world patients would not have qualified for inclusion in the
study, rendering application of its findings a dubious proposition for
them.238 The enormous cost of large-scale clinical trials, which can run to
the tens of millions of dollars, makes this a large obstacle to construction of
an evidence base for most of medical practice, even if outcome measures
can be agreed on.
There is, moreover, a fractal geometry of medical decisionmaking that
complicates the fashioning of clinical practice protocols even when their
drafters have abundant data at their disposal. Any protocol applied to a
group of patients is open to the criticism that it constitutes a one-size-fitsall approach to sick people who vary in relevant ways—genetically,
behaviorally, or otherwise. The astonishing complexity of human biology
virtually guarantees the plausibility of this criticism. The more we discover
about our biology, the richer the diversity that we can envision. We have,
for example, just begun to explore human genomic variation, its
implications for the individualized expression of disease, and the resulting
possibilities for personalized treatment.239 It will be increasingly possible to
236. Heart surgeons perform bypass surgery; angioplasty is typically performed by cardiologists
(internists who have done fellowships in cardiology).
237. See Bloche, supra note 11, at 276 (discussing this problem as an instance of bounded
rationality in health care policy).
238. For example, anticipated differences in the effectiveness of coronary angioplasty—depending
on the anatomy of a patient’s coronary vasculature, the extent and distribution of atherosclerotic disease
across this vasculature, differences in lipid chemistry (for example, levels of high and low density
lipoproteins, known to be mediators of cardiovascular risk), behavioral and lifestyle factors, genetic
markers, and age—might lead clinical investigators to narrow the inclusion criteria for an angioplasty
trial on such grounds. But by so doing, the investigators narrow the real-world clinical relevance of
their findings to the subset of cardiovascular disease patients who meet these inclusion criteria.
239. See, e.g., Thomas J. Lynch et al., Activating Mutations in the Epidermal Growth Factor
Receptor Underlying Responsiveness of Non-Small-Cell Lung Cancer to Gefitinib, 350 NEW ENG. J.
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object to practice or payment protocols by claiming that some patients to
whom a protocol applies will benefit greatly from a disallowed treatment,
or visa versa. In practice, the former claim will be more frequent. Doctors,
drug makers, and others who stand to gain from a disallowed treatment will
have strong incentives to stake this claim—and to seek evidence to support
it by reanalyzing data and performing new studies.240 Clinical protocols
that group patients for the purpose of guiding practice are a probabilistic
exercise. They reflect average, expected outcomes, when, in fact, outcomes
vary depending on characteristics that group members do not share.
Research that elucidates such characteristics, thereby opening the way to
more precise predictions for subgroups, will lead clinical protocols to
unravel.
b. Balancing Benefits and Costs: Preferences, Principles, and Political
Taboo
A further obstacle to use of clinical protocols, once cost concerns are
allowed to count,241 is our inability as a society to come close to agreement
on how to value the benefits of care, even when we have good enough data
to quantitate these benefits.242 Scholars and researchers have proposed
myriad formulations, aimed at making assessments of benefits
commensurable for the purpose of weighing them against each other and
MED. 2129 (2004) (reporting on genetic variations that dramatically increase one particular type of
tumor’s responsiveness to a chemotherapy agent previously found to be only minimally effective for
patients with this tumor type).
240. Patients who vest hope in the disallowed therapy represent additional leverage for health care
providers and drug and device makers intent on challenging clinical protocols. The lobbying efforts of
the so-called Center for Patient Advocacy are a high profile example. The Center was founded by a
back surgeon opposed to a federal agency’s 1993 practice protocol that came out against spinal fusion
and discectomy surgery for low back pain. Brownlee, supra note 231, at 28. Not only did it advocate
successfully against broad adoption of this protocol by health care payers, but it also lobbied
successfully—in conjunction with other provider groups, as well as drug and medical device
manufacturers—for federal legislation that downsized the offending agency and forbade it from issuing
additional practice protocols. Id. On this and other issues, the Center has leveraged people’s trust in
their doctors, as well as their worries about insurers’ skimping on care. Links—accompanied by
favorable references to the Center as a resource for patients—from such websites as those of the Kaiser
Family Foundation and the Public Broadcasting System program Frontline today bring people to the
Center’s website without informing them about the Center’s origins and ongoing advocacy role for
health care providers. See, e.g., KaiserNetwork.org Reference Links, http://www.kaisernetwork.org/
ref_links/ reflinks_advocacy.cfm (last visited Mar. 20, 2009); Public Broadcasting Service, Frontline:
Dr. Solomon’s Dilemma—Links, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/doctor/etc/links.html
(last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
241. Explicit cost consciousness has not, thus far, been incorporated into protocols developed by
federal agencies, professional societies, or medical academics. Cost sensitivity has played a role in
proprietary payment protocols employed by health plans, but there have been no reports of plans
weighing costs against benefits in systematic fashion; rather, consideration of costs has been ad hoc.
242. Bloche, supra note 11, at 270–71.
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against costs. These approaches range from lives or life-years saved to all
manner of methods for calculating quality-adjusted life years.243 But none
of these approaches have caught on, and none seem about to; it is thus
implausible that any of these formulations could become a stable solution,
in the foreseeable future, to the problem of valuing medical care’s benefits.
For this reason, some argue, individuals should decide for themselves
by choosing from among explicitly stated clinical rationing policies when
they subscribe to health plans.244 This solution is morally appealing245 but
unlikely to work well in practice. As I have argued elsewhere, coexistence
of multiple clinical allocation policies would impose too great an
information-processing demand on doctors called on to implement them at
the bedside.246 An engineer can adjust a levee’s design to withstand a tenyear flood, or a hundred- or thousand-year tempest, but a doctor cannot
adhere simultaneously to multiple cost-benefit trade-off schemes for
differently insured patients. Physicians, like soldiers, learn to react, as
much as to reason, as clinical circumstances unfold. Medical training
entails perception and recognition of patterns—patterns that prompt doctors
to make clinical decisions in rapid sequence, typically without engaging in
243. For an excellent review of these formulations and their shortcomings, see Elhauge, supra
note 225, at 1493–1526.
244. Havighurst envisions a medical marketplace made up of differently priced private health
plans, offering multiple tiers of quality and different cost-benefit trade-off policies. Consumers would
choose from among these plans based on both their ex ante preferences concerning cost-benefit tradeoff policies and their willingness and ability to pay. HAVIGHURST, supra note 11, at 22–24. Elhauge, by
contrast, envisions a marketplace of equally priced private health plans, offering benefits of equivalent
actuarial value. Elhauge, supra note 225, at 1524–26, 1529–30, 1538–44. Public financing (constrained
by a politically determined global health care budget) would cover the cost of enrollment. The plans
would offer a variety of clinical resource allocation policies readily comprehensible to consumers, who
could then choose from among competing plans based on their ex ante resource allocation preferences.
Id. at 1524–26. Patients could purchase additional care out-of-pocket (if able to afford it), but there
would be no Havighurst-style tiering of health plans by ability and willingness to pay. Id. at 1524–26.
As Elhauge points out, the ex ante perspective is essential here. Id. at 1507. Allowing patients to
choose cost-benefit trade-off policies (at the insurance pool’s expense) ex post the onset of illness
reintroduces the moral hazard problem that choice between allocation policies from behind the “veil of
ignorance” (about future medical problems) is meant to avoid. Also, as Elhauge notes, the validity of ex
ante consent to an allocation policy is contingent upon the judgment that the conditions under which
consent was given are morally acceptable. Id. at 1536. The public subsidies that Elhauge envisions,
which would ensure universal coverage sufficient to purchase health care at levels now affordable to the
middle class, suffice (in my view) to render the conditions of ex ante consent morally acceptable under
Elhauge’s scheme.
245. The principal moral concern that many share—that this approach legitimizes multiple tiers of
coverage and care, tied to ability to pay (an objectionable development if one views health care as a
“merit good”)—dissolves if the less well off are given public subsidies sufficient to enable them to
afford the levels of coverage and care that middle-class Americans now receive. See Elhauge, supra
note 225, at 1491 & n.124.
246. Bloche, supra note 11, at 276–77.
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conscious, probabilistic reasoning.247 Human cognitive capacity is limited
to a degree that precludes application of such reasoning to more than a
small fraction of the decisions doctors make each day.248 It is beyond this
cognitive capacity for a single physician to adopt multiple clinical practice
styles, each tied to different resource allocation principles.249
One might finesse this problem by placing each physician within only
one health plan; then each physician could follow his or her plan’s
allocative principles and policies without fretting about multiple resource
allocation schemes and practice styles.250 This might work, in theory, in
heavily populated areas with health care markets big enough to support
multiple plans, each with their own in-house specialty services.251 Market
forces, though, have not played out this way. Most medical specialists and
247. This is an instance of the more general truth, increasingly recognized by cognitive scientists,
that people engage in conscious reasoning for only a small fraction of the many quick-fire judgments
they make each day. See GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & ABC RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE
HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 141–67 (1999) (employing medical and other examples to argue
that people make most decisions by employing “fast and frugal” heuristics, not conscious, systematic
reasoning).
248. See generally BOUNDED RATIONALITY (G. Gigerenzer & R. Selten eds., 2002) (reviewing a
variety of psychological adaptations to human cognitive limitations, including cultural norms, imitation,
and emotional responses, as well as unconscious heuristics).
249. Physicians’ past responses to heterogeneous incentives from different payers reflect this
limitation. When, in 1983, Medicare radically changed the way it paid for acute inpatient care—shifting
from fee-for-service to lump-sum payment based on diagnosis—hospitals reduced their average lengths
of stay for all populations of insured patients—private, fee-for-service as well as Medicare. Judith
Feder, Jack Hadley & Stephen Zuckerman, How Did Medicare’s Prospective Payment System Affect
Hospitals?, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 867, 870 & tbl.2 (1987).
This reduction was an expected response to the new Medicare reimbursement scheme, which
rewarded frugality through the lump-sum method. But its spillover into the fee-for-service market was
surprising, since this spillover reduced hospitals’ revenues from private, fee-for-service patients. It is
difficult to explain this spillover except as an expression of physicians’ bounded rationality—their
inability to change their approach to Medicare patients without also changing their approach to fee-forservice inpatients. More recently, studies of physicians who see patients covered under multiple private
plans with differing incentives—for example, fee-for-service, capitation, and other schemes that reward
doctors for doing less—have found that doctors do not vary their practice styles for patients in differing
plans. See, e.g., Laurence C. Baker, Association of Managed Care Market Share and Health
Expenditures for Fee-for-Service Medicare Patients, 281 JAMA 432, 434–36 (1999); Uwe E.
Reinhardt, The Economist’s Model of Physician Behavior, 281 JAMA 462, 462–64 (1999).
250. The Kaiser-Permanente system (comprised of an HMO and a set of medical practice groups
that treat only subscribers to the Kaiser HMO) is the most prominent example of a plan organized in
this fashion. See Fast Facts About Kaiser Permanente, http://xnet.kp.org/newscenter/aboutkp/
fastfacts.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
251. Outside of such areas, there probably is not sufficient demand to support multiple lineups of
specialty care providers, each dedicated to a single health plan. See, e.g., Rebecca T. Slifkin, Thomas C.
Ricketts III & Hilda A. Howard, Potential Effects of Managed Competition in Rural Areas, HEALTH
CARE FINANCING REV., Summer 1996, at 143 (discussing difficulties that confront efforts to engender
competition between multiple health plans, with their own doctors and hospitals, in rural environments).
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virtually all elite tertiary care centers have maintained their independence
from health plans.252 They treat patients from many plans, and they possess
the bargaining power to resist plans’ efforts to influence their practice
styles. Restructuring specialty care as an in-house component of private
health plans would require aggressive government intervention, at odds
with the prevailing preference for market-driven organization of medical
care.
In addition to these obstacles to assessing the benefits of care, efforts
to limit medical spending must confront a larger challenge. Americans
remain, for the most part, unwilling to acknowledge that long-term costcontainment will require the withholding of beneficial care.253 The “RWord”—rationing—remains taboo in public discussion of policy responses
to rising costs,254 except as an epithet employed by politicians to cast
aspersions on health reform proposals they oppose.255 We are not
absolutists in practice: unarticulated trade-offs between benefits and costs
are embedded in clinical judgment.256 But our public morality permits no
discussion of this,257 at least by elected officials, health plan marketers, and
252. One can interpret this in Coasean, theory-of-the-firm terms. See R.H. Coase, The Nature of
the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). The higher transaction costs associated with the independence of
specialty physicians (and tertiary care hospitals) are counterbalanced by the benefits (for both health
plans and providers of specialized services) of the flexibility that comes from annual contracting in a
quickly changing marketplace, as compared with the rigidities and sunk costs of vertical integration.
See James C. Robinson, The Future of Managed Care Organization, HEALTH AFF., Mar./Apr. 1999, at
7, 8–9, 12–14, 17–23.
253. For a blunt discussion of the need to ration beneficial care in order to hold medical spending
to manageable levels, see AARON & SCHWARTZ, supra note 66, at 6–8.
254. Robert Pear, The “R” Word: Justice Souter Takes on a Health Care Taboo, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2000, § 4, at 3.
255. The charge that President Clinton’s health reform plan (which envisioned competition among
HMOs and other prepaid managed health plans) countenanced the rationing of care was one of the
missives hurled by the plan’s Republican critics in 1993 and 1994. A few years later, when House
Republicans proposed that Medicare beneficiaries be enrolled in HMOs, Democrats returned the favor,
claiming that Republicans were planning to ration senior citizens’ care. See Robert Pear, Familiar Ring
to the G.O.P Medicare Plan? It’s What Clinton Talked About, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1995, at A20. Both
accusations were accurate. A unanimous Supreme Court said as much in Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S.
211, 221 (2000), when it noted that “inducement to ration care goes to the very point of any HMO
scheme.”
256. See JOHN M. EISENBERG, DOCTORS’ DECISIONS AND THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE 30–37,
58–61 (1986).
257. The Hippocratic ethic of undivided loyalty to patients, operating in conjunction with
insurance coverage for most medical expenditures, obliges treating physicians to take little or no
account of costs, reinforcing the taboo against rationing. Some contend that the necessity of rationing
justifies permitting doctors to depart from this ethic by withholding care with comparatively low
expected benefits even though insurance contracts do not explicitly countenance this and patients expect
their doctors to do all they can (so long as expected benefits outweigh expected harm). See, e.g., Hall,
supra note 141, at 497. I have cautioned that this puts patient trust at too great a risk, with worrisome
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others concerned about popular opinion.258 Health plans do not promote
competing rationing formulae on their websites, television ads, or
billboards on the sides of buses. And insurance contracts persist in
promising all medically necessary care, without any reference to the
weighing of benefits against costs259 for the purpose of determining what is
necessary.260 Likewise, medical malpractice law continues to defer to
extant professional standards of care, which are, for the most part, only
minimally sensitive to cost.261 For now, at least, efforts to control medical
spending will have to proceed within the confines of our country’s refusal
to openly countenance the calculus of cost and benefit.
c. Putting Policy into Practice: Our Fragmented Health Care System
A final difficulty needs to be faced. Were it possible to surmount all of
the obstacles just discussed, the fragmentation of our health care system
would still present a formidable barrier to implementation of more
evidence-based, cost-sensitive practice protocols. In the 1980s, many
commentators on health policy predicted that consumers’ concerns about
value would drive the consolidation of hospitals, doctors, and insurers into
vertically integrated health plans with internal systems of cost and quality
control. This vision has not panned out. Medical care remains a radically
decentralized endeavor.262 Private physicians, for the most part, continue to
practice alone or in small groups,263 organizationally separate from
implications for medicine’s effectiveness and ability to contribute to people’s sense of security and
solidarity. M. Gregg Bloche, Trust and Betrayal in the Medical Marketplace, 55 STAN. L. REV. 919,
941 (2002).
258. As Elhauge points out, many academics, as well, take the absolutist view, refusing to
countenance either health-health trade-offs or the weighing of clinical benefits against costs on the
ground that we should shift public resources from other programs (for example, the military) to
medicine and health. Elhauge, supra note 225, at 1460–61.
259. This reference to the balancing of benefits against costs is meant to include health-health
trade-offs (that is, choices from among alternative uses of health care resources) within a limited
budget, as well as decisions as to whether the expected benefits of a test or treatment justify spending
additional dollars to cover it.
260. The Supreme Court’s conceptualization of independent review of coverage denials as akin to
a second medical opinion, not a matter of contract interpretation, see Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v.
Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 381–83 (2002), is an additional bulwark against efforts to construe the medically
necessary standard to permit cost-conscious coverage decisionmaking.
261. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
262. See JAMES C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE 35–62 (1999) (discussing
the reasons why a system of competing, vertically integrated health plans did not arise, and describing
the decentralized, rapidly shifting contractual relationships among hospitals, doctors, and plans that
developed in its stead).
263. There are exceptions—large multispecialty group practices have gained substantial market
shares in California, New Jersey, North Carolina, and elsewhere, id. at 8, but medical practice remains a
cottage industry in most locales.
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hospitals and health plans. Hospitals have consolidated horizontally, to
some degree,264 but they exercise minimal managerial control over medical
practice, and they remain institutionally independent from health plans.265
Health plans bargain with doctors and hospitals for discounted rates, but
they do not actually manage care.266 Physicians make clinical decisions on
their own, influenced by personal values,267 peers and mentors,268 financial
incentives,269 drug company marketing,270 and myriad other factors that
contribute to wide variation in practice styles. Coordination of care often
gets short shrift, since this fragmented system does not support team
approaches to patients with multiple medical problems.271
Alternative models of medical care exist. Leading hospitals and
multispecialty group practices have adopted quality-improvement programs
that promote evidence-based practice and collaborative decisionmaking.272
Medicine’s academic leaders have coalesced around an agenda for
transformation that stresses the building of systems—systems that share
information, reward cooperation, apply state-of-the-art clinical science,
discover and learn from mistakes, and adjust to individual patients’ varying
264. See Kristin Madison, Hospital Mergers in an Era of Quality Improvement, 7 HOUS. J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 265 (2007); Barak D. Richman, Antitrust and Nonprofit Hospital Mergers: A
Return to Basics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (2007).
265. There are exceptions to this institutional independence: the Kaiser-Permanente HMO in
California is the outstanding example—the Kaiser HMO owns its hospitals, which treat only KaiserPermanente subscribers. See Fast Facts About Kaiser Permanente, supra note 250.
266. “Managed care” has always been a misnomer. Even during the height of the managed care
era, through the mid-1990s, health plans did not “manage” doctors, if by “manage,” one means rigorous
oversight and direction of their performance with an eye toward standardizing their approaches to
diagnosis and treatment. At most, health plans declined to cover some tests and treatments, refused to
authorize some referrals, and profiled doctors’ clinical spending patterns with an eye toward selecting
more frugal providers for their networks. Plans made minimal proactive efforts: they neither
promulgated their own comprehensive, evidence-based clinical practice guidelines nor pressed their
participating physicians to follow guidelines developed by academic or professional leaders.
267. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, Infected Judgment: Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 VILL. L.
REV. 195, 195–96 (2003).
268. E.g., Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge
in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 392–93 (2002).
269. Michael F. Cannon, Pay-for-Performance: Is Medicare a Good Candidate? 7 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 3, 18, 27 (2007).
270. See AVORN, supra note 233, at 292–312.
271. Failures of coordination can have both life-threatening and wasteful consequences: examples
include prescribing medicines without regard for dangerous drug interactions, duplication of risky and
costly tests, and incomplete diagnostic assessment of clinical signs and symptoms that “fall between the
cracks” of multiple specialties.
272. See, e.g., James J. Mongan, Robert E. Mechanic & Thomas H. Lee, Transforming U.S.
Health Care: Policy Challenges Affecting the Integration and Improvement of Care, HEALTH POLICY:
ISSUES AND OPTIONS (Brookings Inst., Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2006, at 1, available at http://
www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2006/1215healthcare_mongan/20061215_mongan.pdf.
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needs.273 But neither market forces nor health law have nudged a critical
mass of doctors and hospitals toward realization of this agenda.274
Our system’s poor performance, measured by current understandings
of best practice, reflects these failings. A much-publicized study of how
American medicine fares nationwide on more than four hundred broadly
accepted, evidence-based measures of appropriate care found that doctors
make the “right” decisions only 50 to 60 percent of the time.275 There are
stunning geographical variations in the care Americans receive and in the
costs they incur276—variations that lack scientific justification.277 Indeed,
studies of state-by-state variation in Medicare costs have found correlations
between higher-than-average per capita spending and lower-than-average
performance on quality-of-care measures.278 These quality measures reflect
standards of care supported by current financial incentives. They thus do
not incorporate cost sensitivity to the degree necessary for long-term
control of medical spending. But our health system’s weak performance on
these measures bodes poorly for our future ability to put agreed-on
standards of quality and value into effect.
2. Emergent Possibilities
These daunting obstacles to control of costs and pursuit of value in
health care cannot be overcome by some grand stroke of legal design. No
policy-wonk D-Day assault on the problem of medical spending can prevail
over health care’s entrenched complexities, interest groups, and conflicts of
value. Thinking about health care’s governance in emergent-systems terms
supports a more modest approach. The emergent-systems model channels
our attention toward opportunities to set change in motion—to navigate
around some of the obstacles and to allow others to become less formidable
273. See generally COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., supra note 114 (setting out an
agenda for health care reform and establishing six aims for improvement).
274. See Barry R. Greene & Gary L. Filerman, Reinventing CME: The Role of the Care Pilot in
the Medical Group Practice, 30 J. AMBULATORY CARE MGMT. 283 (2007); Thomas H. Lee, Can We
Cross the Quality Chasm? The Case for Realistic Optimism, 4 AM. HEART HOSP. J. 16 (2006); Keith D.
Moore & Dean C. Coddington, Models of Care that Meet the Standards of Crossing the Quality Chasm:
A New Health System for the 21st Century, J. AMBULATORY CARE MGMT., Jan. 2002, at 12.
275. McGlynn et al., supra note 33, at 2642 tbl.3 (finding that patients receive 54.9 percent of
recommended care).
276. See Wennberg et al., supra note 67.
277. See CTR. FOR THE EVALUATIVE SCIS., supra note 115, at 2–8.
278. Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Medicare Spending, the Physician Workforce, and
Beneficiaries’ Quality of Care, 23 HEALTH AFF. W4-184, W4-187 to -189,
http://content.healthaffairs.org.libproxy.usc.edu/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.184v1 (finding that states with
higher Medicare spending have lower-quality care).
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as time passes. It emphasizes opportunism over elegant, system-wide
solutions that have minimal chance of being fully implemented.
a. Toward Evidence-Based Practice and Value-Based Protocols
What might a reform strategy sensitive to potential evolutionary
pathways look like in the cost control realm? I shall point to some
possibilities. For starters, such a strategy should aim to finesse (1) interest
group resistance to comparative evaluation of therapies and (2) Americans’
aversion to the balancing of health benefits against economic costs. An
encouraging sign is the recent surge in bipartisan support for a ramped-up
program of comparative clinical outcomes research.279 Large federal
deficits and ominous warnings about the consequences of failure to contain
Medicare and other entitlement spending280 are pushing Congress toward
action despite antipathy from those who profit from tests and treatments
that might not pan out. Congress took a first step in February 2009 by
appropriating $1.1 billion for comparative effectiveness research.281 Still
needed is a mechanism to insulate this research from the bare-fisted politics
of the annual appropriations process—and from the distorting influence of
health care providers, pharmaceutical firms, and medical-device makers.282
Possible approaches include allocation of a fixed fraction of annual
Medicare spending (to shield outcomes research funding from the politics
279. See Gail R. Wilensky, Developing a Center for Comparative Effectiveness Information, 25
HEALTH AFF. w572 (2006), http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/25/6/w572. A promising program
already up and running is Medicare’s Coverage with Evidence Development (“CED”) initiative,
announced in 2006 by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”). See generally CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR THE
PUBLIC, INDUSTRY, AND CMS STAFF: NATIONAL COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS WITH DATA
COLLECTION AS A CONDITION OF COVERAGE: COVERAGE WITH EVIDENCE DEVELOPMENT (2006),
available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/ncpc_view_document.asp?id=8#P39_3944. Under the CED
program, CMS conditions Medicare coverage of some tests and treatments on the collection of research
data—information beyond what is necessary for Medicare billing—that enables CMS to assemble
evidence bearing on their risks and benefits. The CED program, initiated under the authority of section
1862(a)(1)(E) of the Social Security Act, empowers CMS to modify its coverage rules on an ongoing
basis as the agency gathers and assesses data on the tests and treatments at issue. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395(a)(1)(E) (2000). By issuing favorable national coverage determinations (“NCDs”) under the
CED program, CMS can speed the adoption of new technologies (mollifying patients, providers, and
pharmaceutical and medical equipment firms) while making a substantial contribution to clinical
outcomes research.
280. Aaron, supra note 41.
281. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, tit. VIII, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115, 177–78 (appropriating $300 million for the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, $400
million for the National Institutes of Health, and $400 million for the Secretary of Health & Human
Services to be spent at her discretion).
282. Such attacks crippled earlier federal efforts to conduct medical outcomes research and
develop evidence-based clinical practice protocols. See Brownlee, supra note 231; Gray et al., supra
note 231, at W3-295 to -298.
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of the annual appropriations process283) and creation of an autonomous,
Federal Reserve-style agency284 to perform this research (or to award
research grants on a competitive basis, as does the National Institutes of
Health). Research partnerships between the federal government and private
insurers have also been urged285 to broaden both political and financial
support for outcomes research.286
Ideally, this agency or program should do more than just research: it
should employ available data to assess and compare the value of clinical
interventions,287 so as to guide doctors, hospitals, and health care payers.288
But doctors, drug makers, and others dependent on revenues from tests and
treatments that could fare poorly in such evaluations have the legislative
clout to defeat proposals that would empower government to perform
them.289 From a traditional policy-design perspective,290 creation of an
283. Committing a fixed proportion of Medicare spending—say 1 or 2 percentage points—to
outcomes research would give it status as an entitlement program, immunizing it from efforts by
affected interest groups to cut it during the course of the annual budgetary appropriations process.
284. Possible mechanisms for maintaining such an agency’s independence include keeping it
entirely separate from the Department of Health and Human Services (and thus from the direct
influence of the president and his or her appointees), governance by a bipartisan commission appointed
to staggered terms, and delegation of the task of appointing commission members to a nonpolitical
entity (perhaps the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies of Sciences). The Federal Reserve
model has been endorsed most prominently by former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle—President
Obama’s first nominee for Secretary of Health & Human Services—who has urged that decisionmaking
about health care policy more generally (including the comparative value of tests and treatments) be
vested in an appointed “Federal Health Board.” TOM DASCHLE WITH SCOTT S. GREENBERGER &
JEANNE M. LAMBREW, CRITICAL: WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THE HEALTH-CARE CRISIS 139–80
(2008).
285. Wilensky, supra note 279, at w580–82.
286. Such partnerships could help to protect an outcomes research program from political attack
by positioning insurers as a counterweight to interests that profit from treatments of uncertain value.
287. A possible model for such a program is Great Britain’s National Institute for Health and
Clinical Excellence, which performs and publishes assessments of tests and treatments, then issues
recommended guidelines for clinical care. See generally Welcome to the National Institute for Health
and Clinical Excellence, http://www.nice.org.uk (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
288. It would also be helpful for this agency or program to develop alternative analytic
frameworks, or models, for: (1) the balancing of benefits against costs and (2) the weighing of health
benefits against each other (more relevant for health plans and providers that must make do within fixed
budgets). Private and public insurers (and providers) could then try out these models as tools for making
allocative decisions in candid, accountable fashion. See BEYOND LEARNED HELPLESSNESS, supra note
41. Insurers and providers might or might not experiment along these lines, and such experiments might
or might not catch on. Whether or not medical resource allocation evolves to embrace such models
would be decided in emergent fashion. But development and dissemination of these models would
widen this potential evolutionary pathway.
289. Physicians, pharmaceutical firms, and medical device manufacturers have done so in the
past. See Brownlee, supra note 231; Gray et al., supra note 231, at W3-295 to -297. Those involved in
Congressional efforts to ramp up federal support for clinical outcomes research tend toward the view
that including statutory language empowering government to perform comparative evaluations of
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agency that sponsors clinical outcomes research but does not assess the
results—or offer guidance to providers and payers—is problematic. Why
do this research without using it to improve health care quality and value?
However, from an emergent systems perspective, even this limited mandate
holds great promise. Such a program would generate a flood of outcomes
data, enabling others to compare therapies and develop evidence-based
practice protocols.291 To be sure, these protocols would be quicker in
coming were a federal agency to sponsor them on a large scale. But a series
of high-profile studies that found oft-used therapies to be harmful or
ineffective292 could inspire doctors and patients to demand more vigorous
efforts to compare treatments and to develop evidence-based guidelines.
Rising medical spending, moreover, will put growing pressure on guideline
authors to take costs into account. From an expanding base of data on
therapeutic outcomes, evidence-based, cost-conscious protocols for
payment and practice could emerge despite strong resistance from affected
stakeholders.
medical interventions and to develop clinical practice protocols would doom legislation to increase
funding for outcomes research. Interview with Anonymous Congressional Staff Involved in Developing
Outcomes Research Legislation (Dec. 2006). And indeed the $1.1 billion appropriated for comparative
effectiveness research in February 2009, see supra note 281, was conditioned on the requirement that
the interagency council responsible for coordinating this research not “mandate coverage,
reimbursement, or other policies for any public or private payer” or issue “mandates or clinical
guidelines for payment, coverage, or treatment.” American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
§804(g), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 188. The potential for backlash from stakeholders concerned
about adverse assessments of the value of tests and treatments was underscored by angry denunciations
of the interagency council—and the $1.1 billion appropriation—as a ploy to ration health care. See, e.g.,
Kevin Freking, Obama Team Sees Stimulus Advancing Health Reform, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009,
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2008744217_apstimulushealthobama.html?syndication=
rss.
290. By “traditional policy design perspective,” I refer here to approaches that envision a desired
end state and call for reforms meant to bring about this state, rather than to create conditions for the
future evolution of policy solutions. See supra text accompanying notes 202–03.
291. Among the actors that might make use of a surge in outcomes data to compare treatments and
craft protocols are medical academics, health plans, and insurers. The risk of bias in the development of
protocols is omnipresent (as it would be were these same actors to participate in the formulation of
government-sponsored protocols). The important subject of the management of conflicts of interest (for
example, medical academics’ relationships with drug companies, as well as their income from
providing questionable treatments) is beyond my scope here.
292. Within the last few years, clinical outcomes studies have made headlines by finding that
commonly prescribed treatments increase risks to life. Examples include estrogen replacement therapy
for menopausal women, see Garnet L. Anderson et al., Effects of Estrogen Plus Progestin on
Gynecologic Cancers and Associated Diagnostic Procedures: The Women’s Health Initiative
Randomized Trial, 290 JAMA 1739, 1745–47 (2003), and Vioxx and other new-generation nonsteroidal
anti-inflammatory medications, see Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal
Toxicity of Rofecoxib and Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1520, 1520 (2000).

458

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:389

Winning widespread compliance with such protocols will require an
approach to our health care system’s fragmentation.293 Here also, there are
emergent possibilities. Medicare is in a position to lead by adopting
evidence-based performance standards and rewarding doctors and hospitals
that comply. Congress recently authorized Medicare to make extra
payments to hospitals that meet Medicare’s performance standards294 and
to initiate small-scale trials of pay-for-performance incentives for
physicians.295 Medicare’s nearly 40 percent share of acute care hospital
spending296 and substantial contribution to physicians’ incomes297 give it
enormous influence: past changes in Medicare’s financial incentives to
providers have produced large changes in the providers’ treatment of both
privately insured and Medicare patients.298 Thus far, Medicare has declined
to explicitly count costs when issuing coverage rules299 or adopting
performance standards. Its enabling statute arguably allows it to do so,300
293. See supra text accompanying notes 262–71.
294. Section 501(b) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066, 2289–90, and section 5001(a) of the Deficit Reduction Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4, 28–29, establish hospital payment differentials to reward
facilities that report how they fare on Medicare’s performance measures. Beginning in fiscal year 2009,
Medicare will pay hospitals differentially based on their performance on a variety of measures of
quality, as well as their investment in medical information systems. Deficit Reduction Act § 5001(b).
295. In 2005, Medicare initiated a pay-for-performance experiment (based on measures of quality
in preventive care and management of chronic disease) involving ten large group practices. Press
Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Medicare Begins Performance-Based Payments for
Physician Groups (Jan. 31, 2005), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?
Counter=1341.
296. In 2003, Medicare paid 38.5 percent of America’s acute-care hospital expenses. AM. HOSP.
ASS’N, OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 9 (2005), available at www.aha.org/aha/content/
2005/PowerPoint/0502-us-system-overview.ppt.
297. One study, drawing on data from the 2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, found that
22.9 percent of U.S. physician income came from Medicare. Karen E. Lasser, Steffie Woolhandler &
David U. Himmelstein, Sources of Physician Income: The Contribution of Government Payments to the
Specialist-Generalist Income Gap, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1477, 1479 (2008). Some specialists—
cardiologists, geriatricians, hematologist-oncologists, nephrologists, rheumatologists, and urologists—
derive more than one-third of their income from Medicaid. Id. at 1478.
298. See supra note 249.
299. The most recent guidance document on coverage policy from CMS, the agency that
administers Medicare, states: “Cost effectiveness is not a factor CMS considers in making NCDs. In
other words, the cost of a particular technology is not relevant in the determination of whether the
technology improves health outcomes or should be covered for the Medicare population through an
NCD.” CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE
FOR THE PUBLIC, INDUSTRY, AND CMS STAFF: FACTORS CMS CONSIDERS IN OPENING A NATIONAL
COVERAGE
DETERMINATION
(2006),
available
at
www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/ncpc_view_
document.asp?id=6. For an excellent review of the controversy over the potential role of cost in
Medicare coverage decisionmaking, see generally Jacqueline Fox, Medicare Should, but Cannot,
Consider Cost: Legal Impediments to a Sound Policy, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 577 (2005).
300. Section 1862(a)(1)(A) of the Social Security Act states: “Notwithstanding any other
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but the usual alliance of doctors, hospitals, and drug and device companies
has been firmly opposed. Still, there is reason for optimism. For the first
time, Medicare is linking payment to compliance with clinical standards,
thereby creating an incentive scheme that might someday be used to
encourage cost awareness across our fragmented system. Private payers are
following suit, joining with each other—and with hospitals and medical
groups—to seek common ground on quality measures and practice
protocols.301 So far, they have been no more willing than Medicare to
openly count costs,302 but they are forging collaborative arrangements303
that could someday be employed to give effect to cost-conscious
provision of [law], no payment may be made . . . for items or services . . . not reasonable and necessary
for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2000). The term
“reasonable” has been construed by some commentators to permit consideration of cost; others have
read this provision more restrictively. E.g., Fox, supra note 299, at 584–95. Because Medicare has
never explicitly balanced costs against benefits when promulgating national coverage rules, its authority
to do so has not been litigated.
301. America’s Health Insurance Plans, the principal trade association representing private health
plans, is combining clinical data from multiple plans—and from Medicare—to make it possible to
assess the performance of hospitals and physicians nationwide on agreed-on measures of health care
quality. This aggregation of data will surmount a major obstacle to measurement of provider
performance: the fact that providers report clinical data (for billing purposes) to multiple health plans,
none of which, therefore, can assemble a complete picture of how well providers fare on quality
measures. A consortium of health care industry stakeholders (including insurers, hospitals, group
medical practices, and professional and trade associations) known as the National Quality Forum will
formulate quality measures, including standards of care for common medical problems, that will then be
applied to the aggregated data to assess health care providers’ performance. The results of these
assessments will be widely disseminated with three related purposes in mind: encouraging doctors and
hospitals to do better, enabling health plans to reward providers based on performance, and allowing
consumers to select providers based on quality. Press Release, Robert Wood Johnson Found., National
Effort to Measure and Report on Quality and Cost-Effectiveness of Health Care Unveiled (Oct. 3,
2007), available at http://www.rwjf.org/newsroom/product.jsp?id=22371.
302. Private health plans are beginning to collaborate with doctors and hospitals to develop
standardized methods for tracking and comparing different providers’ costs for tests and treatments. Id.
The avowed aim of this collaboration among stakeholders is to support patients’ (and payers’) efforts to
shop for the least expensive (that is, most cost-effective) way to achieve a given therapeutic result. Id.
But the collaborators in this endeavor, so far, have refrained from explicitly balancing benefits against
costs when formulating quality-of-care benchmarks.
303. Interlocking consortia of private health plans, hospitals, medical specialty societies, and other
health care industry stakeholders have formed over the past several years for the avowed purpose of
reaching industry-wide agreement on the adoption and uses of quality-of-care benchmarks. These
include the AQA alliance (focusing on physician care), the Hospital Quality Alliance (“HQA”)
(focusing on hospital care), and the Quality Alliance Steering Committee (meant to coordinate the
efforts of the AQA alliance and HQA). See Press Release, AQA, Health Care Quality Leaders Join
Forces (July 21, 2006), available at http://www.aqaalliance.org/HCQLeadersJoinForces072106.htm.
See also generally AQA-HQA Collaboration–Quality Alliance Steering Committee, http://
www.aqaalliance.org/aqahqacollaboration.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2009). The Department of Health
and Human Services has participated in these consortia and indicated its intention to coordinate
Medicare and private sector quality improvement efforts.
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protocols.304
b. The Emergent Potential of Current Law
Awareness of these potential evolutionary pathways can and should
play a role in development of several areas of law that bear on cost and
quality: these include antitrust and privacy doctrine, medical malpractice,
and the law governing disputes over insurance coverage. Comprehensive
discussion of the cost and quality implications of each of these areas of law
is beyond my scope here, but I will offer a brief roadmap of potential
problems and opportunities from an emergent systems perspective.
i. Antitrust- and Privacy-Law Barriers to Information Sharing?
Antitrust-law barriers to clinical data sharing among doctors,
hospitals, and health plans for outcomes-research purposes should be
minimized, if indeed there are any.305 Privacy-law protections should be
construed with an eye toward the social importance of this research.306 The
304. Health care reform proposals urged by President Bush and by Republican and Democratic
candidates for the presidency in 2008 presented additional emergent possibilities. The consumerdirected model, see supra notes 213–14, 229, advanced by the Bush administration and by Republican
presidential candidates Rudolph Giuliani and Mitt Romney, would make insured patients more sensitive
both to cost in general and to insurance contract provisions designed to encourage patients to seek care
from providers who score high on performance measures. For example, a consumer-directed health plan
might require a patient to pay much more out-of-pocket for diabetes or heart disease care from a doctor
who scores below some threshold on relevant quality-of-care measures. If and when quality measures
come to incorporate cost-benefit trade-offs, this tiering of insurance coverage, tied to provider
performance, would strengthen doctors’ and patients’ incentives to accept these trade-offs.
Analogously, the insurance exchanges proposed by President Obama and by candidates Hillary
Clinton and John Edwards, see text accompanying notes 215–18, would require health plans to report
their performance on quality-of-care benchmarks in order to sell coverage on these exchanges. If and
when cost-benefit trade-offs are built into these quality measures, this prerequisite for market access
would become a powerful lever for adoption of cost-conscious treatment protocols.
305. Whether such barriers are real or merely perceived is unclear. Leaders in academic
medicine’s efforts to improve health care quality believe that antitrust law stands in the way. Mongan et
al., supra note 272, at 3–5. Collaborative setting of standards for purposes of collecting and sharing data
has raised antitrust issues in other industries, but antitrust law has been open to arguments about the
pro-competitive impact of network economics. Medical antitrust law scholars who have considered this
question tend toward the view that current antitrust doctrine poses no obstacles to industry collaboration
on outcomes research. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, Five Reasons Why Health Care Quality Research
Hasn’t Affected Competition Law and Policy, 4 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 159 (2004) (part
of a special issue devoted to competition and health care quality); William M. Sage, David A. Hyman &
Warren Greenberg, Why Competition Law Matters to Health Care Quality, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr.
2003, at 31, 36–40.
306. See Lawrence O. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Personal Privacy and Common Goods: A
Framework for Balancing Under the National Health Information Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1439, 1440 (2002) (arguing that “[s]haring data may be necessary to achieve important health purposes”
such as health research and public health, and urging that “health information privacy laws . . . carefully
balance the need for individual privacy with the benefits of using health data for the common good”).
State-of-the-art electronic security technologies, along with entry of clinical data in deidentified form
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question of antitrust obstacles to collaboration for the purpose of agreeing
on quality measures and clinical practice protocols is more complex. There
is an obvious tension between antitrust principles, which promote
competition on quality as well as price, and collaborative setting of quality
benchmarks. Yet current antitrust doctrine leaves room for the argument
that collaborative standard setting can facilitate competition on quality by
making it easier for consumers to comparison shop.307 A comprehensive set
of quality benchmarks, accompanied by comparative performance data,
would empower patients to choose wisely from among competing doctors,
hospitals, and health plans. This in turn would put market pressure on plans
and providers to deliver greater value to consumers—the end result sought
by antitrust law. There is a snarl of doctrinal and economic issues here, in
need of disentangling by antitrust scholars familiar with health care.308 But
antitrust law can play a constructive role in the development of national
standards of quality and value.309 Antitrust law should aim to distinguish
(that is, without information that could be used to trace the data back to individual patients) prior to its
aggregation, should provide high levels of privacy protection. But elimination of all risks to privacy is
not a realistic goal, particularly in view of the proliferation of high-powered data-mining methods and
the possibilities for illicit use of these and other techniques. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In
Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48
B.C. L. REV. 331, 366 (2007).
307. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 53–55 (2007),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf; VMEbus International Trade
Associtation, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Business Review Letter, 2006 WL 3326742 (Oct. 30, 2006).
308. Among the entangled issues are how to keep collaborative standard setting from slowing the
pace of therapeutic innovation, how to prevent anticompetitive abuse of standard-setting mechanisms
(to exclude competing treatments and providers without scientific grounds for so doing), and the extent
to which antitrust enforcement agencies and the courts should delve into the details of medical science
and economics in order to make such judgments. Alternative legal approaches include looking to
procedural fairness as a surrogate for inquiry into whether standard setting is anticompetitive as a
substantive matter and, in the extreme, outright rejection of industry-wide clinical practice protocols
and other quality standards as anticompetitive.
309. Some market-oriented commentators hold a sharply different view. They question such
standard setting, arguing that industry-wide adoption of medical practice protocols and other quality
norms is contrary to the letter and spirit of antitrust law because it prevents competing providers and
health plans from marketing multiple tiers of quality. See Clark C. Havighurst, Applying Antitrust Law
to Collaboration in the Production of Information: The Case of Medical Technology Assessment, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1988, at 341, 352–55 (arguing that agreements among professional bodies
to develop consistent positions on the value of tests and treatments deny consumers the welfareenhancing benefits of competition). Consumer choice is enhanced, in this view, by allowing multiple
levels of care, HAVIGHURST, supra note 11, at 7, and in the digital age, there is no lack of marketgenerated information available to consumers to help them to comparison shop for care. See James C.
Robinson, The End of Asymmetric Information, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1045, 1051 (2001). A
rejoinder to this view, grounded in an analysis of antitrust doctrine, is beyond my brief here. But it
would likely incorporate the near impossibility of comparison shopping (in the face of a cacophony of
claims about quality) without broadly accepted benchmarks, as well as the near impossibility of
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between collaborative standard setting that spurs competition to deliver
clinical value and collusive efforts that exclude rivals and suppress
evidence-based therapeutic innovation.310 By so doing, antitrust law can
promote the evolution of cost-sensitive clinical practice norms and their
dissemination through our fragmented health care system.
ii. Tort Liability
Medical tort law’s approach to health care quality and value is a relic
of past, disproven premises about the practice of medicine. It is thus an
obstacle to the emergence of more evidence-based, cost-sensitive clinical
care. The malpractice system’s greatest failing, from a quality and value
perspective, is its reliance on clinical practitioners to specify standards of
care.311 This deference to doctors is a departure from negligence law’s
general requirement of reasonable conduct, a requirement typically
understood in utilitarian terms as a duty to take precautions so long as
maintaining multiple tiers of medical care when the same providers participate in many different health
plans. See supra text accompanying notes 246–52. More controversially, it might suggest that enabling
providers and plans to offer multiple economic tiers of care should count for less, from an antitrust
perspective, than does preservation of most other forms of consumer choice, since medical care is
widely seen as a merit good—that is, something society distributes (or ought to distribute) based on
criteria other than ability or willingness to pay. See Richard A. Musgrave, Merit Goods, in 3 THE NEW
PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 452 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (setting out a definition
of “merit good” and including health care as an example). Possible grounds for treating health care as a
merit good, to be distributed (like education and fire protection) more equitably than most products and
services, include: (1) the moral belief that all people should have access to high-quality care as a matter
of right or human dignity and (2) the paternalistic concern that people will undervalue some forms of
medical coverage and care—for example, preventive services and long-term management of silent but
eventually devastating illnesses like diabetes and hypertension.
310. See supra note 308.
311. The medical tort system’s many failings have been widely discussed elsewhere. These
failings include its lack of sensitivity and specificity as a tool for detecting negligence (studies that
compared results from medical chart reviews of hospitalizations with the subsequent incidence of
malpractice suits, settlements, and judgments arising from these hospitalizations have found little
overlap between episodes of negligence discerned by chart reviewers and lawsuits brought, settled, or
won), its limited deterrent impact on substandard practitioners, and its failure to compensate the vast
majority of victims of negligence. Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, The Medical Malpractice
System: Structure and Performance, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
11 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006). Moreover, malpractice liability costs, combined with
insurance market dysfunctions, have at times pushed liability insurance premiums high enough to
measurably reduce patients’ access to physicians in high-risk specialties like obstetrics and
neurosurgery. OFFICE OF THE ASS’T SECRETARY FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADDRESSING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS: REFORMING THE MEDICAL
LITIGATION SYSTEM TO IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 3–6 (2003), available at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/daltcp/reports/medliab.pdf. But see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 5–7 (2003),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03836.pdf (finding insufficient evidence to support claims
that high malpractice insurance premiums are causing physicians in some specialties to withdraw from
practice and thus reducing patients’ access to care).
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benefits outweigh risks and costs.312 Negligence law, to be sure, often looks
to common practice within an industry as the measure of reasonableness.
But the justification for doing so is that the market works well as a costbenefit313 balancing device—well enough to treat industry custom as the
standard of care.314
For medical care, this justification has broken down, if indeed it were
ever valid.315 It is now widely recognized that physicians know little about
the efficacy of most tests and treatments,316 that they often do not follow
evidence-based clinical protocols even when such guidance exists,317 and
that insurance encourages provision of care with few benefits relative to
cost.318 Medical custom is thus a poor guide to socially optimal standards
of care.
Malpractice law’s reliance on custom locks in extant clinical practice
norms that are products of these market failures. This does not benefit
practitioners, since absent evidence-based answers to most clinical
questions, different doctors treat the same medical problems in different
ways.319 The result is Russian roulette in the courtroom when things go
312. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (defining negligence law’s
standard of conduct as “that of a reasonable man under like circumstances”); id. §§ 291–93 (defining
reasonableness in terms of the balance between the risk and the utility of an actor’s conduct). But see
Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1431 (2000) (arguing that negligence law in fact recognizes nonutilitarian concerns such as
prudence and care); Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249 (1996)
(arguing that negligence law can be consistent with non-risk-based deontological theories).
313. I use “cost” here as shorthand for both risk and cost.
314. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued
Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1388–89 (1994)
(arguing that courts should look to industry custom to determine negligence when networks of
contractual bargaining suffice to take all affected interests into account).
315. It probably never was. Through the mid-twentieth century, most commentators on health care
law and policy believed that doctors’ scientific knowledge and patient-centered ethics ensured that
(barring negligence) they would exercise medical judgment to which society, including the legal
system, should defer. Kenneth Arrow captured this set of assumptions in his oft-cited 1963 article
contending that physicians promise patient-centeredness to the public in order to win trust—and
business—in the face of patients’ inability to evaluate the effectiveness of medical care. Arrow
assumed—with undue optimism, it turned out—that physicians did know how well their tests and
treatments worked, and that they largely delivered on their promise to abjure economic incentives to act
contrary to the interests of their patients. Arrow, supra note 85, at 965–66.
316. See supra text accompanying notes 230–40.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 33–35.
318. Commentators have borrowed the term “moral hazard” from the casualty insurance context
to convey the impact of insurance on medical spending. I have elsewhere questioned the analogy
between increased risk taking by people with fire or auto insurance and increased health spending by
people with medical insurance, Bloche, supra note 11, at 260–66, but it is plain that medical insurance
promotes overspending on health services, relative to people’s other wants and needs.
319. CTR. FOR THE EVALUATIVE CLINICAL SCIS., supra note 115, at 2–5.
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wrong and patients sue. If there are multiple therapeutic options and the
one chosen turns out badly,320 the plaintiff can find a physician-expert
witness321 who would have opted for one of the other options. Malpractice
law lets such testimony in, so long as the witness qualifies based on his or
her credentials. The law puts testimony about the appropriate standard of
care to the test of professional acceptance,322 but it does not subject such
testimony to Daubert-style scrutiny of its scientific foundations.323 And in
many jurisdictions, malpractice law bars the admission of evidence-based
practice protocols (by treating them as hearsay324) unless an expert witness
testifies as to their content. When evidence-based protocols find their way
into court, they are usually given no more weight than other medical
testimony,325 however flimsy the science base on which this testimony
320. If a treatment yields a bad result because it was administered ineptly—say, the proverbial
sponge left in the surgical patient or an overdose of a dangerous drug—negligence is open-and-shut, not
a matter of Russian roulette (unless the alleged ineptitude requires a borderline call). Such cases matter
because it is important to deter ineptitude and to adequately compensate its victims, but they are not my
focus in the above discussion because their health care policy import is comparatively small. These
cases involve errors of execution, not larger conflicts over how health care resources should be spent.
321. Expert testimony is required in all jurisdictions unless “only common knowledge and
experience” are required to judge the conduct. See H.H. Henry, Annotation, Necessity of Expert
Evidence to Support an Action for Malpractice Against a Physician or Surgeon, 81 A.L.R. 2d 597, 608
(1962).
322. Legal tests for professional acceptance vary by jurisdiction: formulations in wide use include
the requirement that a standard of care be upheld by a “consensus of opinion” among physicians, that it
be adhered to by the “ordinary practitioner,” that it be followed by at least a “respectable minority” of
physicians, and that it be what a “reasonable and prudent” doctor would undertake under similar
circumstances. See Jackson v. Burnham, 39 P. 577, 580 (Colo. 1895) (“[W]hen a particular mode of
treatment is upheld by a consensus of opinion among the members of the profession, it should be
followed by the ordinary practitioner; and if a physician sees fit to experiment with some other mode,
he should do so at his peril.”); Boyanton v. Reif, 798 P.2d 603, 604–05 (Okla. 1990) (“The question in
professional malpractice suits is not whether a physician has made a mistake, but whether he has used
‘ordinary care’—that which is ordinarily exercised by his peers.”); Jones v. Chidester, 610 A.2d 964,
969 (Pa. 1992) (stating that the correct standard for avoiding malpractice liability is that the physician
“followed a course of treatment advocated by a considerable number of recognized and respected
professionals in his given area of expertise”); Harris v. Robert C. Groth, M.D., Inc., P.S., 663 P.2d 113,
116 (Wash. 1983) (“[T]he plaintiff in an action for professional negligence must show that the
defendant health care provider ‘failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning expected of a
reasonably prudent health care provider in the profession or class to which he belongs.’”); 61 AM. JUR.
2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 189 (2002); Theresa K. Porter, Cause of Action Against Physician or
Surgeon for Breach of the Duty of Attention and Care, in 21 CAUSES OF ACTION 1, 9–11 (1990).
323. See supra note 146.
324. See 2 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 321 (4th ed. 1992). In a minority of
jurisdictions, practice protocols are admissible under the learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule.
Albert Tzeel, Clinical Practice Guidelines and Medical Malpractice: Guidelines Gaining Credibility in
Courtrooms, May Eliminate Expert Testimony, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE, Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 36, 37–38.
325. See Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical
Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 327, 339–41 (2001) (discussing judicial reluctance
to give clinical practice protocols greater weight than expert testimony concerning professional
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rests.
Thus, doctors who follow these protocols are as vulnerable to the
liability roulette wheel as are those who adhere to practice norms that lack
a scientific basis. The opposing side need only produce an expert prepared
to claim that an alternative therapy is widely employed and would have
yielded a better outcome. Then jurors get to choose one side (unless the
judge does so for them326) based on professional acceptance, not scientific
rigor. The unfortunate consequence for health policy is that early adopters
of an evidence-based protocol face enhanced liability risk if the protocol
departs from common practice. Prevailing malpractice doctrine is thus at
odds with its supposed justification—the utility of medical custom as a
measure of reasonable care.
From an emergent systems perspective, there is thus a strong case for
privileging evidence-based practice protocols over professional custom.
Opportunism knocks: health care providers have taken an interest in
practice protocols as a way to ward off lawsuits,327 making providers
potential supporters of greater legal deference to such protocols. This
strategy may or may not shield doctors and hospitals from suits,328 but
provider support for it could leverage reformers’ efforts to incorporate
science-backed protocols into legal standards of care.
In the near term, doing so is unlikely to restrain rising costs, except
insofar as compliance with such protocols averts adverse clinical outcomes
that are expensive to treat. Today’s practice protocols rarely take cost into
account, at least explicitly. But if and when practice protocols evolve
toward greater cost sensitivity, their integration into legal standards of care
would ease the way toward wide acceptance of clinical cost-benefit tradeoffs—in medical malpractice law and in society more generally. There is
no guarantee of such acceptance; there could just as well be popular
backlash against the courts for countenancing rationing. But incorporating
cost-sensitive, science-based protocols into malpractice doctrine will be
necessary to keep this body of law from emerging as a formidable obstacle
custom).
326. A trial judge can do so, of course, by determining that one or the other side’s expert has
stated the correct standard of care as a matter of law (that is, no reasonable juror could conclude
otherwise).
327. Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 666 (2001).
328. Although considerable research has addressed the impact of damage caps, shortened statutes
of limitations, and other much-debated reforms on the incidence of malpractice suits and the size and
frequency of settlements and awards, no study has decisively addressed the influence of clinical practice
protocols on these variables.
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to the balancing of health care’s therapeutic benefits and economic
burdens.
Detailed consideration of how evidence-based, cost-sensitive
protocols might be incorporated into malpractice law is beyond my scope
here.329 Three principles, though, should guide efforts to nudge malpractice
doctrine in this direction—if malpractice law is to abet progress toward
cost-benefit trade-offs that Americans can tolerate. First, protocols should
be science based. By this, I do not mean that they should be put to the steep
tests required by the research community to treat hypotheses as
established.330 The fractal complexity of clinical outcomes research331
precludes gathering enough data to rest most medical decisions firmly on
publishable science. A more realistic requirement is that protocols rest on
clinical premises accepted by researchers as more probable than not, based
on the best available data.332
Second, the cost-benefit (and health-health) trade-offs embedded in a
protocol should be both explicit and broadly accepted by society. Covert
rationing is not sustainable. It is inexorably exposed by America’s
entrepreneurs of revelation—plaintiffs’ lawyers, journalists, congressional
investigators, and others who reap rewards by minding the gaps between
what those in authority say and do.333 To win widespread, sustained
acceptance for cost-benefit trade-offs, authors and adopters of practice
protocols will need to state their premises about the value of life and
various states of disability.334
329. For a review of the possibilities, see Mello, supra note 327.
330. Strictly speaking, scientists can never say that their hypotheses are proven by experiments;
they can only judge that a hypothesis has not been disproven. KARL POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC
DISCOVERY 10 (Routledge 2d ed. 2002) (1935). In practice, though, researchers treat a hypothesis as
established when a sufficient number and variety of experiments (sufficiency here is a normative
judgment) yield data consistent with that hypothesis.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 237–40.
332. Use of a more-probable-than-not standard here reflects the reality that a clinician must
decide, one way or the other. Since a decision must be made, any guidance with more than a 50 percent
prospect of being “right” is useful. Judicial assessment of whether the factual premises undergirding a
protocol are more probable than not will call for inquiry into both the reasoning behind them and the
extent to which they are accepted by the research community. This is a demanding endeavor, but no
more so than is the assessment required when courts engage in evidentiary gatekeeping under Daubert.
Cassandra H. Welch, Note, Flexible Standards, Deferential Review: Daubert’s Legacy of Confusion, 29
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1085, 1094 (2006).
333. Bloche, supra note 257, at 946–47. Popular backlash in the late 1990s against covert
rationing by aggressively managed health plans is illustrative. Id. at 925.
334. Government agencies have, on occasion, been forthright about these premises without
unleashing popular backlash. The Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) basing of its aviation
safety rulemaking on dollar values for lives lost and degrees of injury inflicted is illustrative. See GRA
INC., ECONOMIC VALUES FOR FAA INVESTMENT AND REGULATORY DECISIONS: A GUIDE § 2-2 (2004),
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Doing so will not guarantee public acceptance. Americans will first
have to come to terms with the need to say no to some of medicine’s
benefits—a need most of us are not willing to acknowledge.335 But if and
when growing cost pressures bring about broad acknowledgment of the
need to set limits, protocol development processes that engage a wide range
of participants will stand the best chance of yielding trade-offs that endure.
Industry-wide collaboration along these lines—involving doctors,
hospitals, and health plans—is already underway. So far, this collaboration
has focused on the setting of quality-of-care standards336 without regard for
cost.337 But, like brain circuits that take on new behavioral tasks as
evolution progresses, the organizations that oversee this collaboration could
become venues for the weighing of benefits and costs.338
Still to develop are mechanisms for incorporating the values and
preferences of heath care consumers.339 For reasons I set forth earlier, the
favored mechanism of most market-oriented health law commentators—
consumer choice from among health plans with multiple cost-benefit tradeoff tiers—faces formidable cognitive obstacles and moral objections.340
These cognitive and moral factors favor maintenance of a single costbenefit trade-off tier for liability purposes. This trade-off policy is likely to
be a fuzzy compromise between two starkly different consumer
perspectives: that of health plan purchasers who economize from behind a
“veil of ignorance” concerning their future medical needs,341 and that of
sick people who want all the beneficial care they can get.342 Arguably,
available at http://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/policy_guidance/benefit_cost/media/050404%
20Critical%20Values%20Dec%2031%20Report%2007Jan05.pdf. Popular backlash admittedly will be
more likely if such dollar values are built into clinical practice protocols, since medical care (unlike
FAA and other health and safety regulation) involves identified lives.
335. See supra text accompanying notes 253–61.
336. See supra notes 301–03.
337. See supra note 302.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 303–04.
339. Many such mechanisms have been proposed, including public opinion surveys, focus groups,
presentation of hypothetical decisionmaking scenarios to research subjects, and elegant formulae that
take account of data derived from these sources. So far, none of these approaches has gained
institutional purchase, a reality that reflects our national unwillingness to acknowledge cost-benefit and
health-health trade-offs in medical care.
340. See supra note 308.
341. This veil, in truth, is translucent, not opaque. Chronic disease, genetic and behavioral risk
factors, and other health information known to consumers when they purchase medical coverage reduce
their inclinations to economize on some kinds of care—the care they anticipate needing.
342. From an Olympian social welfare perspective, such a fuzzy compromise is unsatisfactory: the
perspective of the consumer who economizes from behind the medical veil of ignorance is preferable.
But as a practical matter, the perspective of the sick person in need will always have countervailing
power: our hard-wired empathy (and the politics of social solidarity) will have a great deal of influence
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industry-wide collaboration that balances the perspectives of providers and
health plans can serve as a crude stand-in for formalized consumer input.
Since health plans profit by paying for less, while doctors and hospitals
have incentives to do more, their competing interests approximate the
divergent perspectives of consumers before and after the onset of illness.
Third, malpractice law should not incorporate practice protocols
inflexibly as irrebuttable presumptions. Medicine’s irreducible
variability—the fractal complexity of clinical situations—ensures that even
protocols with solid research behind them will merit exceptions. Clinical
outcomes research is necessarily population based, making it inevitable that
some patients will be outliers. Malpractice law can accommodate this by
treating protocols as rebuttable presumptions to be overridden upon an
evidence-based showing that a different approach made sense in a
particular case.343
Tort law can make another contribution to health care quality and
value by incorporating state-of-the-art, systems approaches to the
management of medical services. This will require moving beyond blame
for individuals and toward shared duties to disseminate and adopt
evidence-based protocols, coordinate diagnosis and treatment in complex
cases, employ information systems that avert mistakes, and report and learn
from errors.344 For example, a doctor’s failure to prescribe beta blockers or
aspirin to a heart attack patient upon discharge from the hospital should be
treated not just as negligence on her part, but as breach of duty by the
hospital—if the hospital has not made these medications part of its postheart-attack protocol and adopted monitoring practices to minimize the risk
of their omission. And a nurse’s misunderstanding of a doctor’s hard-toread handwritten order, resulting in a fatal overdose, should be understood
not merely as the nurse’s (or the doctor’s) negligence, but as the hospital’s
breach of its duty to employ reasonably safe information systems.
Rechanneling medical liability along these lines would help to
on the clinical practice norms adopted by physicians and the law. Cf. Bloche, supra note 11, at 272
(discussing compromise between patients’ perspectives on health care resource allocation before and
after the onset of illness).
343. By “evidence-based” here, I do not mean scientific proof that measures up to Daubert
standards of admissibility (an unrealistically high prerequisite, since comparative-effectiveness research
cannot anticipate and keep pace with every potential exception to established protocols). A more
pragmatic approach would be to require evidence sufficient to show that a prudent physician would,
more probably than not, have departed from the protocol under the circumstances. Sharpening this test
is a task beyond the scope of this Article. Doing so will be complicated by the tension between
aspirations to make medical care more science based and more responsive to individual differences.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 114, 273–74.
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promote the emergence of a better-coordinated, more efficient health care
system.345 Some have urged enterprise liability as a means of improving
health care quality.346 Were our medical system more vertically integrated,
the case for this approach would be powerful.347 But our fragmented
system presents high barriers to the transmission of enterprise liability’s
deterrence signals from defendants (health plans or hospitals) to individual
caregivers.348 And since malpractice settlements and judgments constitute
less than 1 percent of U.S. health care spending,349 enterprise liability’s
incentives would not suffice to bring about the vertical integration of
American health care.350 More realistic—and more doctrinally modest, and
thus more suitable for judges to do—would be to extend traditional joint
345. There are numerous open questions within the interstices of this proposition. These include
whether health plans (which typically contract with many hospitals and physicians but do not exercise
managerial control over them) should share in such liability, whether hospitals should ever share
responsibility for their staff physicians’ negligent treatment of outpatients (courts have thus far said no),
and how liability should be distributed among clinical caregivers and institutions (especially hospitals)
with system-wide responsibility. Developing rich responses to these questions is beyond the scope of
this Article.
346. E.g., PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 114 (1991).
347. Organizations that integrate health care financing, physician services, and hospital care
would be best situated (and most motivated) to adopt systems approaches to patient safety and medical
care quality in response to enterprise liability. For an early, comprehensive argument on behalf of
enterprise liability for medical malpractice, see Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise
Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 415–
20 (1994) (preferring hospitals to health insurers as objects of enterprise liability).
348. In theory (from a Coasean perspective), the degree of fragmentation should make no
difference: industry actors should bargain toward allocations of liability to the lowest-cost risk avoiders,
regardless of starting point (or default) liability rules. In practice, this classic story breaks down in the
health care industry for many reasons. These include the transaction costs involved in such bargaining
(among vast numbers of actors), the difficulty of pinpointing lowest-cost risk avoiders when risk is the
product of collective efforts by independent industry actors (for example, multiple specialists in
separate practices who treat the same patient), and cultural factors (for example, doctors’ reluctance to
forgo professional autonomy by acceding to hospitals’ or health plans’ supervisory authority in
exchange for avoidance of the threat of liability).
Thus the choice of default liability rules matters greatly in health care. And in our fragmented
system, hospitals and health plans generally lack the supervisory authority or bargaining leverage
necessary to respond to enterprise liability’s incentives by obliging physicians to adopt state-of-the-art
systems approaches to medical care. See supra text accompanying notes 264–73.
349. Gerard F. Anderson et al., Health Spending in the United States and the Rest of the
Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFF. 903, 910 (2005) (“The cost of defending U.S. malpractice
claims, including awards, legal costs, and underwriting costs, was an estimated $6.5 billion in 2001—
0.46 percent of total health spending.”).
350. Moreover, as a practical matter, doctors, hospitals, and health plans strongly oppose
enterprise liability. Doctors equate giving up the “right to be sued,” as one put it, with surrendering their
authority and autonomy to insurance or hospital bureaucrats, while hospitals and health plans fear that
jurors will see them as “deep pocket[s].” Randall R. Bovbjerg & Robert Berenson, Enterprise Liability
in the Twenty-First Century, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM, supra
note 311, at 219, 230–31.
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and several liability to encompass a duty to adopt proven systems
approaches to improvement of quality and avoidance of error.351 The
provider’s personal fault would remain part of the picture, but the failure of
health care organizations to adopt information systems, management
strategies, and other quality improvement methods that might have averted
error352 would subject them to liability. This would complicate litigation
and settlement to some degree, but mounting evidence of the risk
avoidance achievable through state-of-the-art systems approaches353
weighs in favor of accepting this cost.354
iii. Health Insurance Contracts and “Medical Necessity”
The law governing disputes over medical coverage is more
consequence than cause of American society’s reluctance to accept limits
on beneficial care.355 Nearly all health insurance contracts employ the term
medical necessity as their standard for coverage, and Americans continue
to see this term as a promise to pay for care whenever its expected benefits
outweigh the clinical risks.356 Courts no longer defer blindly to treating351. The legal foundations for such a duty are already in place. Since the mid-1960s, courts have
held that hospitals have duties to take reasonable care in reviewing the credentials of staff physicians
(including those who are independent contractors rather than employees) and monitoring doctors’ and
nurses’ ongoing performance. Lee J. Dunn, Jr., Hospital Corporate Liability: The Trend Continues,
MEDICOLEGAL NEWS, Oct. 1980, at 16, 16. Updating this duty to encompass adoption of systems
approaches to quality improvement would be a small doctrinal step.
352. Organizations subject to this duty would include health plans, hospitals, group medical
practices, and all others in position to reduce the risk of error by adopting systems approaches.
353. See COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., supra note 4, at 61–62.
354. Any such extension of institutional liability should be accompanied by empirical study of
both its costs and its impact on the incidence of error.
355. Some advocates of minimally regulated medical markets assert otherwise, contending that
courts’ lack of deference to insurers’ coverage denials is a large obstacle to health care cost
containment. See, e.g., HAVIGHURST, supra note 11, at 115. They are right about judges’ lack of
deference, but in my view, judges’ attitudes toward nay-saying by health plans reflect our society’s
unwillingness to tolerate the withholding of beneficial care. See supra note 308.
356. To be sure, health insurance contracts also contain a wide array of specific exclusions and
limitations; for example, no coverage for cosmetic surgical procedures and limited numbers of
psychotherapy sessions per year. Legal disputes over these exclusions and limitations are much less
common than are disputes over “medical necessity.” One type of exclusion, though, does occasion
considerable conflict—noncoverage for “investigational” or “experimental” treatments. See, e.g.,
Elsroth v. Consol. Edison Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 427, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying the insured’s motion
for a preliminary injuction requiring the defendant-insurer to precertify high-dose chemotherapy
treatment because it was deemed experimental); Watts v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 892 F. Supp. 737,
746 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (denying the insured’s motion for a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction preventing the insurer from declining to cover autologous bone-marrow
transplant with high-dose chemotherapy (“ABMT-HDC”) because the treatment was experimental);
Kekis v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utica-Watertown, Inc. 815 F. Supp. 571, 578 (N.D.N.Y. 1993)
(granting the insured a preliminary injunction and ordering the insurer to provide coverage of ABMTHDC); Rollo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Civ. A. No. 90-597, 1990 WL 312647 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 1990)
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doctors’ determinations of medical need,357 but the law still looks to
professional norms to give content to this formless term. In forty states,
independent medical review schemes rely on physician panels to rule on
medical necessity, based on professional practice.358 Extant clinical
practice is likewise the touchstone when courts confront medical necessity
disputes, whether as breach-of-contract or tort claims.359 As the 1990s
backlash against managed care underscores, Americans are not ready to
recognize medical necessity as warrant for withholding care, so long as
expected benefits outweigh clinical risks. But the law governing coverage
disputes could support the emergence of cost-sensitive, evidence-based
clinical protocols by permitting insurers to adopt them in lieu of traditional
medical-necessity clauses. A cautious approach is in order: courts should
not accede to contractual departures from long-standing consumer
expectations360 absent clear explanation of the terms of coverage.361
Contract language allowing health plans to weigh therapeutic benefits
against costs should explain trade-off principles in plain language.362
(enjoining a defendant medical insurer from denying coverage for ABMT-HDC).
357. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
358. See supra 99–101, 121 and accompanying text.
359. These disputes present as breach-of-contract cases when patients (or providers) sue insurers
to obtain payment after care has been provided or to secure preauthorization of payment in order to
proceed with treatment. They present as tort cases when refusal to preauthorize care has led to denial of
care, resulting (allegedly) in injury. ERISA preempts these state law claims when employers provide
coverage. But patients with employment-based coverage can obtain payment for care under ERISA
after prevailing in state-level independent medical review proceedings. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v.
Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 359 (2002).
360. This deference to long-standing expectations reflects: (1) appreciation of the fact that people
buy medical coverage (and other kinds of insurance) in large part for the sense of security that it offers
and (2) acknowledgment that most insurance subscribers have no role in the drafting or negotiation of
the specific provisions of insurance policies. This accords with insurance law’s special regard for “the
reasonable expectations of the insured.” See generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and
Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151
(1981) (discussing the justifications for the “expectations principle”).
361. Clarity about health plan terms that depart from consumer expectations requires more than
the use of language readily accessible to the average person: plan marketing procedures should ensure
that such terms are communicated to potential subscribers in vivid, high-visibility fashion. Coverage
exclusions, in particular, should be conveyed in concrete language, perhaps accompanied by examples
of tests and treatments covered or excluded under common circumstances. Bloche, supra note 11, at
316.
362. Id. The FAA’s explicit valuation of life—and of several levels of injury and disability—in
dollar terms, GRA INC., supra note 334, offers one model for such clarity. As with other limits on
medical coverage that depart from consumer expectations, see supra note 361, such valuations—and
how they are to be incorporated into clinical protocols—should be presented clearly, in vivid, highvisibility fashion, in health plan marketing materials, not merely in the “small print” of insurance
contracts.
Health plans should also be clear in their contracts about how the protocols they adopt treat
scientific uncertainty concerning the efficacy of tests and treatments. Do they, for example, rely on best
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Clinical protocols need not be written into the contract; it should suffice to
incorporate them by reference.363 But the cost-benefit trade-offs that
underlie each protocol should somewhere be made explicit,364 and they
should be consistent with the trade-off principles set out in the contract.
One might imagine hybrid contracts, containing traditional medicalnecessity clauses modified by language incorporating some evidence-based
protocols—for example, all protocols adopted by one or another of the
industry-wide collaborations I discussed earlier.365 Given the
incompleteness of the science base for medical practice, total replacement
of medical necessity (and thus, deference to customary practice) by clinical
protocols is impracticable, and will remain so for the foreseeable future.
Insurers might or might not offer these cost-sensitive contractual
formulations, and consumers might or might not accept them in exchange
for lower premiums. But if such plans emerge, the law should enable them,
rather than stifling them by subjecting coverage denials to review based on
customary practice when denials rest on evidence-based, cost-sensitive
protocols.
c. Expectations, Incentives, and the Evolution of Medical Technology
The above-discussed adjustments to current law have large potential to
speed the development of cost-sensitive clinical practice if and when
Americans accept the need to limit beneficial care for the common good.
But so long as society rejects such limits, law cannot impose them. Health
plans will not set them, and providers will not abide by them.366 Still, there
are measures that government can take to slow the escalation of
estimates of efficacy by protocol drafters (including leading researchers in a specialty), or do they reject
tests and treatments outright when these have not yet been shown scientifically to work? If plans take
the latter, more aggressive course, they should advise consumers in plain language that many therapies
in wide use lack scientific proof of efficacy and thus will not be covered. Bloche, supra note 11, at 316.
An in-between course that plans could take is to cover widely used clinical measures based on best
estimates of efficacy by protocol drafters, but to insist on scientific evidence of efficacy for new clinical
interventions.
363. To require that they be set out in full in health insurance contracts could turn these contracts
into multivolume medical treatises—hardly a way to make them understandable to subscribers.
364. It should suffice for protocol developers to state the cost-benefit trade-off rules on which
protocols rely. The industry-wide protocol development collaborations now getting underway, see
supra notes 301, 303, offer an opportunity in this regard: each collaboration could adopt a common
cost-benefit trade-off standard for the protocols it adopts. This would enable health plans to adopt
packages of protocols that rest on compatible trade-offs—trade-offs that are also consistent with the
resource allocation principles articulated in plans’ contracts with subscribers.
365. See supra notes 301, 303.
366. Market forces will drive health plans and providers to eschew such limits, as the late 1990s
backlash against managed-care organizations’ rationing methods illustrates. See supra text
accompanying notes 227–29.
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technology-intensive medical spending. Attentiveness to emergent
possibilities suggests an evolutionary strategy anchored in people’s
different expectations about treatments that are technically feasible now
and those that might arise as medicine advances. Put simply, most of us
bristle at the prospect of being denied the benefits of today’s health care on
account of cost, but we are not made livid by our lack of access to the
technologies of the future.367 We hope for cures to diseases that terrify us,
and some of us feel rage or despair over the blind cruelty of illnesses that
wreck the lives of loved ones or end them prematurely. Yet we do not rail
against health plans, providers, and public officials because they do not
deliver, say, the magically effective care Dr. McCoy gives his Star Trek
shipmates.
This expectations gap constitutes a cost-control opportunity that does
not depend on widespread willingness to ration contemporary medicine’s
benefits. By reining in the development of ever more expensive
technologies, we can restrain future spending growth without saying no
now to beneficial care for identified patients. An obvious worry about this
strategy is the risk of retarding clinical breakthroughs—advances that yield
high value, relative to cost, and that are thus worth paying for.368 But there
is a fortuitous answer to this problem. Major breakthroughs tend to result
from leaps in biological understanding of disease—advances in
biochemistry and physiology that open the way for elegant, decisive
interventions. Penicillin, which destroys bacterial cell walls, is perhaps the
best-known example. A more recent illustration is the revolution in our
understanding of lipid metabolism,369 which opened the way for
development of the statin drugs that tens of millions of Americans take to
slow the growth of artery-clogging atherosclerotic plaque.370 Therapies that
target mechanisms of disease in such elegant fashion tend to be relatively
inexpensive to provide, once the basic science that supports them has been
367. Put differently, our anchoring heuristic for the health care we expect is the medical
technology currently available. People alive at the dawn of the twentieth century did not take umbrage
at the unavailability of antibiotics (which did not appear until the 1930s). Similarly, we do not bristle
today because the gene therapies of the future are not yet on pharmacists’ shelves.
368. See generally CUTLER, supra note 65 (reviewing health services research that has identified
tests and treatments worth paying for).
369. See Nicole Kresge, Robert D. Simoni & Robert L. Hill, 30 Years of Cholesterol Metabolism:
The Work of Michael Brown and Joseph Goldstein, 281 J. BIOLOGICAL CHEMISTRY e25 (2006).
370. The statin medications work by inhibiting an enzyme that catalyzes one of the steps in
cholesterol synthesis. This reduces the level of low-density lipoproteins (so-called bad cholesterol) in
the blood, which, in turn, slows, stops, and under some conditions reverses the formation of
atherosclerotic plaque. Dominic S. Ng, The Role of Statins in Oxidative Stress and Cardiovascular
Disease, 5 CARDIOVASCULAR & HAEMATOLOGICAL DISORDERS—DRUG TARGETS 165 (2005).
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paid for.
By contrast, our most costly treatments—those that Lewis Thomas
famously termed “half way technologies”371—tend to rest on comparatively
crude understandings of the biology of disease. They are, paradoxically,
marvels of engineering, electronics, and materials science, and of modest,
often minimal medical benefit.372 Examples include drug-coated stents
designed to keep atherosclerotic arteries open,373 high-technology life
support,374 and last-ditch radiation and chemotherapy regimens meant
mainly to sustain hope. Such treatments account for much of the
outpouring of medical spending that occurs in the last months of life, in
surgical suites, intensive care units, and elsewhere. They are expensive
because they are both technology intensive and clinically indecisive. They
employ costly, complex equipment and highly trained, well-paid personnel.
And their inability, in most cases, to make more than a modest therapeutic
difference leads, perversely, to their intensive and sustained (rather than
one-shot) use. In medicine, as in warfare, decisive victory is cheaper than
drawn-out struggle.
A rational incentive scheme for therapeutic advance would reserve the
greatest rewards for those technologies most likely to add clinical value.
But the American health care system rewards the adoption of new
technologies with little regard for value. Physician time spent performing
invasive, technology-intensive procedures is much better compensated than
is time spent counseling patients, consulting medical journals, or ordering
and overseeing minimally invasive measures.375 Doctors thus have
371. LEWIS THOMAS, THE LIVES OF A CELL 34 (1974).
372. When I characterize their benefits as modest, I mean modest in the aggregate, relative to cost.
Such technologies do, in some cases, add years to people’s lives and diminish suffering and disability.
Examples include angioplasty during the first twelve hours after a heart attack, Albert Schömig et al.,
Mechanical Reperfusion in Patients with Acute Myocardial Infarction Presenting More than 12 Hours
from Symptom Onset, 293 JAMA 2865, 2869–71 (2005) (finding that angioplasty within twelve to
forty-eight hours from symptom onset can positively affect long-term outcomes), and replacement of
severely arthritic hips and knees with artificial joints, NIH Consensus Dev. Panel on Total Hip
Replacement, Total Hip Replacement, 273 JAMA 1950, 1950 (1995) (“Total hip replacement is an
option for nearly all patients with diseases of the hip that cause chronic discomfort and significant
functional impairment. Most patients have an excellent prognosis for long-term improvement in
symptoms and physical function.”).
373. See William H. Maisel, Unanswered Questions—Drug-Eluting Stents and the Risk of Late
Thrombosis, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 981 (2007).
374. This can include computer-controlled ventilators and cardiac-assist devices, electronic
monitoring of intracardiac pressures as well as peripheral blood pressure and heart rate, total parenteral
nutrition (intravenous feeding), and pressor support for patients unable to sustain viable blood pressure.
375. William C. Hsaio et al., Results and Policy Implications of the Resource-Based RelativeValue Study, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 881 (1988) (finding that despite the fact that both consume the
same resource inputs, invasive procedures tend to be compensated at more than double the rate of
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powerful incentives to adopt new halfway technologies,376 and, in turn,
biotechnology firms (and investors) have strong incentives to develop
them. By contrast, clinical advances that build on biological breakthroughs
to treat disease in decisive fashion typically yield fewer financial rewards
for doctors, since these therapies tend to be less invasive and technology
intensive.377 This reward scheme is a recipe for rapid growth of spending
on those technologies that are least likely to yield high clinical benefits
relative to cost.
To the extent possible, given market and political constraints, the
compensation gap between physician time spent performing technologyintensive procedures and talking with patients (or providing noninvasive
care) should be closed. Market pressures rule out an immediate push by
private insurers in this direction, since large cuts in a health plan’s
payments for such procedures are likely to prompt specialists to drop out of
that plan.378 But Medicare’s large market share—it accounts for almost
one-fourth of physician payment379—positions it to lead by initiating such
reductions. Medicare should go as far as is politically feasible toward
closing the chasm between payment for high-tech procedures and other
uses of physician time. As evidence accrues concerning the comparative
effectiveness of clinical approaches,380 Medicare should adjust its
valuations of physician time accordingly.
Stakeholder opposition, mainly from medical specialists,381 will limit
Medicare’s ability to do these things.382 Yet any progress that Medicare can
evaluation-and-management services).
376. Hospitals can also profit handsomely from these technologies, which due to economies of
scale and close proximity of complementary inpatient services, are often hospital based. But doctors’
incentives have a much greater influence on their rate of adoption, since doctors are the key
decisionmakers.
377. An example is the prescription of statins—based on advances in our understanding of
cholesterol metabolism, see supra note 370—to treat or prevent buildup of atherosclerotic plaque in
blood vessels. Pharmaceutical firms, of course, can benefit greatly from the sale of drugs, so long as
they remain patent protected, but they cannot ethically or legally share these revenue streams with
prescribing doctors. The cardiologist who evaluates a patient, then prescribes a statin along with,
perhaps, a few other medications might be able to bill a few or several hundred dollars. The cardiologist
who spends the same time performing an angioplasty with placement of a stent might be able to collect
a few or several thousand dollars.
378. In most regions, individual health plans lack sufficient market share to impose such cutbacks
without losing large numbers of specialists and thereby diminishing their ability to compete. Antitrust
law, of course, keeps plans from colluding to dictate such cuts.
379. See supra note 297.
380. See supra text accompanying notes 279–86.
381. Firms that develop and manufacture halfway technologies are likely to join in this opposition.
382. New legislation—sure to be resisted by specialty societies—would be necessary to empower
CMS, the federal agency that runs Medicare, to do so. CMS is currently required by statute to set fees
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make on these fronts would nudge the future trajectory of health spending
downward, especially if (as has happened with past Medicare payment
reforms) private health plans follow Medicare’s lead. Such progress would
diminish doctors’ incentives to adopt new halfway technologies and thus
reduce investment in efforts to develop them. This, in turn, would slow
their introduction into clinical practice, moderating their contribution to
rising costs. Unidentified future patients would forgo some therapeutic
benefits—probably low, in the aggregate, relative to the costs saved. But
popular objections to denial of beneficial care would not come into play,
since the tests and treatments “withheld” would not be available to anyone
in the here-and-now.
This approach can be applied more generally, in ways that
differentiate between technologies that are more and less likely to add high
value relative to their costs. Pharmaceutical and medical device firms could
be rewarded for new products with intellectual property protection for
varying periods, based on how much a product improves therapeutic
outcomes. This might nudge research and development decisions, over
time, toward larger therapeutic advances by reducing these firms’
opportunities to reap windfalls from exclusive marketing of modest
improvements. Alternatively, government could reward firms directly for
medical innovation (through prizes or other payments) while requiring all
such innovations to pass into the public domain.383 Such rewards could be
tied to favorable comparative-efficacy research results, or to sales levels,384
if evidence-based clinical practice protocols come to play a large role in the
adoption of medical innovations.
Potentially intractable complications cast doubt on the viability of
these ideas. Settling on metrics of therapeutic improvement would prove
based on the Resource-Based Relative Value Scale (“RBRVS”) methodology, a species of cost-ofservice rate making. RBRVS incorporates physician effort and training costs but disregards therapeutic
value. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a) (2000). RBRVS, enacted in 1989, was itself an improvement over the
physician payment methodology enacted upon Medicare’s creation in 1965—the “reasonable-charge”
formula (which set payments to doctors based on the physician-charge schedules prevailing in a region,
thereby inviting doctors to raise their fees as quickly as the market would bear). See Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6102, 103 Stat. 2106, 2169. RBRVS achieved
modest reductions in some specialists’ fees (10 to 20 percent in some cases) and correspondingly
modest increases in primary care physicians’ fees. John K. Iglehart, Medicare’s Declining Payments to
Physicians, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1924, 1925–26 (2002).
383. See Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44
J.L. & ECON. 525, 525–26 (2001) (arguing that giving innovators a choice between intellectual property
rights and a reward system under which innovations would immediately enter the public domain is
superior to merely conferring intellectual property rights).
384. Id. at 526.
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difficult at both the statutory and administrative law levels. Political and
legal conflict between stakeholders over the selection of benchmarks385
could paralyze implementation of any sliding scale reward scheme. And
firms that benefit from full-fledged intellectual property protection for
halfway technologies are likely to oppose enactment of any sliding scale
scheme. I raise these ideas not because I am sure they would work,386 but
because they suggest the broader potential of an evolutionary strategy—one
that slows spending growth without awakening Americans’ passionate
objections to the withholding of beneficial care.
This strategy seizes the opportunity presented by people’s different
expectations concerning access to the beneficial care that is technically
possible today and that might become feasible in the future. The strategy is
emergence oriented in two ways: it exploits an opening for comparatively
modest change in current law, and it anticipates industry actors’ adaptations
to changed incentives (and to others’ adaptations). It finesses a premise
embedded in our culture and politics—the notion that doctors should
provide care, whatever the cost, whenever expected benefits outweigh
risks—by slowing the development of high-cost technologies. By itself,
however, this finesse could not suffice to keep health care from absorbing
an ever-rising share of our national wealth. So long as we continue to reject
clinical limit setting on account of cost, therapies of great technical
virtuosity and modest benefit will proliferate at the ragged edges387 of
biological understanding, pushing medical spending upward.
V. CONCLUSION
The American way of paying for and providing health care cannot
385. The possibilities for conflict are much enhanced by the subjectivity inherent in selection of
medical outcome measures. As is the case for selection of outcome measures by comparative-effective
researchers, see supra text accompanying notes 235–36, and adoption of quality-of-care benchmarks for
the purpose of comparing provider performance, see supra text accompanying notes 300–02, different
personal preferences and values are best captured by different measures. There will thus always be
room to object to designated metrics of therapeutic advance on the ground that they privilege some
patients’ concerns while giving short shrift to those of others.
386. They merit further exploration by scholars of intellectual property who are familiar with the
dynamics of technological change in health care. That exploration is beyond the scope of this Article, as
is consideration of whether likely opposition from drug and device makers renders these ideas
politically implausible.
387. The term “ragged edges” is Daniel Callahan’s, meant to capture the truth that however far
our biological understandings of disease advance, and however quickly we devise effective therapies
based on these understandings, there will always be a frontier zone of biological ignorance and
minimally effective tests and treatments. DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF
MEDICAL PROGRESS 63–65 (1990).
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long survive. Since the early 1990s, a million people per year have lost or
foregone medical coverage, a figure that masks countless stories of
anguish—of loved ones dying too soon, life savings lost, and needless
suffering and disability. Health spending, meanwhile, has become the fiscal
equivalent of global warming. Current rates of increase are unsustainable
without federal deficits or tax increases of astonishing size.388 American
enterprise faces a parallel threat from the soaring cost of employee
coverage.
Can law help to divert our country from this path? I have argued here
that the law has enormous potential to do so, but that this potential remains
unfulfilled. To take advantage of the possibilities, we must begin to treat
health law as more than a jumble of diverse doctrinal parts. Legal schemes
that are well designed for some purposes often work poorly in concert,
yielding chaos instead of coherent governance in the health sphere. On the
other hand, no single, unifying paradigm can capture all that we expect
from the legal governance of health care provision. Like medicine itself,
health law pursues diverse and conflicting aims. Organizing the governance
of medicine around any one theory is bound to neglect some of these aims.
Theory, nevertheless, is indispensable. Too often, health lawyers disregard
the big picture, urging answers to discrete questions without heeding the
connections between moving parts. Coherence matters, even if it can never
be complete, owing to health law’s competing goals.
With an eye toward coherence, where possible, and toward
opportunities to turn health care policy away from its current path toward
ruin, this Article offers a new conception of health law. My core
proposition is that health law’s disconnected doctrinal spheres and myriad
decisionmakers are usefully understood as an emergent system. The same
is the case for the American way of medical care financing and provision.
This understanding comes to terms with health law’s contradictions,
confusion, and resistance to wholesale change. It also explains our health
care system’s multiple dysfunctions as regards access, cost, and value.
These contradictions and dysfunctions are not the fault of some failed
master designer. No one actor has a grand overview or the power to impose
a unifying vision. Countless market actors, public planners, and legal and
regulatory decisionmakers interact in oft-chaotic ways, clashing with,
reinforcing, and adjusting to each other. Out of these interactions, a larger
regulatory system emerges—one that incorporates the health sphere’s
competing interests and values. Change in this system, for worse and for
388.

See supra text accompanying notes 41–44.
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better, arises from the interplay between its myriad actors.
By quitting the quest for a single, master design, we can better focus
our efforts on real-world possibilities for legal and policy change. We can
and should continuously survey the landscape of stakeholders and
expectations with an eye toward potential launching points for evolutionary
processes—processes that leverage current institutions and incentives.
What we cannot do is to plan or predict these evolutionary pathways in
precise detail—the complexity of interactions among market and
government actors precludes fine-grained foresight of this sort. But we can
determine the general direction of needed change, identify seemingly
intractable obstacles, and envision ways to diminish or finesse them over
time. Dysfunctional legal doctrines, interest group expectations,
consumers’ anxieties, and embedded institutional and cultural barriers can
all be dealt with in this way, in iterative fashion.
In this Article, I have set out a strategy for doing so. To illustrate this
strategy, I have proposed a package of approaches to the most urgent
questions we face in health care policy and law. I have urged approaches to
universal coverage that build on possibilities immanent in existing legal
and institutional arrangements, draw energy from cultural currents (for
example, rising emphasis on personal responsibility), and minimize
disruption of settled expectations. And I have counseled cost-control
stratagems that work around obstacles to scientific assessment of tests and
treatments, resistance from purveyors of profitable care, and the popular
belief that we are entitled to all beneficial care, regardless of cost. The
indirectness and incompleteness of these approaches is bound to dismay
scholars and activists who prefer one or another elegant, sweeping solution
to our crises of health care access, cost, and value. But we are not about to
adopt any single, all-encompassing answer. The clashing values and
perspectives of the health sphere’s disconnected legal and regulatory
decisionmakers make doing so impossible.
There are early signs that reform strategies sensitive to emergent
possibilities are catching on. Pending state-level reform plans, as well as
proposals developed during the last presidential campaign, are open ended
in their approaches to the health system’s future design. In contrast to
President Clinton’s failed plan, which scripted the workings of the system
it envisioned in great detail, this new generation of reform ideas leaves
central questions unresolved. The principal Democratic presidential
candidates’ plans built on employment-based coverage but opened the way
to multiple evolutionary possibilities; these ranged from purchase of private
insurance by individuals to single-payer coverage. Republican proposals
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foreclosed the single-payer option but, like Democrats’, deferred to markets
to decide between employment-based and individually acquired insurance.
Both Democrats and Republicans also left space for states to seize the
initiative by enacting their own reform schemes.
The emergent systems perspective makes sense of the seeming chaos
that besets American health law and policy. It invites health reformers to
develop pragmatic agendas for change by looking for evolutionary
possibilities immanent in current law, institutions, politics, and culture. I
have pointed to some of these possibilities and proposed legal and policy
changes to exploit them. It is my hope that this Article will inspire other
efforts to do so. Health law’s fragmentation and incoherence are large
obstacles to urgently needed change. But they reflect the ongoing collision
of values and interests that shape the health sphere’s legal governance.
Whether we can avert health care’s threat to our nation’s solvency while
extending twenty-first century medicine’s benefits equitably, to all, will
turn on our ability to seize the opportunities this collision engenders.
The potential of emergent systems thinking as a way to understand
fragmented schemes of legal governance is relevant beyond the health
realm. Increasingly, governance problems—within and beyond America’s
borders—cut across many areas of legal and regulatory authority.
Disconnected decisionmakers in both the public and private domains shape
policy concerning cyberspace, capital flows, and the built and natural
environment. Prescriptions for new, hierarchical institutions to meet policy
challenges in these areas are, more often than not, political nonstarters.
They threaten powerful interests, and they infringe on fiercely guarded
realms of authority. Proliferation of hierarchical mechanisms, moreover,
would create new coordination problems, since inevitably, large issues will
arise that cut across their domains. Efforts to understand fragmented
governance in terms of self-organizing networks of decisionmakers have
potential to guide law and policy in diverse fields. Adept use of emergent
strategies to cope with our worsening crises of health care access and cost
could become a model for the governance of other endeavors that sprawl
across doctrinal and jurisdictional realms.

